Impact of Repression on Mobilization: The Case of the Euromaidan Protests in Ukraine.

• Date: 22 June 2020
• Author: Gladun, Andrii

STUDENTS OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS SUCH ASTED GURR AND CHARLES Tilly (in Lichbach 1987, 267) have concluded, that "government coercion [is] perhaps the most important factor accounting for political dissent." However, although scholars acknowledge the importance of repression, there is little consensus regarding its precise impact.

In terms of theory, several conflicting explanations regarding the impact of repression on mobilization have been put forward. Authors within resource mobilization (Tilly 1978) and rational choice (Olson 1965) perspectives emphasize the fact that repression increases the costs of mobilization and collective action. Thus, if protesters are taken to be rational actors that weigh the potential costs and gains of mobilization, increased repression should have a negative impact on mobilization, holding other factors constant.

Meanwhile, psychological approaches emphasize the fact that government repression that is perceived to be illegitimate may lead to increased mobilization (Gurr 1970, 186). A particular example of this mechanism is so-called backfire: public outrage to a repressive event that is perceived to be unjust (Hess & Martin 2006). A historically recurring form ofbackfire occurs when excessive police or military violence is directed at peaceful protesters. Such instances of backfire can increase mobilization in two ways. Firstly, public outrage can cause defection among law enforcement, lowering the costs of participation. Secondly, backfire can attract new participants who are concerned about unjust repression (ibid.).

The two mechanisms are not necessarily incompatible. For an individual, an increased likelihood of repression may reduce their chances of participation in collective action. However, the movement as a whole may benefit from increased participation of new supporters if government repression is perceived to be unjust.

Another possibility is that the relationship between repression and mobilization follows an inverse U-shape (Gurr 1970, Muller &* Weede 1990). Muller and Weede (1990) focus primarily on explaining political violence, but their explanation can be extended to all noninstitutionalized forms of political participation. It goes as follows: at low levels of government repression, reasonably effective peaceful (or institutionalized) means of attaining political goals exist. In contrast, at high levels of repression, it suppresses all possible violence (or noninstitutional participation). However, at intermediate levels of repression, political violence is at its peak.

In terms of empirical evidence, however, there is little consensus concerning the precise impact of repression on mobilization. Hoover and Kowalewski (1992), having examined more than 100 academic publications on the topic, conclude that 70 percent of publications found that repression has a positive impact on dissent, meaning that more repression causes more protest. This means, however, that the other 30 percent of publications confirmed the opposite hypothesis. In a more recent review, Davenport and Inman (2012) state that previous publications have found that repression can either decrease conflict, decrease it to a certain level and then increase it (U-shaped relationship), limit some forms of dissent while promoting others, or have no impact at all. As summarized by Zimmermann (1980, 191): "there are theoretical arguments for all conceivable basic relationships between government coercion and group protest and rebellion except for no relationship."

One of the problems with the previous research is that it analyzes the data on repression and mobilization on a highly aggregated level. Researchers typically deal with panel data covering country-years. This approach hides a lot of important aspects. Firstly, it overlooks the contentious interactions between challengers and incumbents that can happen within the same year. Secondly, it blurs the geographical dimension of events within each unit of observation: repression and mobilization may take place simultaneously in different regions of the same country. Thirdly, this approach overlooks the fact that multiple actors may challenge the government in a given period. Thus, repression against some challengers may facilitate mobilization among others. Finally, the way the public perceives repression matters. The impact of repression on mobilization may be positive or negative, depending on the way it is framed by the movement and interpreted by the public.

This study overcomes these problems by relying on more disaggregated data, which allows rigorous testing of previous hypotheses in relation to a single movement. I turn to a description of the data after briefly summarizing the main case under analysis: the Euromaidan protests that took place in Ukraine from November 2013 to February 2014.

The Euromaidan Protests

The Euromaidan protests (1) in Ukraine began as a response to the government's decision to postpone signing an association agreement with the European Union (EU). On November 21, 2013, more than one thousand protesters, led by opposition parties, NGOs, and celebrities, gathered at Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti (2)) in the capital city, Kyiv, to protest the presidential decree which led to the suspension of preparations for signing the agreement. For about a week following this initial event, the Euromaidan protests consisted of mainly peaceful rallies and demonstrations, until it became clear on November 29, 2013, that President Viktor Yanukovych would not sign the association agreement. On the following night, the Berkut, a riot police unit, violently dispersed the protesters at Independence Square in Kyiv. According to official sources, at least 79 protesters were injured. (3) This police violence effectively ended the first stage of the protests.

This event resulted in substantial backfire. Widely publicized images of police violence sparked large protests in the capital and all over the country over the subsequent days. In some cities, protesters set up stages and tent camps that resembled Euromaidan activity in Kyiv. Although many joined peaceful demonstrations, some actions were disruptive or violent. Particularly in Kyiv, members of far-right groups attempted to capture the presidential administration building on December 1. In addition, protesters occupied several administrative buildings and erected barricades around Independence Square in Kyiv. The backfire was partly fueled by images of the infamous riot police unit Berkut violently dispersing the protesters during this and subsequent episodes. The name of the 5,000-strong militarized unit became synonymous with the government's repressive policy toward protests (Marat 2014). The use of the Berkut to disperse the protesters attracted various social groups to Euromaidan. (4)

According to the polls, the demands of protesters during the second stage of the protests, following the events of November 29-30, shifted away from association with the EU. Protesters began demanding the prosecution of the officials responsible for the beating of protesters, the impeachment of the president, and the resignation of the government (KievInternational Institute of Sociology 2014, Onuch 2014). Most notably, the police violence attracted new participants to the movement, which is evident by the growth of the demonstrations. The average conventional protest event during the second stage of Euromaidan attracted more than 5,000 participants, compared to slightly more than 3,000 during the first stage of the protests. (5) Moreover, six events during the second stage attracted more than 100,000 participants, compared to only two events of this size during the first stage.

During the second stage of the protests, several clashes between the protesters and the riot police took place in the capital. The police tried to regain control over the occupied administrative buildings near Independence Square, while the protesters strengthened the barricades around the tent camp. Large rallies took place in Independence Square around New Year's Eve. In early January 2014, courts in Kyiv repeatedly banned public gatherings in Independence Square, which led the protesters to believe that the riot police would try to disperse them again, hence inciting more protests.

On January 16, Ukrainian parliament passed a set of restrictive laws, which prohibited a wide range of protest activities. The laws were passed by show of hands, as the electronic voting system was said to have been broken on that day. Some commentators have noted that the members of parliament (MPs) violated parliamentary procedure (Ukrayinska Pravda 2014). Provisions of the laws included short-term sentences for covering one's face in public, prohibition of motorcades that consisted of more than five vehicles, prison sentences for defamation, mandatory licensing of internet providers, increased tax rates for NGOs that received foreign funding, and so forth. The adoption of these restrictive laws backfired again, leading to clashes between the protesters and the police in Kyiv, which started on January 19, 2014.

The beginning of these clashes marked the third stage of the protests. On January 22, the police killed two Euromaidan protesters. Moreover, several people who had been injured in the clashes were kidnapped from hospitals. One of them was later found dead; his body showed signs of torture. The deaths of these protesters further escalated the conflict.

During the third stage of the protests, regional mobilization came to play a more prominent role. After the first deaths in Kyiv, a wave of occupations of regional state administration buildings began in the western regions of Ukraine. Unlike Kyiv, in the western oblasts (regions), the protesters met very little or no resistance from the police. In some regions, they forced the governors, appointed by the capital, to resign and proclaimed people's councils, which...