In the Shadow of Peace: Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Accountability in UN Peacekeeping.

• Author: Comstock, Audrey L.

1 Introduction

In 2014, French authorities were notified about allegations that their troops sexually abused and exploited six young boys, offering food or money for sexual acts in Central African Republic. Though these allegations were later investigated by France and sent to trial, the French government was notified only because whistleblower Anders Kompass was frustrated with UN inaction. Child witnesses were interviewed, in some cases, two years after the alleged abuse, and their testimony was not deemed credible. The fourteen French soldiers on trial were not convicted, based on lack of evidence, and the victims were not provided support following the investigation and trial process. Human rights organizations assessed this as a failure of the French government and the UN for not holding the peacekeepers accountable for the abuse. (1)

Though the French case resulted in a dispiriting outcome for victims and human rights activists, the cooperation of domestic governments and the holding of trials are rare events. Most allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) that occur during UN peacekeeping missions do not lead to national government cooperation or judicial responses. Rather, most abuse allegations lead to inaction or repatriation back to the peacekeeper's home country. One point that many stakeholders within the activist community and those researching peacekeeping abuse seem to agree on is that one cannot consider UN peacekeeping in whole without considering abuse and accountability. (2) As UN peacekeeping marks its 75th anniversary, it is important to consider the relationship between accountability and peacekeeping abuse as well as ways forward to ensure all are protected as peacekeepers keep the peace.

This article begins with a brief contextual discussion of sexual abuse in conflict and a lack of historic accountability. Next, I introduce the argument that accountability has been a difficult and, at times, elusive goal. This, I argue, is based on three dimensions of the relationship between the UN and accountability for abuse--the incremental nature of change and accountability measures, the conditional nature of accountability based on troop-contributing country (TCC) reliance, and the tenuous nature of accountability measures grounded in their nonbinding nature, backsteps, and lack of enforcement. I argue that a driving force forward for accountability has come from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and media while accountability backsliding has often come from within the UN or TCCs. Next, I highlight the two case examples of abuse in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and a South Sudanese refugee camp related to UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) personnel. These cases illustrate the incremental, conditional, and tenuous dimensions of accountability in UN abuse. I conclude by praising the advances toward accountability while criticizing the dimensions holding it back.

2 Sexual Violence and Accountability

Long before the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was established in 1945, sexual abuse had been a well-documented and horrific part of conflict and military operations. During World War II, sexual abuse was recorded and perpetrated by both the Allies and Axis powers. Following the war, there was little inertia for prosecuting crimes involving sexual violence. Nazi-perpetrated sexual war crimes were not prosecuted at the Nuremberg Trials, despite Allies collecting extensive evidence of the crimes. (3) The "will to prosecute crimes of sexual violence was not strong during the Nuremberg Trial," possibly because Allies feared they would be "prosecuted for sexual violence crimes themselves." (4) Evidence points to a reluctance by the UN and other organizations in pursing prosecution. "For their part, international women's organizations gave little attention to mass rape and forced prostitution during World War II or in the new United Nations system." (5) This contrasts with the emergent energy behind the global human rights regime following the war. Seeking accountability and punishment for sexual abuse was seen as politically difficult and less important than other crimes at the time. Notably, even the later UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) did not initially include coverage of violence against women.

Prosecuting sexual violence charges remains an uphill struggle. (6) The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been criticized for its lack of attention to sexual violence cases. Tanya Altunjan, for example, notes that despite the Rome Statute covering sexual crimes, "these potentials have not been fully translated into legal practice" with "only a single, final conviction for sexual crimes" in the first twenty years of the ICC. (7) Jessica Anania argues that SEA has been overlooked in other parts of the international justice system with only two transitional justice mechanisms addressing SEA by intervening actors. She notes that "excluding SEA from transitional justice blocks pathways to justice and undermines goals of accountability and prevention." (8)

Despite the difficulty and reticence to incorporate sexual violence and SEA, more specifically, into legal accountability, sexual abuse has been well documented. SEA and sexual violence are similar; however, concerning SEA, there need not necessarily be force. As discussed in this special issue, sexual violence typically denotes forced behavior. (9) Although there can be forced behavior as part of sexual abuse, important elements of unequal or coercive conditions, differential power or trust, and vulnerability are present for the definitions of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse used by the UN Conduct in Field Unit. (10) In some situations, SEA behavior may be consensual or legal in certain circumstances; however, the coercive, exploitative aspects shape the violating behavior. This is particularly important in the peacekeeping context since peacekeepers are identified as actors in an authority position who may violate trust and exploit power dynamics.

Abuse occurred in most peacekeeping missions up to the 1990s and continues in current missions. (11) Peacekeeping has been responsive to conflict-related sexual violence, with some research finding that peacekeepers are more likely to go where this type of violence is present. (12) For most research examining the determinants of SEA, punishment and accountability have not factored into explaining future abuse patterns. This, in part, is due to a dearth of public punishment following abuse allegations. Legal scholars and activists argue for more accountability through prosecution through the ICC. However, Susan A. Notar notes that this is unlikely for several reasons, including that the crimes are not expected to rise to the threshold of severity that most ICC prosecutors are interested in prosecuting. (13)

Prosecuting peacekeepers for allegations of SEA is extraordinarily rare. Punishment is most commonly pursued at the UN or troop-contributing country levels. (14) Considering UN records between 2016 and 2022, only 7 percent of substantiated SEA allegations resulted in a referral for criminal accountability, or about 2 percent of all allegations reported. (15) The rest of allegations resulted in no action, repatriation, or other nonjudicial acts such as suspended pay. Significant barriers exist for pursuing legal and nonlegal punishments at the UN and TCC levels. As discussed in the next sections, the difficulty is reflective of an overall lack of accountability for peacekeeper abuse and relates to complexity in assessing the scope of the problem, balancing troop fulfillment, and negotiating relationships with TCCs.

3 Accountability and Peacekeeping Abuse

The concept of accountability is deeply intertwined with the concept of justice. This is especially the case related to issues of human rights and international law. (16) Justice can be connected to legal channels or less formal mechanisms of responsibility. Across formality levels, there are inherent power dynamics related to accountability and tangible accountability outcomes. Accountability is a relationship where individuals or groups, the accountability holder, needs to have "some degree of influence over the power-wielder." (17) Both information and sanctions are needed for accountability. (18) Accountability is a larger issue within the UN, extending beyond SEA and relates to broader UN accountability within peacekeeping operations. (19) Charlotte...