Incorporating legal claims.

• Author: Steinitz, Maya
• Position: Commercial litigation funding governance - Introduction through II. Claim Incorporation and Litigation Governance: Winstar, Information Resources, Crystallex, and TRECA A. Loose and Strict Incorporation to Reduce Hidden Costs: The Winstar Savings & Loans Litigations and Information Resources 2. Loose Incorporation by Golden State: Litigation ...

ABSTRACT

Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in commercial litigation funding. Whereas the judicial, legislative, and scholarly treatment of litigation finance has regarded litigation finance first and foremost as a form of champerty and sought to regulate it through rules of legal professional responsibility (hereinafter, the "legal ethics paradigm"), this Article suggests that the problems created by litigation finance are all facets of the classic problems created by "the separation of ownership and control" that have been a focus of business law since the advent of the corporate form. Therefore, an "incorporation paradigm, " offered here, is more appropriate. "Incorporating legal claims" means conceiving of the claim as an asset with an existence wholly separate from the plaintiff. This can be done by issuing securities tied to litigation proceed rights. Such securities can be issued with or without the use of various business entities. The incorporation paradigm also opens up the possibility of applying practices of corporate governance to litigation governance.

Indeed, in certain previously overlooked real-world deals, creative lawyers used securities tied to litigation proceed rights as well as corporate governance mechanisms. This Article analyzes and then expands upon such instances of financial-legal innovation, suggesting how various business entities can be used to deal with the core challenges presented by the separation of ownership of and control over legal claims: specifically, the problems of (1) extreme agency problems; (2) extreme information asymmetries; (3) extreme uncertainty; and (4) commodification.

In addition, this Article discusses how incorporation of legal claims can reduce various costs that litigation imposes in other transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions.

INTRODUCTION A. The Legal Ethics Paradigm and Its Limitations B. Incorporation of Legal Claims I. LITIGATION FINANCE AS A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE AND THE INHIBITION OF LIQUIDITY IN LEGAL CLAIMS A. The Rise of Litigation Finance and the Liquidity in Legal Claims B. The Concerns Raised by Litigation Finance II. CLAIM INCORPORATION AND LITIGATION GOVERNANCE: WINSTAR, INFORMATION RESOURCES, CRYSTALLEX, AND TRECA A. Loose and Strict Incorporation to Reduce Hidden Costs: The Winstar Savings & Loans Litigations and Information Resources 1. Loose Incorporation in the Cal Fed Litigation: Participation Right Certificates 2. Loose Incorporation by Golden State: Litigation Tracking Warrants 3. Loose Incorporation in the Dime/Anchor Savings Litigation: Litigation Tracking Warrants 4. Strict Incorporation in the Coast Savings Litigation: Trust Certificates 5. Strict Incorporation in the Information Resources Antitrust Litigation: Contingent Value Rights B. Inadvertent Incorporation: Crystallex C. The Treca Litigation Financing: Litigation Proceeds Trust III. THE INCORPORATION PARADIGM: USING LEGAL ENTITIES TO ELIMINATE THE HIDDEN COSTS AND GOVERN LITIGATION A. The Problems Solved and the Problems Created in the Real world Examples 1. Corporate Deal-making and Corporate Finance a. Reducing the Hidden Costs of Litigation in Certain Mergers, Acquisitions, and Large Equity Investments b. Monetizing Claims that Currently Go Unremedied and Litigation Finance as Corporate Finance 2. Litigation Finance a. Control and Conflicts of Interests b. Information Asymmetry and the Attorney Client Privilege. c. Uncertainty, Pricing, and Transparency. d. Commodification. e. Transaction Costs f. Investor Protection. B. Trusts and Beyond: Using Various Legal Entities for Financed or Spun-off Claims 1. Statutory Trusts 2. Partnerships 3. Corporations. 4. Limited Liability Companies CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION

The law and economics movement has revolutionized our understanding of law by placing economic cost-benefit analysis at its center. One of the achievements of this movement, for better or worse, has been the conceptual commodification of legal claims. Currently, we are witnessing one of the most breathtaking consequences of this turn in the history of legal ideas: the rise of markets in legal claims, a phenomenon also known as "litigation finance." Legal claims are being commoditized in the literal sense of the word: they are being traded like other assets.

