In remembrance of Judges Frank M. Johnson, Jr. and John Minor Wisdom.

AuthorMarshall, Burke

Judges Frank M. Johnson, Jr. and John Minor Wisdom, senior judges on the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, respectively, were great judges. This adjective can be used without qualification not just because of the superb intellectual energy and high professional standards that each brought to the bench. These two extraordinarily gifted men also met the very special--indeed, burdensome without parallel--tasks the Supreme Court thrust upon them and their colleagues, especially those sitting in the old Fifth Circuit (now the Eleventh and Fifth), as well as others in the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits and throughout the federal court system. The Supreme Court's mandate to the inferior courts was contained--obscurely, indirectly, and without any specific guidelines or instructions--in the final paragraph of the second Brown opinion, ordering a remand.(1) I say this without hesitation because even though that paragraph could be taken, and might possibly have been intended to be taken, as referring only to the four cases before the Court, I have always interpreted it to reflect the Court's vision of the future. That final paragraph articulates the duty of the inferior courts to exercise their judicial discretion and to bring their experience to bear not just on segregated school systems, but also on other state-controlled institutions that perpetuated the monstrous subjugation of black people.

In very brief summary, the Court was telling the inferior courts that, as the most direct and immediate source of pertinent federal power in the matter, they had to change the society in which they functioned from one in which structure and politics depended on the systematic subjugation of African Americans, to one in which there was equality, or at least the opportunity for equality, regardless of race, in all institutions and aspects of society controlled by the state. (This burden was expanded, of course, by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, especially Title VII.) The impact of the Court's mandate on individual judges, personally identifiable, whose friends and families were in the groups most benefited by the system of subjugation, is best understood or imagined by white Southerners living in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Based on my own experience with federal judges (as well as with many lawyers) in the South toward the end of the first part of the 1960s, I suspect that the judges, with the terrible but unavoidable power flowing to them from the cases brought before them, could be separated into three groups.

The first and perhaps largest group followed the most narrow version of the message of Brown and applied wherever possible--and certainly in all school cases--the famous interpretation of Brown by Judge Parker in Briggs v. Elliot:

[I]t is important that we point out exactly what the Supreme Court has decided and what it has not decided in [Brown]. It has not decided that the federal courts are to take over or regulate the public schools of the states. It has not decided that the states must mix persons of different races in the schools or must require them to attend schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools they attend. What it has decided, and all that it has decided, is that a state may not deny to any person on account of race the right to attend any school that it maintains. This, under the decision of the Supreme Court, the state may not do directly or indirectly; but if the schools which it maintains are open to children of all races, no violation of the Constitution is involved even though the children of different races voluntarily attend different schools, as they attend different churches. Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away from the people freedom to choose the schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation. The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the exercise of power by the state or state agencies, not a limitation upon the freedom of individuals.(2) The judges taking this course in the 1960s were, of course, under considerable pressure, both professional and personal, to avoid breaking new ground or moving in a way that could not be described as obligated by their judicial duties. They and their families were, after all, subjected to many threats--and sometimes acts--of violence. And they were, in the 1960s at least, always aware of the publicly condoned conduct of a second group of sitting judges who openly refused to follow Brown even in the most flagrant situations, such as the entry of James Meredith into the University of Mississippi in 1962.(3)

Judges Johnson and Wisdom were of a different breed from either of these two groups, and it is in that difference that their greatness lay. That difference earned them their ultimate fame and the official recognition of extraordinary achievement and merit from their government and from many university and professional groups.(4) Perhaps because of the inescapable connection between excellence in the judicial act and the substance of judicial actions, it is difficult to define precisely why judicial greatness arose in the wake of Brown, and not as a consequence of lower courts' reactions to other controversial decisions. I believe that the heart of the matter, unexpressed with specificity at the time, was that these two inspired judges and a very few of their colleagues(5) understood and shared a hidden vision of the true message of Brown: that in the flow of American history it was time to end forever the systematic subjugation of black Americans; that this need for change created a necessary, dangerous, and unavoidable conflict with many states in the full detail of the exercise of their power of governance; and that the federal courts, judge by judge, were an integral part of the federal power. Having seen that, these judges did not try to avoid, but accepted willingly, the conflicts that followed and the accompanying necessity to recognize and protect the liberties and fights of the subjugated black Americans of the area.

Happily, it would be impossible to document the summary of post-Brown litigation described above through categorization of judicial behaviors without a thorough review of judicial decisionmaking in the most heavily affected circuits during the 1960s and 1970s. Even the work of Judges Johnson and Wisdom is beyond documentation except at book length, because the work of each is massive in product and rich in short-term as well as historical influence, and yet is recorded only in case-by-case citations and the opinions explaining them. In summary, my belief is that without the decisions and the words of these two men, together...

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