Influence of external authorities on collaborative frictions

• Published date: 01 May 2023
• Author: Chenlin Zhao,XiaoHu Wang,Peter T. Y. Cheung,Jingyuan Xu
• Date: 01 May 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13616

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Influence of external authorities on collaborative frictions

Chenlin Zhao

1

|XiaoHu Wang

2

|Peter T. Y. Cheung

3

|Jingyuan Xu

4

1

Hong Kong Economic and Policy Research

Division, Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited,

Hong Kong, China

2

Department of Public and International Affairs,

City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

3

Department of Social Sciences, Education

University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

4

Institute for Global Public Policy, LSE-Fudan

Research Centre for Global Public Policy, Fudan

University, Shanghai, China

Correspondence

Jingyuan Xu, Institute for Global Public Policy,

LSE-Fudan Research Centre for Global Public

Policy, Fudan University, 220 Handan Road,

Shanghai, 200433, China.

Email: xujingyuan@fudan.edu.cn

Abstract

When institutional frictions threaten to disrupt collaborations, an external authority

can be brought in to resolve disputes. How effective is such external imposition? What

are the institutional circumstances in which it works? Framed by the collaborative

governance regime (CGR), which sees established procedures and institutions as a

critical collaborative capacity, this research employs a unique concept—collaborative

friction—to explore the role of external imposition in collaboration among entities

with significant institutional differences. We examined 965 recorded collaborative

frictions from four large collaborative infrastructure projects between governments

in Hong Kong and mainland China. Our finding suggests a significant, but limited,

effect of the central government’s imposition on collaborative frictions. We also find

a significant role of sociopolitical circumstances in collaboration. Based on the find-

ings, we make several theoretical propositions articulating external imposition’srole

in collaboration.

Evidence for practice

•A large number of collaborative frictions can occur when collaborating institu-

tions with different governing procedures and institutions interact.

•The engagement of an external authority may improve collaboration through

reducing collaborative frictions in short term.

•External imposition may not necessarily improve collaboration in long term.

•Controversial political issues could increase the difficulty for collaboration

through creating or augmenting frictions in collaborating institutions.

•Controversial political issues could also make the external authority’s engage-

ment in collaboration difficult to achieve expected outcomes.

INTRODUCTION

Many joint projects are undertaken between Hong

Kong and local governments in mainland China, in

which collaborative actions are designed to tackle

various policy and service delivery issues. Institutional

differences between quasi-democratic Hong Kong and

authoritarian mainland China have often created fric-

tions in these collaborative projects, and in some cases,

the central government in Beijing has been brought in

to resolve disputes, either with a one-off leadership

directive or through long-term engagement.

The implementation of the “one country, two systems”

(1C2S) principle in Hong Kong thus provides a rare opportu-

nity to examine how a central authority influences collabora-

tion between institutions with very different institutional

settings. Indeed, 1C2S’s implementation involves partners

with (a) significant institutional differences (“two systems”)

and (b) elements of imposed collaborative authority from

the central government (“one country”). This study seeks to

exploit this unique opportunity to answer the following

research questions: Given significant institutional differences

between collaborating partners,does external imposition

impact collaboration,and if so,how and under what circum-

stancesdoesthisinfluencework?

In answering these questions, there is little evidence

to draw upon worldwide. This may be because in the

Western context (which is the focus of most collabora-

tive action literature), collaborators mainly consist of

liberal democracies that feature separation of powers,

and central authority is less likely to become involved in

local collaborations. Evidence is therefore needed from

the contexts like China, where central authorities are

more likely to engage to influence collaboration.

Received: 20 July 2021Revised: 31 January 2023Accepted: 31 January 2023

DOI: 10.1111/puar.13616

Public Admin Rev. 2023;83:603–622. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/puar © 2023 American Society for Public Administration.603

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TOPIC

A classic problem in the collaborative governance litera-

ture concerns how collaborators work out differences

caused by the diverse institutional arrangements that

pose serious obstacles to collaboration. Mismatched poli-

cies or delayed action by one partner can seriously affect

the others’collaborative actions and motives. Collabora-

tion risk rises due to higher transaction costs in informa-

tion flow and coordinated activities caused by structural

variations in different decision designs (Bel et al., 2021;

Noda, 2023; Wang et al., 2016).

