Industrial organization.

The NBER's Program on Industrial Organization, directed by Nancy L. Rose of MIT, met at the NBER's California office on February 5-6. Glenn Ellison, NBER and MIT, organized the meeting at which the following papers were presented:

Otto Toivanen, Helsinki School of Economics, and Michael Waterson, University of Warwick, "Market Structure and Entry: Where's the Beef?"

Discussant: Francine Lafontaine, NBER and University of Michigan

Glenn Ellison, and Sara Fisher Ellison, MIT, "Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration"

Discussant: Judith A. Chevalier, NBER and University of Chicago

Martin Pesendorfer, NBER and Yale University, "Horizontal Mergers in the Paper Industry" (NBER Working Paper No. 6751)

Discussant: Wallace Mullin, NBER and Michigan State University

Ken Hendricks and Joris Pinkse, University of British Columbia; and Robert H. Porter, NBER and Northwestern University, "Structural Estimation in First-Price, Symmetric, Common-Value Auctions"

Discussant: Susan Athey; MIT

John List, University of Central Florida, and David Lucking-Reiley, Vanderbilt University, "Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit

Auctions: Evidence from a Sports Card Field Experiment"

Discussant: Robert Wilson, Stanford University

Daniel Ackerberg and Maristella Botticini, Boston University, "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form"

Discussant: Michael D. Whinston, NBER and Northwestern University

Amil Petrin, University of Chicago, "Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan" Discussant: Aviv Nevo, NBER and University of California, Berkeley

Toivanen and Waterson study the effects of market structure on entry using data from the fast-food (counter-service burger) industry in the United Kingdom from 1991 to 1995. During this period, the market was a duopoly. The authors find that the firms' entry decisions were not endogenous to one another; that market structure matters greatly; that each firm is more likely to enter markets where it is not present but its rival is, rather than where neither firm is present; and that firms are affected differently by demand and cost variables. They conclude that the level of market competition cannot be very high.

Ellison and Ellison examine the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents in the period just before they lose patent protection. The authors' data contain advertising, product proliferation, and pricing information for drugs...