City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: the constitutionality of drug interdiction checkpoints.

• Author: Mulligan, Ann
• Position: Supreme Court Review

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2001).

1. INTRODUCTION

   In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, (1) the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a drug interdiction program operated in Indianapolis. The Supreme Court held that the drug interdiction checkpoints were unconstitutional violations of the Fourth Amendment because the primary purpose of the checkpoints was general crime control.

   This Note argues that the decision in Edmond was incorrect. The previous roadblock cases of United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (2) and Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (3) clearly established that roadblocks in certain situations are constitutional, and the roadblocks at issue in Indianapolis were not sufficiently distinguishable to warrant a contrary outcome. Had the Court followed the principles it set forth in earlier roadblock cases, it would have been forced to uphold the drug interdiction checkpoints as constitutional. Instead, the majority of the Court created an arbitrary distinction that has no basis in prior case law or in the wording of the Fourth Amendment. As a result, current roadblock case law has become confusing and illogical--the Court solved nothing and despite its attempt to preserve individual liberties under the Fourth Amendment, the Court failed. States can easily circumvent the Court's decision and establish roadblocks identical to the roadblocks struck down in Edmond simply by taking care to articulate a primary purpose that the Court has deemed acceptable. As a result, the Court's promise to protect Fourth Amendment rights is hollow and illusory. Increased litigation and uncertainty about the types of roadblocks that are constitutional will likely result.

2. BACKGROUND

   1. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

      The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." (4) The Supreme Court has generally held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures requires a finding of individualized suspicion or probable cause. (5) However, over the years, the Court has carved out several exceptions to this general rule, and currently there are several limited situations where a search or seizure can be reasonable under the Court's Fourth Amendment case law even absent such individualized suspicion. These exceptions can be grouped into two categories--the "special needs doctrine," where the States pursue significant interests exceeding normal need for law enforcement, (6) and administrative searches, where there is frequently no individualized suspicion but the scope of the intrusion is correspondingly limited. (7)

      In Brown v. Texas, the Supreme Court addressed the reasonableness of seizures under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of individualized suspicion. (8) In that case, two police officers cruising in a patrol car in a high-crime area of El Paso observed defendant Brown and another man in an alley. (9) The officers did not suspect any misconduct, but asked Brown to identify himself because he "looked suspicious." (10) Brown refused, so the officers arrested him. He was prosecuted for violation of a Texas statute requiring individuals to identify themselves to the police when asked. (11) The Supreme Court held that the officers violated Brown's Fourth Amendment rights "because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe that [he] was engaged in or had engaged in criminal conduct." (12)

      In addition, the Brown Court set forth certain principles regarding searches or seizures conducted despite the lack of individualized suspicion. (13) Such seizures, the Court argued, are not precluded by the Fourth Amendment, but must be limited. (14) First, the "reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest ... depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." (15) Factors to be considered in evaluating this balance include "the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." (16) The Court argued that the central concern in this analysis is that individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy are not subject to arbitrary invasions. (17) To that end, the Court maintained, "[t]he Fourth Amendment requires ... that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." (18)

   2. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ROADBLOCKS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

      The Supreme Court first addressed standardized roadblock programs in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, (19) where the Court reviewed criminal prosecutions resulting from the operation of border patrol checkpoints near the border between the United States and Mexico. (20) The roadblocks consisted of fixed border patrol stations marked with clear signage on principal highways near the Mexican border, and their purpose was to curb the importation of illegal aliens into the United States from Mexico. (21) At the checkpoints, approaching motorists slowed to allow "point" agents to visually screen each vehicle--"most motorists [were] allowed to resume their progress without any oral inquiry or close visual examination," and only if the "point" agent concluded that further inquiry was necessary would the vehicle be detained for a longer duration. (22) This checkpoint purpose and its procedure were upheld as constitutional, primarily because of the substantial federal interest in curbing the flow of illegal aliens and the minimal intrusion the checkpoint imposed on passing motorists. (23)

      In evaluating the border checkpoints, the Court weighed individual Fourth Amendment interests and the public interests served by the checkpoint program. (24) The Court argued that the checkpoints were designed to further an important and substantial public interest (limiting the flow of illegal aliens into the United States), and the intrusion upon individuals' Fourth Amendment rights was limited (the stops were brief in duration and limited in scope). (25) The Court recognized that motorists knew or could determine in advance the location of these fixed border checkpoints. (26) In addition, the officers conducting the checkpoints were not vested with limitless discretion; rather, they were operating under strict guidelines in a regularized manner and thus less able to engage in abusive, discriminatory, or harassing stops. (27) These factors led the Court to conclude that the roadblocks should be upheld. (28)

      Shortly thereafter, the Court revisited the issue of detaining motorists in Delaware v. Prouse. (29) In that case, however, the Court was not evaluating a checkpoint program. Rather, the Court reviewed the detention of a single motorist driving on a public highway in Delaware and sought to determine whether the stop of the motorist was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (30) Finding that the officer lacked any reasonable or articulable suspicion that the motorist he detained was unlicensed or lacked vehicle registration, the Court held that the stop at issue was unreasonable. (31) To reach this conclusion, the Court applied a balancing test, maintaining that "the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." (32) The Court indicated that this analysis should be conducted in light of an objective standard such as probable cause. (33)

      The Court recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that motorists are properly licensed and vehicles on the roadway are properly registered. (34) However, the Court argued that discretionary spot checks, such as those conducted in Delaware, did not contribute substantially to highway safety and therefore were not justifiable intrusions under the Fourth Amendment. (35) Such a program of random and discretionary stops, the Court concluded, would result in discovery of only an insignificant number of violators and was thus too ineffective to qualify as a valid law enforcement practice under the Fourth Amendment. (36) In addition, the Court warned that a program approving wide officer discretion in determining who should be detained was likely to result in grave abuses of discretion. (37) The Court indicated, however, that its holding did not "preclude the State of Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." (38) The Court implied that a roadblock established for the purpose of verifying licenses and registration would be upheld as constitutional. (39)

      The Court addressed the constitutionality of another kind of roadblock--sobriety checkpoints--in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz. (40) The purpose of the roadblocks was to detect and eradicate drunk driving. (41) According to the program guidelines, all vehicles on the roadway would be briefly detained and motorists examined for signs of intoxication; if an officer believed a motorist was intoxicated, the motorist would be detained for further sobriety testing and for verification of license and registration. (42) The average duration of a stop was twenty-five seconds. (43) Because of the substantial governmental interest in roadway safety and the minimal intrusion the checkpoints posed on passing motorists, the Court upheld the sobriety checkpoints as constitutional. (44) The Court argued that the Brown v. Texas balancing test should be applied in roadblock cases. (45)...