In recent years, legal scholars, regulators, and the media have focused intensely on the visible segment of this new market: new investment firms, such as Burford and Juridica, that invest in litigation by making capital contributions covering litigation costs in return for a share of the litigation proceeds, should any be awarded (private equity litigation funding or PELF). Indeed, it was the historically unprecedented going-public of Juridica and Burford (1) that launched the media frenzy, (2) academic interest, (3) and nationwide regulatory wave that has washed over the United States in recent years, (4) even though the trade in legal claims in the United States has been ongoing for more than two decades.

Unfortunately, because of path dependence, the academic and regulatory analysis has been trapped in what I call a "legal ethics paradigm": the view that litigation finance, where legal, is an extension of the contingency fee exception to the champerty doctrine (below) and the consequent regulation of litigation finance via the champerty doctrine and the rules of lawyers' professional responsibility. This Article offers an alternative theoretical and regulatory paradigm: the "incorporation paradigm," according to which litigation finance should be understood as a pocket of the finance industry rather than an extension of the contingency fee. According to this new paradigm, commercial legal claims can and should be "incorporated" (as defined in Section A below) in order to minimize or even resolve the concerns that both proponents and opponents of litigation finance are seeking to solve through the ethics paradigm. These concerns (detailed below in Section B) center on conflicts of interest, information asymmetries, risk, and commodification (collectively, the Funding Challenges). Indeed, perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of reframing the debate in this way is that it helps reconceive of the Funding Challenges--which occupy in some form or another most of the scholarship and public debate surrounding litigation finance--as an instance of the familiar problem of the separation of ownership and control, a problem at the heart of corporate law. (5) The problem of the separation of ownership and control is the problem of understanding the survival--or in our case, the emergence--"of organizations in which important decision agents do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of their decisions." (6) Indeed, decision agents may even seek to line their own pockets and engage in self-dealing at the expense of the owners. Since Adam Smith first raised the problem of the separation of ownership and control in The Wealth of Nations (7) more than two centuries ago, the practice and law of business entities has made great strides in understanding and controlling the associated problems (though certainly not eliminating them altogether).

The theoretical argument for a paradigm shift rests on a description and analysis of deals--that have heretofore been overlooked by scholars--in which creative merger and acquisition (M&A) lawyers have incorporated legal claims, and argues that this practice can replace existing practices through which ownership and control of legal claims are traded, in whole or in part, in the litigation finance context.

The incorporation paradigm also calls for extending financial regulations, not the regulation of attorneys, to regulate the litigation finance industry. By better solving the Funding Challenges, the incorporation paradigm should increase both acceptance of litigation finance and liquidity of legal claims, and in turn increase access to justice.

Finally, while the argument focuses on solving problems plaguing litigation finance, incorporating legal claims has important implications in the corporate context for three reasons. First, because it reduces what I call "hidden costs," sometimes prohibitive, that litigation imposes on mergers, acquisitions, and major equity investments in certain (uncommon but important) scenarios. Second, because spinning off large litigations into Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) can create accounting benefits for corporations. And third, because simplifying and reducing the costs of litigation finance of large commercial claims by incorporating them may encourage corporations and governments to pursue claims that currently go unprosecuted.

Part I describes the rise of litigation finance, the ethical concerns it raises, the ethical constraints currently imposed upon it through the legal ethics paradigm, and the economic inefficiencies caused by the simultaneous over- and under-regulation of litigation funding under the legal ethics paradigm. Part II presents a set of deals in which corporations have used business entities (Delaware statutory trusts) and various types of securities to reduce the hidden costs of litigation and facilitate corporate transactions, as well as two deals where incorporation presented itself in the litigation finance context. After describing these complex and innovative deals, Part III generalizes from the deals how incorporation can minimize (or exacerbate if misused) the Funding Challenges. It then outlines a broader vision of how corporate entities other than statutory trusts can be used to solve both the problems of the hidden costs of litigation and facilitate efficient and ethical trade in commercial claims. This Article concludes with some remarks on further implications of the incorporation paradigm that can be explored in future works such as the idea of "litigation governance," modeled on corporate governance, and the question of the proper regulation of litigation...