Impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on grain and fertilizer supply: Evidence from Kenya

• Published date: 01 November 2023
• Author: Shadrack Muthami Mwatu
• Date: 01 November 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/wfp2.12064

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on grain and

fertilizer supply: Evidence from Kenya

Shadrack Muthami Mwatu

Kenya Institute for Public Policy

Research and Analysis (KIPPRA),

Nairobi, Kenya

Correspondence

Shadrack Muthami Mwatu, Kenya Institute for

Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA),

Nairobi, Kenya.

Email: smwatu@kippra.or.ke;

muthamimwatu@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of the Russia–Ukraine

war on grain and fertilizer supply to Kenya as the sixth

largest economy in Africa using the Regression Disconti-

nuity estimator on monthly data spanning from January

2017 to August 2022. The share of the quantity and value

of cereals and fertilizer imports by Kenya from Russia

and Ukraine in the total quantity and value of cereals

and fertilizer imports by Kenya from world are utilized.

The share of freight and insurancecosts on grain and

fertilizer imports by Kenya from Russia and Ukraine in

total freight and insurance costs on grain and fertilizer

from world have also been used. After controlling for

sensitivity and incorporating depreciation of the

exchange rate and a dummy on drought ascovariates,

the results indicate the war has had insignificant impact

on imports of grain and fertilizerby Kenya though the

impact is negative for grain but positive for fertilizer.

The findings have policy implications touching on need

for African countries to diversify import sources for grain

and fertilizer, enhance productive capacities through

investment on irrigation, strengthen diplomatic ties with

existing import sources for grain and fertilizer, and

invest in climate action to tackledrought incidences.

KEYWORDS

fertilizer, grain, impact

Received: 24 March 2023Revised: 20 September 2023Accepted: 20 September 2023

DOI: 10.1002/wfp2.12064

250 © 2023 Policy Studies Organization.World Food Policy. 2023;9:250–274.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/wfp2

1|INTRODUCTION

Kenya is the 6th largest economy in Africa

1

and is larger than the combined GDP of 21 out of

the 54 economies in Africa (African Development Bank, 2021).

2

Further, using the share of

imports to GDP as a measure of openness of an economy, 20 in every Kenyan Shillings

100 earned in GDP are spend on imports (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2022), implying

that Kenya has linkage to world economies through trade. With climate change witnessed

through persistent droughts where 11 counties in Kenya experienced severe droughts in 2022

(National Drought Management Authority, 2022), the country’s food productivity is becoming

constrained. This has made it necessary for the country to turn to importing agricultural com-

modities as an adaptation mechanism (Giulioni et al., 2022). Due to recurrent droughts, for

instance, Kenya’s maize production fell from 36.7 million bags in 2021 to 34.3 million bags in

2022 (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2023). The decline in domestic production has made

it necessary to turn into importing to ensure food security and sustain welfare. Specifically,

imports of food commodities have increased by 8% over the last 5 years.

The country’s average annual rainfall has generally been poor with most regions witnessing

below average precipitation (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2023). Despite bearing an

adaptive potential for countries to sustain food security and national welfare in face of climate

change, the allocative role of trade is, however, prone to shocks like the Russia–Ukraine war,

which has largely affected trade logistics. The outcome could be a rise in cost of living and a

deterioration in consumer welfare.

Before February 2022 when the war started, grain and fertilizer imports by Kenya from

Russia and Ukraine were smaller than what the African country was importing from other

parts of the world especially for the period 2017–2021 (Figure 1). The implication is that the

war could have less pronounced impact on imports of cereals (grain) and fertilizer by Kenya

given the East African economy had existing alternative import sources for the commodities.

Izzeldin et al. (2023) note the negative impact of the war on markets subsided over time, while

Liadze et al. (2022) hold that geographical location was a key determinant of the impacts of the

war experienced by different countries with countries closer to war zone being the most

impacted.

Figure 2further reveals that the main cereals imported by Kenya from Russia and Ukraine

are wheat, meslin, buckwheat, barley, and maize. Moreover, the largest share of Kenya’s

imports of wheat, meslin, buckwheat, and barley comes from rest of the world (RoW), followed

by Russia and Ukraine, while the largest share of Kenya’s imports of maize comes from Africa,

followed by RoW and then Russia and Ukraine combined. The largest share of Kenya’s imports

of rice comes from RoW, followed by Africa, and the largest share of the country’s imports of

grain sorghum comes from RoW, followed by Africa, while the largest share of Kenya’s“other

cereals”comes from Africa.

3

For fertilizer, the bulk of Kenya’s imports (76.2%) come from RoW

with Russia supplying only 15.6%, while Africa supplies Kenya with 8.1% (Figure 3). Again, the

implication is that Russia and Ukraine account for only a small portion of Kenya’s grain and

1

See Figure A1.

2

Kenya’s GDP (102,427 USD million) is larger than the combined GDP of 21 African Economies (95,427 USD million).

These 21 economies include Namibia, Congo, Rwanda, Equitoria Guinea, Mauritania, Togo, Somalia, Sierra Leone,

Eswatini, Djibouti, Burundi, Liberia, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Lesotho, Gambia, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau,

Comoros, Seychelles, and Sao Tome and Principe.

3

This analysis covers the period from January 2017 to August 2022.

MWATU 251