Incumbent-Aligned Terrorism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from Argentina’s 1973 Elections

• Author: Pearce Edwards,Patrick Pierson
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221121141
• Published date: 01 April 2023
• Date: 01 April 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution

2023, Vol. 67(4) 672–700

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00220027221121141

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Incumbent-Aligned Terrorism

and Voting Behavior: Evidence

from Argentina’s

1973 Elections

Pearce Edwards

1

and Patrick Pierson

2



Abstract

What is the relationship between domestic terrorism and voting behavior? Past re-

search notes the prevalence of domestic terrorist attacks in democratic regimes, but

focuses primarily on such violence as a “weapon of the weak.”We extend this lit-

erature by focusing on terrorism by incumbent-aligned armed groups and argue these

actors use selective violence against political elites to delegitimize the political op-

position and provide credible signals of the instability and unrest that is likely to ac-

company a transfer of power. Using data from two Argentine presidential elections in

1973, we evaluate the relationship between incidents of violence and changes in two

measures of voting behavior—vote share and turnout. Consistent with expectations,

left-wing political violence between elections reduced right-wing vote share but did not

reduce turnout. Additional tests support the mechanism that violence increased

voters’doubts about a potential right-wing government’s ability to govern, and show

violence is correlated with future repression.

Keywords

democratization, terrorism, conf‌lict, democratic institutions

1

Institute for Politics and Strategy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

2

Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Pearce Edwards, Institute for Politics and Strategy, Carnegie Mellon University, Posner Hall 386, 5000 Forbes

Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA.

Email: pearcee@andrew.cmu.edu

Introduction

Terrorist violence regularly mars electoral politics in democratic regimes.

1

Political

actors use violence strategically, often around elections (Aksoy 2014,Aksoy and Carter

2014,Newman 2013), to pressure incumbents into meeting group demands (Pape

2003) or to undermine the legitimacy of other actors (Condra et al. 2018). To evaluate

whether terrorist violence achieves these objectives, we must understand how it in-

f‌luences those who pressure incumbents and confer legitimacy on democratic gov-

ernments: voters. Existing research on terrorism’s effect on voting generally shares a

theoretical framework: terrorist actors operate outside the political system and use

violence to undermine voters’support for the incumbent or their policies (Chenoweth

2010,Youngand Dugan 2011). In other words, terrorism is a “weapon of the weak”and

emerges when democratic institutions neglect or repress the civil liberties and political

rights of marginalized groups (Bloom 2005,Crenshaw 1981). With limited non-violent

avenues for seeking political redress, violence becomes an attractive option for

achieving these groups’objectives (Findley and Young 2011,Ghatak 2016,Ghatak,

Gold and Prins 2019,Piazza 2011,2012,Young and Dugan 2011).

In some instances, however, terrorist violence is perpetrated by actors connected

to—or targeting common opponents of—the incumbent (Davenport 2007,Heger 2015,

Henne, Saiya and Hand 2020,Staniland 2015a,2015b). Less a weapon of the weak, in

these cases terrorist violence is a tactic wielded by the politically advantaged to secure a

preferred electoral outcome (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos 2013). Recognizing this,

a growing body of research examines the relationship between political actors par-

ticipating in democratic institutions and the armed groups aligned with them (Daly

2021,Matanock 2016,Matanock and Staniland 2018). We build upon this work to

examine the electoral effects of such incumbent-aligned terrorist violence—that is,

contexts in which terrorist violence is perpetrated by non-state armed groups who

support the incumbent government.

We argue that violence by incumbent-aligned groups casts doubt on the opposition’s

ability to provide security by selectively targeting opposition elites and symbols—

prominent sites frequented by its elites like headquarters, training facilities, or mon-

uments. These attacks signal the opposition’s inability to protect even its most high-

prof‌ile backers, heightening expectations about the social and political instability likely

to accompany any transfer of power. A signal of the opposition’s weakness in the face

of violence persuades voters that the target is less capable of providing stable and

legitimate governance if it were to win elections (Daly 2019,Wantchekon 1999).

Furthermore, we argue that selective violence by incumbent-aligned groups neither

intimidates voters nor provokes backlash from the civilian population against the

incumbent. Anticipating the need for responsible governance in the post-election

period, incumbent-aligned groups have incentives to minimize harm inf‌licted on or-

dinary citizens. Violence that targets them may backf‌ire and reduce the incumbent’s

support (Pearlman 2018). By focusing on elite targets, incumbent-aligned actors

“[transmit] political messages through violence of a spectacular and symbolic, yet

Edwards and Pierson 673