"if I Get Married, I Want to Be Very Married." the Godfather of Soul, Richard Pryor, and Other Post-death Challenges Tell Us: How Married You Are Depends on the State
| Publication year | 2022 |
| Author | Written by Adam F. Streisand, Esq.* |
Written by Adam F. Streisand, Esq.*
"If I get married, I want to be very married."
-Audrey Hepburn.
Ms. Hepburn's sentiment is an understandable one. However, since marriage is a creature of state law, whether a person is married (very or not) is not always an easy question to answer. The status of what seems to be a very married couple can be upset by claims of bigamy, polygamy, lack of capacity, undue influence, and fraud. Whether the claims will be sustained to upset an apparently-valid marriage often will depend upon the state laws that may apply, as well as on the views of the courts applying those laws.
The purpose of this article is not to conduct a 50-state survey but to highlight how the different approaches of the different states can affect the outcomes of marriage contests and the rights of a purported spouse to inheritance.
We begin with two cases involving James Brown, the godfather of soul—a dissolution case and a probate case—because they present the question: Was the final probate result dictated by the statute, or did the court have its own clear views about the proper outcome?
In 2001, James Brown, the "Godfather of Soul," married back-up singer, Tomi Rae Hynie, in South Carolina. In the process, Ms. Hynie signed a marriage license application stating under oath that she had never been previously married.1 In 2004, Mr. Brown filed to annul the marriage on the basis that Ms. Hynie had never divorced her first husband, Javed Ahmed, whom she had married in 1997.
Ms. Hynie responded to Mr. Brown's claim in South Carolina by seeking an annulment of her marriage to Mr. Ahmed as void ab initio.2 She served Mr. Ahmed by publication. He made no appearance. The trial court accepted Ms. Hynie's unchallenged testimony that Mr. Ahmed had admitted after-the-fact that he had three wives in Pakistan at the time of the marriage and had married her solely to obtain a Green Card that would allow him to stay in the United States. She also stated that the marriage had never been consummated. The court granted the petition for annulment on the grounds that the marriage was void ab initio because it was bigamous and thus Mr. Ahmed lacked capacity to marry, because he fraudulently induced the marriage, and because the marriage was never consummated.3
Mr. Ahmed was allegedly lying in 1997. I would think Ms. Hynie was certainly lying in 2001.
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Mr. Brown, perhaps satisfied that his wife was no longer a bigamist, and thus, he was no longer a bigamist, settled his differences with Ms. Hynie.4 He withdrew his petition to annul the marriage.5 She dismissed a cross-complaint she had filed for divorce, on the grounds of domestic violence, which also included a request for genetic testing to establish Mr. Brown's paternity of a son born June 11, 2001, named James.6 Despite their rapprochement, they had an on-again, off-again relationship until Mr. Brown died on December 25, 2006.7
Mr. Brown died testate. His 2000 Will devised his personal effects to six named adult children (Ms. Hynie's son, James, born in 2001, was not one of those named children).8 The 2000 Will provided for the remainder to be distributed to The James Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust ("Trust").9 Upon Mr. Brown's death, the Trust directed the trustees to divide the assets into two shares or subtrusts: (1) The Brown Family Education Trust ("Family Trust"), which was capped in the amount of $2 million for tax purposes and designated for the education of Brown's grandchildren; and (2) The James Brown "I Feel Good" Trust ("Charitable Trust"), which Brown declared:
shall be used solely for the tuition, educational expenses, and financial assistance of ... poor and financially needy children, youth, or young adults (who are both qualified and deserving) who seek and have need of such assistance to obtain and further their education at the many educational entities and/or institutions available in the States of South Carolina and Georgia.10
The will predated the marriage between Mr. Brown and Ms. Hynie; hence, it did not provide for her or her son. In addition, on November 27, 2001, Mr. Brown and Ms. Hynie had signed a prenuptial agreement which provided, among other things, that upon Mr. Brown's death, Ms. Hynie waived any right in Mr. Brown's estate, including a "statutory share" that could result from the omission of Ms. Hynie as a spouse from Mr. Brown's testamentary documents.11 They married on December 14, 2001.12 Thus, Ms. Hynie would not be entitled to share in the estate if the premarital agreement were valid.
