II. Constitutional Speedy Trial Issues
| Library | The Rights of the Accused under the Sixth Amendment (ABA) (2016 Ed.) |
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."11 The Supreme Court has applied the constitutional requirement of a "speedy trial" differently depending on the stage of the proceedings when the delay occurred.
In 1971, shortly after the speedy trial right was incorporated to apply to the states, in United States v. Marion12 the Court determined that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial did not apply before a defendant was charged or arrested.13 The defendants in Marion filed motions to dismiss the indictment because a delay of three years between the government's discovery of the crime and the indictment violated their Sixth Amendment speedy trial right and Fifth Amendment14 due process rights.15 The district court dismissed the indictment based on the government's failure to speedily prosecute.16
The Court focused on the speedy trial language of the Sixth Amendment and determined that, on its face, the clause protects only a defendant who is "accused" and exists only when a prosecution has begun.17 The Court found no support in the English common law for Marion's argument that the Sixth Amendment right applied prior to the arrest of a defendant.18 The Court also examined Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) and determined that the criminal rules permitted dismissal only after a defendant was arrested.19
Marion affirmed that the statutes of limitation, and not the defendant's right to a speedy trial, protect against the prosecution of overly stale criminal charges.20 The justices noted that the statutes of limitation provide a fixed period of time after the criminal act in which a criminal case may be prosecuted.21 This limitation protects individuals from defending themselves against, and being punished for, charges based on acts committed long ago.22 The Court suggested that the statutes of limitation may also encourage law enforcement to promptly investigate criminal activity.23
Marion also claimed that potential prejudice and the passage of time violated his due process rights.24 The government conceded that if preindictment delay caused substantial prejudice to the defendant and the delay was intended by the government to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment required dismissal of the indictment.25 The Court found that Marion did not prove this type of violation because he had not offered evidence of actual prejudice caused by the preindictment delay or an intentional delay by the government designed to gain an unfair advantage.26
Four years later, in Dillingham v. United States, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, clarified that speedy trial rights attach before indictment (or issuance of other formal charges) at the time of arrest.27 The decision in Dillingham is notable because the Court's conclusion is inconsistent with prior determination that other Sixth Amendment rights, such as right to counsel, apply only at the time of commencement of formal judicial proceedings and not at arrest.28 Although the Dillingham Court failed to address the doctrinal distinction, one commentator has opined that the speedy trial right applies regardless of whether there is a trial, but other Sixth Amendment rights apply during judicial proceedings.29
The Court was presented with a preindictment due process claim based on a delay of indictment in United States v. Lovasco.30 The criminal offenses occurred between July 25 and August 31, 1973. Within a month, postal inspectors presented a report to the U.S. Attorney's Office, but the U.S. Attorney did not initiate a prosecution for seventeen months.31 The government stipulated that little additional information was developed in the seventeen months after receiving the report32 and the defendant testified at the district court hearing that his case was prejudiced by the deaths of two material witnesses, one who sold guns to the defendant and the other who witnessed the sales of all of the guns.33 The defendant, however, failed to explain how these witnesses would have helped his case.34 The government offered no explanation for the delay, but disagreed that the investigation had ended at the time of the completion of the postal inspector's report.35
The Court adopted a rule, hinted at in Marion, that a motion to dismiss based on a violation of due process caused by preindictment or prearrest delay involves a two-prong test, requiring an examination of (1) proof of prejudice to the defendant and (2) any explanation for the delay.36 The opinion focused on the government's explanation for the delay. According to the Court, a defendant's due process rights are not violated when the government establishes that the reason for the delay was that it was continuing the case for further investigation. Even though the defendant was somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time, his due process rights were not violated.37
The Lovasco Court also noted that prosecutors are not required to seek an indictment as soon as probable cause exists.38 They may develop the case to a point where they are satisfied that they have evidence to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.39 Neither law enforcement nor defendants nor the courts are well served if there is a mandate to charge as soon as probable cause is found.40 Requiring a prosecutor to charge a defendant as soon as proof beyond a reasonable doubt is established against a defendant on one charge would disrupt the normal investigative process.41 Otherwise, a defendant may be indicted before charges against others are mature, or before evidence of other illegal acts by the defendant are ready for prosecu-tion.42 Such a rule, moreover, could prevent the prosecutor from giving full consideration to not prosecuting in a particular case.43
No due process violation was found by the Court on the facts presented in Lovasco.44 Because so few cases had been decided in the lower courts, these courts had not had the opportunity to sufficiently examine the constitutional reasons for delay.45 The lower courts are left with the task of applying the particular facts to "the settled principles of due process," according to Lovasco.46
Statutes of limitation are creations of both the federal and state legislatures, and vary among the jurisdictions. For example, the general statute of limitations for violent felonies ranges from seven years to fifteen years depending on the state,47 while the statute of limitations is five years for noncapital federal crimes.48
On rare occasions, the circumstances of the crime can extend the statutory period. For example, acts of terrorism usually have an eight-year statute of limitations, but the period is increased if the offense results in, or creates a foreseeable risk of, death or serious bodily injury.49 And, in most jurisdictions, there is no time limit for the prosecution of a capital offense.50
Statutes of limitation are located in the codebooks of the various jurisdictions. The previous examples demonstrate that care must be taken to consider all potentially applicable statutes to ensure that an exception does not apply to a particular crime.
The Supreme Court held in Barker v. Wingo51 that four main factors should be considered when analyzing a speedy trial issue raised by one who has been accused of a crime: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the demand of the right to a speedy trial by the defendant, and (4) whether the delay has resulted in prejudice to the defendant.52 These four factors, the Court held, should be applied to the fact-specific circumstances of each allegation of a speedy trial violation.53
The actual length of the delay of a trial is the threshold factor in determining whether a case should be reviewed in light of the speedy trial clause.54 Substantial delay, amounting to a presumptively prejudicial effect upon the defendant, must be shown in order for the balancing test to continue beyond this first step.55 The Supreme Court noted that the lower courts have found postaccusation delay "presumptively prejudicial" as the length of the delay approaches one year.56
If there has been a substantial delay, the prosecution's reason for the delay becomes important.57 Any deliberate attempt to delay the trial should weigh greatly against the prosecution.58 If the government's negligence is the reason for the delay, the delay is weighed less heavily but still held against the government.59 However, where the prosecution has a legitimate reason for delaying the trial, such as the illness of a witness, the delay is justified, and the case will not be dismissed on speedy trial grounds.60
The third factor incorporates the defendant's responsibility to promptly assert his Sixth Amendment right.61 That is, if a defendant fails...
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