I’ll Be Back? Exiled Leaders and Political Instability

• Author: Daniel Krcmaric,Abel Escribà-Folch
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221115622
• Published date: 01 February 2023
• Date: 01 February 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution

2023, Vol. 67(2-3) 402–427

© The Author(s) 2022

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/00220027221115622

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I’ll Be Back? Exiled Leaders

and Political Instability

Daniel Krcmaric

1

and Abel Escrib`

a-Folch

2

Abstract

Exile is often considered a useful political solution that can coax violent or unpopular

leaders out of power. But these “golden parachutes”may come with a price. Spe-

cif‌ically, do exiled leaders increase instability back in their home countries? In this

paper, we outline the mechanisms through which exiled rulers can destabilize their

home state’s politics and ultimately increase conf‌lict. We present two types of evidence

to support the argument. The f‌irst is a cross-national analysis that uses our original

Leaders in Exile dataset to examine how exiled leaders shape the likelihood of civil

conf‌licts, coups, and protests. The second is a cross-leader analysis designed to

minimize inferential concerns by comparing cases where leaders escape into exile with

cases where leaders are killed. In both tests, we f‌ind that exiled leaders are linked to

political instability in their home countries.

Keywords

political leadership, exile, civil wars, conf‌lict, international security

Introduction

A leader who refuses to step down after wearing out his welcome presents the in-

ternational community with a thorny problem. Military intervention to dislodge the

1

Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

2

Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Institut Barcelona d’Estudis

Internacionals, Barcelona, Spain

Corresponding Author:

Daniel Krcmaric, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 601 University Place,

317 Scott Hall, Evanston, IL 60208-0001, USA.

Email: daniel.krcmaric@northwestern.edu

leader is a possibility, but the high costs rarely make this an attractive option. Coaxing

embattled rulers out of off‌ice with a comfortable exile—essentially a golden

parachute—can be more appealing. The recent crisis in Venezuela illustrates this

dynamic. Even John Bolton, the National Security Advisor to the Trump administration

known for his aggressive approach to American foreign policy, expressed hope that the

situation could be defused by Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro taking “a long, quiet re-

tirement…on a nice beach somewhere far from Venezuela.”

1

There is an extensive history of rulers f‌leeing abroad once the situation at home

became too dangerous. In fact, exile has been the second most common post-tenure fate

for political leaders over the past 140 years.

2

Policymakers often see a pragmatic logic

behind granting safe haven: it gives besieged rulers a better alternative than continuing

to f‌ight in a desperate attempt to hold onto power. For instance, the People Power

Revolution in the Philippines reached a surprisingly peaceful conclusion when Fer-

dinand Marcos decamped to a Hawaiian villa instead of doubling down in Manila.

American Congressman Stephen Solarz, a vocal critic of Marcos’human rights record,

nonetheless was satisf‌ied with the outcome: “If the price we had to pay to avoid massive

bloodshed…in the Philippines was to offer Mr. Marcos asylum in the United States,

then it was a price worth paying.”

3

While exile may be a solution in the short term, this paper investigates whether it can

create problems in the long term. Specif‌ically, after they f‌lee abroad, do exiled leaders

undermine political stability back in their home countries?

This question speaks to two growing—but still disconnected—research agendas.

The f‌irst involves the study of leaders in international relations (e.g., Saunders 2011;

Horowitz et al. 2015;Gift and Krcmaric 2017;Horowitz and Fuhrmann 2018;Krcmaric

et al. 2020). Current work convincingly analyzes the incentives leaders have to engage

in conf‌lict while they are in off‌ice (e.g., Chiozza and Goemans 2011;Croco 2011;

Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Ezrow 2014;Prorok 2016;Krcmaric 2020). In this line of

research, the prospect of facing post-tenure punishment is a key variable used to explain

the decision-making of sitting rulers. However, in existing models, rulers cease to be

relevant once they are out of power. Our study of exiled leaders advances the literature

by highlighting a new possibility with far-reaching ramif‌ications: political leaders may

be connected to conf‌lict even after they leave off‌ice.

The second involves the study of transnational politics. Current work emphasizes

how groups abroad—such as migrants and diasporas—continue to participate in the

political and social lives of their countries of origin after leaving (e.g., Levitt and

Jaworsky 2007;Kapur 2014). Most relevant to our paper, transnational actors may

destabilize their home states by fomenting conf‌lict, encouraging regime change, and

hindering post-war reconstruction and reconciliation (Lyons and Mandaville 2010;

Brinkerhoff 2011;Miller and Ritter 2014;Van Hear and Cohen 2017;Koinova 2018;

Escrib`

a-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2022). Indeed, it is now widely accepted that

there is a transnational dimension of civil war (e.g., Gleditsch 2007). While existing

work on migrants and diasporas highlights important dynamics, nearly all studies focus

on large, aggregate networks of expatriates (for an exception, see Huang et al. 2022).

Krcmaric and Escrib`

a-Folch 403