In 2007, five of the six children named in the Will, and Ms. Hynie, sued to set aside the Will and Trust on the grounds of undue influence.13 They alleged the estate should pass according to the laws of intestacy.14 Ms. Hynie claimed the right to an omitted spouse share and that her son was entitled to an omitted child share.15 The South Carolina Attorney General ("AG"), responsible for representing the interests of the charitable beneficiaries of the Trust, brokered a settlement of the litigation.16 The settlement involved creating a Settlement Entity by transferring a net 47.5% of the assets to a new charitable trust, 23.75% to Ms. Hynie (who would be responsible for her son) and 4.79% to each of the settling adult children (with percentage rights for voting concerning the exploitation of Mr. Brown's intellectual property).17
The personal representatives and trustees were iced out of the settlement process. They were not part of the negotiations and were not parties to the ultimate agreement.18 When the settling parties sought court approval of the settlement, the personal representatives and trustees objected.19 However, the court approved the agreement, having found that there was a good faith controversy and the settlement was just and reasonable.20
The objectors appealed and the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, invalidating the settlement.21 The court simply did not buy that there were bona fide claims that justified the AG's agreement to give away essentially half the estate and upend Mr. Brown's estate planning, including Ms. Hynie's rights or those of her child.22
On remand, Ms. Hynie filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to establish the validity of her marriage to Mr. Brown.23 The Limited Special Administrator and Trustee ("LSA") filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the marriage was invalid, asserting that it was void ab initio since Ms. Hynie was, at the time of her marriage ceremony to Mr. Brown, still married to Mr. Ahmed, citing South Carolina Code Annotated section 20-1-80 (marriage while a person has a living spouse is void ab initio).24 The LSA also contended that while no one could contest the status of the marriage between Ms. Hynie and Mr. Ahmed, the underlying factual determinations would not be binding on nonparties who had no opportunity to litigate them, e.g., that Mr. Ahmed had three wives in Pakistan.25 The LSA conceded that they could not undo the annulment and indeed that nothing could or would restore the status of that marriage.26 However, they argued, the issue was not actually litigated, and they did not have the opportunity to litigate the matter.27 Instead, Ms. Hynie in essence obtained a default judgment, offering no evidence other than her testimony about a statement Mr. Ahmed made that he had three wives in Pakistan.28 For example, no marriage certificates were produced that would establish the facts.29 Thus, Ms. Hynie's rights, if any, in the estate as the surviving spouse could not be challenged.30 Petitioners were prevented from challenging Ms. Hynie's status as the purported surviving spouse of Mr. Brown on the basis of an unchallenged statement by Ms. Hynie that Mr. Ahmed said he was previously married.31
The circuit court granted Ms. Hynie's motion, holding that the 2004 judgment annulling her marriage to Mr. Ahmed was a conclusion that it was void ab initio; hence, Ms.
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Hynie could freely marry Mr. Brown without any legal impediment, because she did not have another living spouse at the time.32 The court held that the LSA could not reopen the underlying factual findings that were essential to the ruling as a means of challenging the validity of Ms. Hynie's marriage to Mr. Brown.33 The court of appeals affirmed.34 It held that the LSA lacked standing to challenge the annulment of Ms. Hynie's marriage to Mr. Ahmed. It further held that the LSA could not relitigate the factual findings based upon collateral estoppel, because: (1) the annulment was actually litigated, i.e., the court evaluated the evidence presented by Ms. Hynie and made findings, (2) the validity of the marriage was finally determined, and (3) the factual findings were necessary to the outcome. Finally, the court of appeals held the marriage to Mr. Ahmed did not pose an impediment to the marriage to Mr. Brown, even though Ms. Hynie did not obtain her annulment order until after her marriage to Mr. Brown.
On appeal of these rulings, the South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed.35 It reasoned that the annulment proceeding between Ms. Hynie and Mr. Ahmed was an in rem proceeding, and that such a proceeding binds those persons claiming in the res as to the status of the res and the parties' rights in it.36 "It is ancient law that a judgment in rem is res judicata as to all the world with regard to the res or status that is determined therein."37 However, the court explained, the United States Supreme Court has long held that an in rem judgment is not binding on nonparties as to factual determinations, even ones essential to the judgment.38 Thus, a determination by a court as to the status of a marriage is binding on the world, "but the judgment will not...
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