Incumbent Contributions to the Congressional Campaign Committees, 1990-2000

• Author: Bruce A. Larson
• Published date: 01 March 2004
• DOI: 10.1177/106591290405700113
• Date: 01 March 2004
• Subject Matter: Articles

The individual reelection interests of House incum-

bents have been known to clash with the collective

electoral interests of the congressional parties. Ana-

lyzing the 1982 elections, Jacobson (1985-1986) observed

that Democratic incumbents hoarded their excess campaign

funds and ignored the Democratic Congressional Campaign

Committee’s (DCCC) appeals to assist the party’s strapped

challengers—preventing the party from capitalizing on

favorable national partisan trends. Since then, much has

changed. In the early 1990s, both House congressional

campaign committees developed programs to encourage

financial support from incumbents (Kenworthy 1991;

Babson and Donovan 1994; Gimpel 1996). The programs

have been quite successful. During the 1999-2000 cycle, for

example, the National Republican Congressional Commit-

tee (NRCC) collected nearly $15 million in hard dollars

from House GOP incumbents, and House Democrats con-

tributed more than $11 million to the DCCC.

Although a few scholars have briefly called attention to

incumbent financial support for the party campaign com-

mittees (Bibby 1999; Herrnson 1997; Sorauf 1992), this

paper conducts the first comprehensive exploration of this

activity. After briefly reviewing the federal regulations that

govern member contributions to the campaign committees,

I present data for the 1989-1990 through 1999-2000 elec-

tion cycles that illustrate the steep rise in these contribu-

tions. I then test several hypotheses about the determinants

of incumbent contributions to the parties in light of the ten-

sions described by Jacobson (1985-1986).

MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL

CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES:REGULATIONS AND DATA

House members have several ways of making campaign

contributions to the congressional campaign committees.

First, members may transfer funds to the campaign com-

mittees through their reelection accounts. Second, members

may distribute campaign support to the party committees

through a “leadership” PAC. Finally, like any legal U.S. resi-

dent, members may make contributions to the parties from

their own personal funds. This study limits itself to contri-

butions from members’ reelection committees and leader-

ship PACs.

In contrast to regulations governing member contribu-

tions to other candidates (Wilcox 1989), federal campaign

finance regulations allow members to contribute more to

the parties through a reelection account than through a

leadership PAC. As with all PACs participating in federal

elections, leadership PACs may legally contribute $15,000

per calendar year to any national party committee. In con-

trast, Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations

permit a federal candidate’s reelection committee to transfer

unlimited amounts of unobligated hard money to any

national party committee (11 CFR 113.2). In the most

recent election cycles, numerous House incumbents have

taken advantage of this rule and transferred six-figure sums

to the congressional campaign committees.

As Table 1 shows, incumbent contributions to the con-

gressional campaign committees have increased markedly

during the past four election cycles. The increase in contri-

butions made by House Republicans to the NRCC has been

nothing short of dramatic: whereas only two House Repub-

licans contributed a total of $10,000 to the NRCC during

the 1991-1992 election cycle, 190 House Republicans con-

tributed nearly $15 million to the party campaign coffers

during the 1999-2000 cycle. Following a slight drop off

during the 1993-94 cycle, contributions from House

Democrats to the DCCC have increased substantially as

well, with an especially sharp increase in the 1999-2000

election cycle.

In general, the increase in aggregate incumbent contri-

butions to the party campaign committees over the six elec-

tion cycles reflects two factors: (1) that more members are

contributing to the campaign committees, both in absolute

terms and as a percentage of each party’s total number of

incumbents, and (2) that members are giving, on average,

larger contributions to the committees. Finally, the last

155

Incumbent Contributions to the

Congressional Campaign Committees, 1990-2000

BRUCE A. LARSON, FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY

House incumbents now regularly transfer significant sums of campaign money from their reelection accounts

to the party campaign committees. This article conducts the first comprehensive exploration of this activity.

After briefly reviewing the federal regulations that govern member contributions to the campaign committees,

I present data for the 1989-1990 through 1999-2000 election cycles that illustrate the steep rise in these con-

tributions. I then test several hypotheses about members’ willingness to support their parties financially in light

of the electoral conflict between incumbents and parties described by Jacobson (1985-1986). I find that a

member’s leadership status in the House and ability to raise “surplus” campaign dollars are the two most con-

sistent determinants of his or her financial support for the party campaign committees.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 1 (March 2004): pp. 155-161