Ignored no longer: Contributions of the law of agency to principal-agency theory and congressional leadership

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1016/S1059-4337(08)45007-X
Date01 September 2008
Pages235-254
Published date01 September 2008
AuthorWilliam J. Phelan
IGNORED NO LONGER:
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE LAW OF
AGENCY TO PRINCIPAL-AGENCY
THEORY AND CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERSHIP
William J. Phelan, IV
1
ABSTRACT
Principal-agency theory was adapted from business and economics to
explain the behavior of various government actors. Yet the idea of an
agent and a principal is only depicted in a limited fashion when discussed
in light of the realm of business and economics. Legal studies has grappled
with the idea of agency well before political science or economics. I
lay out the basic principles of both agency law and Congressional
principal-agent theory. I then establish the groundwork for drawing
important connections between agency law and principal-agency theory.
I also analyze and attempt to ameliorate differences between these two
theoretical approaches.
As seen throughout history, particularly that of western civilization, a
frequent cloak dictators and depots dress themselves in is that they are
Studies in Law, Politics, and Society, Volume 45, 235–254
Copyright r2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 1059-4337/doi:10.1016/S1059-4337(08)45007-X
235
operating for such intangibles as ‘‘the crown’’ or a deity. All along, most of
these leaders probably knew they were acting on their own behalf; claiming
to act for some common good was simply an attempt at pacifying the
masses. This tactic had some merit: revolutions aside, people were usually
hesitant to topple a leader who was supposedly put in place and acting
on behalf of, for example, God. Yet it was not till after the Enlightenment
and the creation of the democratic republic known as the United States
of America that a leader could truly understand and claim to be working
on behalf of the people. The representational government found in the
U.S. Congress is an excellent case in point. The members of Congress
are proportionally elected by their constituents to become leaders in
Washington, DC and represent them in a collective, deliberative body.
Further, within this legislative body, there are the leaders of these leaders.
Over the years, both the United States Senate (2007) and the United
States House of Representatives (2007) have developed unique leadership
structures that enabled the chambers to carry out business.
The manner in which the leadership structure of Congress has developed
was, in part, controlled by the attitudes of those who filled the leadership
positions. Speaker Joe Cannon, for example, made sure to advance rules
that helped keep his tight grip on the speakership and Rules Committee.
Such a course of action was a result of a desire to use the speakership as
a source of power to dominate the House. Yet early in the development of
Congressional leadership, Henry Clay had a different view on being elected
Speaker.
Gentlemen. In coming to the station which you have done me the honor to assign
me – an honor for which you will be pleased to accept my thanks – I obey rather your
commands than my own inclinations yShould the rare and delicate occasion present
itself when your speaker should be called upon to check or control the wanderings or
intemperance in debate, your justice will, I hope, ascribe to his interposition the motives
only of public good and a regard of the dignity of the house. (Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997,
p. 382)
Whether Clay actually was an agent for his House is not important; Clay
raises an early attitude found in Congressional leadership that can also be
seen today: the leader is an agent of the body that selected him. Clay wanted
the members to know that they were the ones principally in charge. He was
merely an agent/leader present to carry out their will.
The idea of being one’s agent is not novel. In fact, concepts of the agency/
principal relationship predate Clay’s notion by millennia. Currently, several
in the academic community have taken Clay’s sentiments and attempted to
formalize this principal-agent theory (P-A theory) in the field of political
WILLIAM J. PHELAN, IV236

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