In Defense of Intentionally Shaping People’s Choices

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211069974
• Published date: 01 December 2022
• Date: 01 December 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Political Research Quarterly

2022, Vol. 75(4) 1335–1344

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/10659129211069974

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In Defense of Intentionally Shaping

People’s Choices

Viki M. L. Pedersen

1

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Abstract

In defense of nudging policies, proponents have pointed out that choice archi tecture is inevitable. However, critics have

objected that shaping people’s choices in an intentional way is not inevitable and involves an objectionable substitution of

judgment, with the choice architect imposing his will on others. Accordingly, the inevitability of choice architecture in

general does not provide reason to accept intentional nudges. In contrast to this view, the paper argues that precisely

because the choice architects will unavoidably contribute to people’s choices, it is permissible for them to consider the

content of the choices that their choice architecture promotes. Specif‌ically, I argue that it is often within choice ar-

chitects’, including states’, own legitimate sphere of control whether they want to contribute to other people’s behavi ors

through their organization of the choice architecture. It is argued that such intentio nal choice architecture does not

involve objectionable substitution of judgment.

Keywords

nudging, choice architecture, the inevitability argument, substitution of judgment, legitimate sphere of control

Introduction

According to the founders of the nudge theory, Richard

Thaler and Cass Sunstein, a nudge “is any aspect of the

choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a

predictable way without forbidding any options or sig-

nif‌icantly changing their economic incentives”(Thaler

and Sunstein 2009, 6). Examples include automatic

registration to the donor registry, making cigarettes less

visible in supermarkets and changing the size of the plates

in the restaurant buffet. Such modif‌ications of the choice

architecture matter. In their New York Times bestseller

“Nudge,”Thaler and Sunstein demonstrate how even

“small and apparently insignif‌icant details can have major

impact on people’s behavior”(Thaler and Sunstein 2009,

3; see also Kahneman 2011).

In their justif‌ication for nudging, Thaler and Sunstein

argue that it is a misconception “that it is possible to

avoid inf‌luencing people’schoices”(Thaler and Sunstein

2009, 10). Specif‌ically, they argue that it is impossible to

organize the contexts in which people make choices

without thereby inf‌luencing the decisions people make in

a considerable way. The way in which people sign up for

the donor registry inf‌luences the number of donors, the

design of the supermarket inf‌luences what we put in the

basket,andthesizeontheplateinf‌luenceshow muchwe

eat from the buffet. Their point is that since such choice

architecture, which seems to affect people’s choices

considerably, is inevitable, why not strive for the choice

environment that promotes good decisions ?

However, critics respond that even though choice ar-

chitecture in itself seems inevitable, this does not provide

an argument for intentionally shaping people’s choices.

One important set of objections to such intentional

nudging raises worries about objectionable judgment

substitution (see, e.g., Grüne-Yanoff 2012, 638–639;

White 2013,81–82). Hausman and Welch, for example,

argue that:

There remains an important difference between choices that

are intentionally shaped and choices that are not. Even when

unshaped choices would have been just as strongly inf‌lu-

enced by deliberative f‌laws, calculated shaping of choices

still imposes the will of one agent on another (Hausman and

Welch 2010, 133).

1

Centre for the Experimental-Philosophical Study of Discrimination,

Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

Corresponding Author:

Viki M. L. Pedersen, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University,

Bartholins All´

e 7, Aarhus 8000, Denmark.

Email: vikip@ps.au.dk