In Favor of the 2019 Equality Act: A Comment on Burt

AuthorSusan Gluck Mezey
DOI10.1177/1557085121991336
Published date01 October 2021
Date01 October 2021
Subject MatterComments
2021, Vol. 16(4) 526 –531
https://doi.org/10.1177/1557085121991336
Feminist Criminology
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/1557085121991336
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Comment
In Favor of the 2019 Equality
Act: A Comment on Burt
Susan Gluck Mezey1
Abstract
There are three reason why I disagree with the author’s premise that 2019 Equality
Act disadvantages women by blurring the distinction between sex and gender identity.
First, it ignores current legal theory and practice that sex discrimination encompasses
gender identity discrimination in federal law; second, it has not made a sufficient case
that the Act’s interpretation of sex would harm women; third, it incorrectly assumes
gender equality in the workplace can be achieved while sex-segregated spaces remain
segregated by biological sex. In sum, revising the Equality Act to exempt women’s
spaces would sacrifice the principle of gender equality upon which the Act is based.
Keywords
Equality Act, LGBT, gender identity, sexual orientation, women’s rights, discrimination
Let me begin by briefly outlining the reasons why I disagree with Professor’s Burt’s
(2020) rationale for reformulating the 2019 Equality Act. First, her opposition to the
current version of the Act stems from her belief that merging sex with gender identity
encroaches on women’s rights. This argument is almost entirely outside the realm of
current legal theory and practice in the United States. It ignores the fact that the LGBT
community and its allies (men and women, gay and straight, transgender and cisgen-
der) had long fought for an interpretation of sex discrimination that encompasses dis-
crimination on the basis of gender identity, sexual orientation, and sex stereotypes and
that the Act establishes that they succeeded in persuading the courts and the Obama
administration to accept this broad definition of sex discrimination.
Second, I believe she has not made a sufficient case for her claim that the Equality
Act would harm women. Emphasizing that she does not want to suggest that transgen-
der women (individuals who identify as women and were assigned to the male gender
1Loyola University Chicago, IL USA
Corresponding Author:
Susan Gluck Mezey, Loyola University Chicago, 1032 W. Sheridan, Chicago, IL, 60660 USA.
Email: smezey@luc.edu
991336
FCXXXX10.1177/1557085121991336Feminist CriminologyMezey
research-article
2021

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