Insecuring Iraq.

• Author: Byman, Daniel
• Position: Restoring security

WHEN Saddam's regime collapsed last year, security for Iraqis collapsed with it. Saddam's brutal rule may have offered Iraqis few benefits-but crime was low and civil strife was largely contained.

In the chaos after the collapse, violent crime soared. Foreign jihadists slipped unimpeded across unsecured borders and Iraqi insurgents began attacking not only coalition forces but ordinary Iraqis as well. One year after the liberation of Iraq, the situation remains abysmal. Iraqis still fear to walk the streets, and in April 2004, the simmering insurgency boiled over, producing the bloodiest month yet for coalition forces.

Security is essential for Iraq's political and economic reconstruction. Without it, Iraqis may look to warlords or thugs who can offer security even at the price of good governance. Democracy cannot take root if voters are afraid to go to the polls or if citizens believe they cannot trust "strangers" from other tribes or communal groups to protect them. Compounding the problem, few investors want to risk their money in a country torn by violence. The "normalcy" most Iraqis long for is still lacking.

Coalition troops cannot depart Iraq in any great numbers, however, until they can hand off their mission to Iraqis. But Iraqi forces are poorly trained, demoralized and penetrated by the insurgents. Not surprisingly, they have added little to Iraq's security and may have made things worse, as President Bush himself noted in April 2004.

Yet success carries its own perils. Creating a competent Iraqi security force increases the risk of a coup d'etat down the road, particularly if Iraq's post-Saddam government is weak, venal and inept. Building up Iraq's security while guarding against a coup requires a delicate dance. It demands money, time and a substantial U.S. commitment--all of which may be lacking.

Security Forces Problems

IRAQ HAS FIVE major security forces: the Iraqi Police Service, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), the army, the border patrol and the Facilities Protection Services. On paper, recruiting Iraqis has not been a problem. The Pentagon reports that almost 80,000 police officers have been hired, along with approximately 25,000 for the ICDC, while another 93,000 or so have signed on to the Facility Protection Service, the army and the border patrol. Because Iraq's economy is in disarray, working for the security sources is one of the few sources of a regular paycheck.

These forces, however, are poorly equipped. After the war's end, Baghdad police officers reportedly stole cars so that they could have something in which to patrol: in today's Iraq, crime prevention begins sometimes with a criminal act. Today, some Iraqi forces still lack uniforms and communications gear...