The literature gives a broad description of these institu-

tional factors, calling for the integrated procedural and

institutional arrangements “necessary to manage repeated

interactions over time”in collaboration (Emerson et al.,

2012, 15; Wei et al., 2022), but is largely silent on how to

achieve it. Regarding this, the institutional collective action

literature makes broad references to the role of external

imposition, asserting that a central authority could help

manage the level of transaction costs for participants and

result in reduced collaborative risks in coordination, divi-

sion, and defection issues (Andrews et al., 2021;Angst

et al., 2022;Feiock,2013). However, thus far, the literature

provides neither empirical evidence for this assertion nor

explanation for how this impact is realized. It also does not

consider potential increases in transaction costs arising

from such impositions.

By analyzing imposition’s role and influence on collabo-

rative actions, we take the literature in a more nuanced

direction, from macro-level descriptions to the deeper inter-

active dynamics of collective actions. Moreover, with a

unique unit of analysis—collaborative friction—our research

provides an empirically observable basis for evidence-based

policy recommendations on engaging external authority to

achieve desirable collaborative outcomes.

Given this research’s limitations in scope (a specific

region in China) and method (in-depth case analysis), we

designed it as an exploratory study gathering evidence of

collaborative complexities and intricacies. We aimed to

generate enough insight and evidence to form a sound

basis for future hypothesis testing with large samples.

COLLABORATIVE FRICTIONS

Collaborative frictions occur when interacting partners

meet with resisting forces. Frictions may stem from dis-

putes among collaborating individuals or institutions,

but are not limited to disputes or conflicts (Bryson

et al., 2006,2015). Frictions may be caused by contrac-

tual disagreements uncovered long ago but only

recently affecting collaboration. They can arise in any

collaboration phase and carry various consequences.

Though frictions can lead to innovation and new

knowledge, eventually enhancing collaborative capac-

ity (Weber & Khademian, 2008), many disputes that

start with differences in institutional structure, policy

intent, or leadership personalities become dysfunctional

as debates reach real obstacles to collaborative actions

(MacKillop & Downe, 2022;Wal,2020).

Frictions can occur at the individual or institutional

level. Here, we focus on frictions caused by differences

between collaborating institutional arrangements. In the

collaborative governance regime (CGR) model (Emerson

et al., 2012; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015), these factors are

known as procedural and institutional design factors

(PIDs), which are needed to maintain collaborative capac-

ity; their absence or inadequacy would deter collaborative

actions (Morse, 2011). Though PIDs are considered as col-

laborators’internal collaborative or institutional arrange-

ments, PIDs-induced frictions are susceptible to

collaborative contextual influence, which is the system

context as defined in the CGR (see further illustration of

contextual factors in Figure 1). Our study setting of salient

institutional differences provides an excellent opportunity

for empirical observation of PIDs-induced frictions and

their institutional remedies.

PIDs are the protocols and organizational structures

necessary to ensure collaborative interactions between

collaborative partners (Emerson et al., 2012;Emerson&

Nabatchi, 2015). This research classifies PIDs into two

dimensions: procedures or institutional designs. Proce-

dures are formal documents of laws and executive ordi-

nances, contractual agreements, and operation and

management regulations. Laws, rules, and executive

ordinances are created by governments to regulate the

behaviors of participants in decision-making and imple-

mentation. Contractual agreements legitimize partner-

ships by clarifying the duties and obligations of each

partner and outlining processes of consensus formation

and action implementation. Operational and manage-

rial regulations are made by collaborators to ensure

all procedures are fully enacted. Collaborative frictions

can stem from different interpretations of procedural

documents.

Institutional design concerns the interactive natureof

institutional players (executive, judicial, legislative, and

civil stakeholders) and their roles in collaborative net-

works. This dimension of PIDsreflects the dynamics of

institutional players in collaboration and the need for

accountability. In political systems of institutional stake-

holders with self-serving interests, collaboration is influ-

enced by stakeholders’duties and interests; for example,

by exercising their powers,legislatures may join and

impact collaborative decision-making processes. Engage-

ment between the executing agencies directly involved

in collaboration and those less involved requires institu-

tional arrangements. Frictions can happen if such

engagement deteriorates oris absent. Table 1defines

the collaborative frictions caused by PIDs; examplesare

largely drawn from collaborative practices in Hong Kong

where high-level governmentinformation transparency

makes possible the observation of friction.

604 INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL AUTHORITIES ON COLLABORATIVE FRICTIONS