Inequality, Self-Interest, and Public Support for “Robin Hood” Tax Policies

• Author: William Franko,Caroline J. Tolbert,Christopher Witko
• Published date: 01 December 2013
• Date: 01 December 2013
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1065912913485441
• Subject Matter: Articles

Political Research Quarterly

66(4) 923 –937

© 2013 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912913485441

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Article

Introduction

During the last few decades, income inequality has sky-

rocketed. Influential economic models predict that under

such conditions, out of self-interest, the public (especially

the lower income) will demand and the government will

provide more redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981),

requiring higher taxes on the wealthy. In contrast, a long

stream of political science research suggests that broader

attitudes and values are often a more important determi-

nant of policy preferences (Sears et al. 1980), leading to

the expectation that views toward growing inequality

should determine redistributive policy preferences. But

existing research questions whether the public is capable

of tying its own economic self-interest or broad attitudes

toward inequality and taxation to views on specific tax

policy proposals (Bartels 2005; Roberts, Hite, and

Bradley 1994). Most research, however, has focused on

abstract attitudes toward tax policy or the determinants of

public support for specific tax cuts, simply because pro-

posals to increase taxes on the wealthy have been so rare

in America in recent years. In this article, we take advan-

tage of one of the rare proposals to raise taxes on the

wealthy, Washington State’s Proposition 1098, to exam-

ine how self-interest, attitudes toward inequality, and par-

tisanship influence support for “Robin Hood” tax policies.

We find that in this context, where the costs and benefits

of the policy were made very clear in the structure of the

policy and elite debates, voters are able to link their eco-

nomic self-interest to congruent policy preferences, and

that this relationship did not require a high level of

attention to the debate. We also find that broader attitudes

toward inequality and partisanship shape support for

1098.

The question of what determines public support for

progressive tax increases and redistribution in an increas-

ingly unequal era is critically important. The dramatic

increase in economic inequality is one of the most strik-

ing developments in America in recent years, and

researchers have convincingly demonstrated that govern-

ment policies help create or exacerbate economic inequal-

ities (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Kelly 2009). A small

proportion of the population that has received large tax

cuts has done very well economically while most of the

country struggles. As governments at all levels face

increasing fiscal pressure, raising taxes on the rich will

become an increasingly salient issue. Indeed, this issue is

ultimately at the heart of party conflict in America.

Republican 2012 presidential candidate, Mitt Romney,

campaigned on more tax cuts for the wealthy, while

Democrat Obama argued for tax rates on the high income

to return to Clinton-era levels. In the abstract, the public

seems to agree with Obama that the wealthy should pay

higher taxes (McCall and Kenworthy 2009), and in

485441PRQXXX10.1177/1065912913485441Political Research QuarterlyFranko et al.

research-article2013

1Auburn University, AL, USA

2The University of Iowa, Iowa City, USA

3University of South Carolina, USA

Corresponding Author:

Christopher Witko, Department of Political Science, University of

South Carolina, 817 Henderson Street, Columbia, SC 29208, USA.

Email: WitkoC@mailbox.sc.edu

Inequality, Self-Interest, and Public

Support for “Robin Hood” Tax Policies

William Franko1, Caroline J. Tolbert2, and Christopher Witko3

Abstract

Influential economic models predict that as inequality increases, the public will demand greater redistribution. However,

there is limited research into the determinants of support for redistributive tax increases because such proposals have

been so rare in America in recent decades. We use Washington State’s Proposition 1098 to examine how economic

self-interest, concerns about inequality, and partisanship influence support for redistributive taxation. The results

show that all of these factors influenced support, with strong support among the lower income, indicating that when

the distributional implications of policies are clear, citizens can translate their self-interest and broad attitudes into

congruent redistributive preferences.

Keywords

inequality, redistribution, public opinion, taxation