In the Mayor We Trust? Trust as the Micro-Foundation of Complementary Politico-Administrative Relations in Local Governments
DOI | 10.1177/0095399718791541 |
Author | Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen,Caroline Howard Grøn |
Published date | 01 April 2019 |
Date | 01 April 2019 |
Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399718791541
Administration & Society
2019, Vol. 51(4) 581 –606
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0095399718791541
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Article
In the Mayor We
Trust? Trust as the
Micro-Foundation of
Complementary Politico-
Administrative Relations
in Local Governments
Caroline Howard Grøn1
and Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen2
Abstract
This article investigates trust between politicians and public officials in
local government. Beginning with Svara’s claim that such relations are
characterized by complementarity, we point to the importance of trust as
the micro foundation for these relationships. Applying a mixed-methods
strategy, we investigate a number of factors we expect to be related to
the level of trust between politicians and public officials, as perceived by
the latter. We find that the communication climate and a clear distribution
of tasks correlate positively with trust, whereas an unstable environment
correlates negatively with trust.
Keywords
trust, complementarity, local governments, public officials, politicians
1University of Copenhagen, Denmark
2University of Aarhus, Denmark
Corresponding Author:
Caroline Howard Grøn, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of
Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, DK-1353 København K, Denmark.
Email: cg@ifs.ku.dk
791541AASXXX10.1177/0095399718791541Administration & SocietyGrøn and Salomonsen
research-article2018
582 Administration & Society 51(4)
Introduction: Politico-Administrative Relations and
the Importance of Trust
The notion of a clear separation of politics and administration has been shown
to be a myth when analyzing and conceptualizing the relationship between
top officials and politicians. Whether described as a bargain (Hood & Lodge,
2006), in terms of concepts of politicization (Hustedt & Salomonsen, 2014),
or different role-and-relation typologies (Aberbach, Putnam, & Rockman,
1981; Svara, 2001, 2006a) these descriptions reflect how, for some officials,
their life with their minister or mayor is experienced in what is often referred
to as a “gray zone” between the administrative and political spheres. A rather
dominant approach in local government research is the four-role model for-
mulated by Svara (2001, 2006a). This approach has been applied in a number
of studies of local governments throughout the Western world (e.g., Mouritzen
& Svara, 2002; Navarro et al., 2018). Departing from the more “realistic” and
empirically valid account of the relationship than that forwarded in the clas-
sical theories of Weber and Wilson, Svara points out the relevance of concep-
tualizing the relationship between top officials and their political principals in
terms of complementarity (Svara, 2001, pp. 178-180; 2006a, pp. 966-970).
This reflects how officials enter the political domain just as politicians enter
the administrative realm, creating a gray zone between the two.
Complementarity has been critically assessed with respect to questions of
political and ultimately democratic control and accountability (Mulgan,
2007, 2008; Svara, 2006a). However, these are not the only issues at stake.
On one hand, political control over the administration to ensure responsive-
ness and curb bureaucratic drift is needed; on the other, the preservation of
professional values and standards of formally neutral public officials (Svara,
2001) is also essential.
The argument in this article is that gray zones require more than formal
political control on the part of the politicians; they also demand trust between
the parties. In contrast to formal political control, however, trust is not merely
reflected in the institutional design choices made in any given polity, residing
on the relational level between the types of actors. We, therefore, argue for
trust being part of the micro foundation of politico-administrative relations,
especially those of a complementary type. Hence, while control mechanisms
may generally be seen as a means for politicians to reduce uncertainty and
ensure political responsiveness to political goals vis-à-vis the administration
due to the information asymmetry characterizing the principal–agent relation
(Dixit, 2002), officials entering the gray zones also become much more vul-
nerable to criticism and blame due to their involvement in work of a political
nature. For their part, the administration must, therefore, trust their political
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