II. Measuring Monetary Damages

• Library: Litigating Religious Land Use Cases (ABA) (2016 Ed.)

II. Measuring Monetary Damages

By mere virtue of a plaintiff succeeding on his or her RLUIPA claim against a government or a governmental worker, a person's religious freedoms have been found to be violated by a court of law. Such a violation against a person's First Amendment freedom of religion is a serious injury and deserves the highest form of compensation. Therefore, to make a plaintiff whole, in the truest sense of the word "whole," he or she must be entitled to compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages.

As the case law previously outlined makes apparent, numerous courts liken the RLUIPA statute to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 statute, and "[i]n a section 1983 action, both compensatory and punitive damages are available upon proper proof."⁵⁸ Just as the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that § 1983 was intended to create "'a species of tort liability' in favor of persons who are deprived of 'rights, privileges or immunities secured' to them by the Constitution," such is true for a deprivation of religious rights under RLUIPA.⁵⁹ Thus, when a § 1983 plaintiff "seeks damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts."⁶⁰

The calculation of damages may prove to be a challenge. Naturally, out-of-pocket expenses that are incurred due to the denial of land use are recoverable. However, one can look at the corresponding constitutional claims for damage claims. Compensatory damages for emotional injuries are recoverable under § 1983.⁶¹ Damages under § 1983 are intended to compensate for actual injuries caused by constitutional violations; therefore, a § 1983 plaintiff alleging emotional distress must demonstrate that the emotional duress resulted from the constitutional violation itself.⁶² A plaintiff must adduce sufficient evidence "that such distress did in fact occur and that its cause was the constitutional deprivation itself and cannot be attributable to other causes."⁶³ Indeed, any anxiety, stress, or other unpleasantness experienced as a by-product of litigation (the grievance process) is not caused by "the constitutional deprivation itself" and thus is not recoverable.⁶⁴

In Carey v. Piphus, the Court concluded that § 1983 was intended to create "'a species of tort liability' in favor of persons who are deprived of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured' to them by the Constitution."⁶⁵ Thus, damages awarded pursuant to § 1983 often find...