Identifying Employers' 'Proxies' in Sexual-Harassment Litigation

• Author: Curtis J. Bankers
• Position: J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law, 2014; B.A., Creighton University, 2010
• Pages: 1785-1815

1785

Identifying Employers’ “Proxies” in

Sexual-Harassment Litigation

Curtis J. Bankers

ABSTRACT: The Supreme Court’s companion decisions of Burlington

Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton

represent the modern framework governing employer liability in sexual-

harassment suits. The opinions organize the basic rules for employer

liability, its affirmative defense, and unique situations where the

affirmative defense is unavailable. An employer’s affirmative defense is

unavailable when the harasser is a “proxy” of the employer. But who

constitutes a proxy? The Supreme Court has provided little guidance on who

constitutes a proxy, and the federal circuit courts have struggled to apply the

existing doctrine with much consistency. This Note proposes that the courts

utilize a suggestion from Ellerth that has gone ignored: the courts should

use the concept of corporate intent as a yardstick for identifying proxies.

Specifically, the courts should find that proxies are those who have the

capability to impute intent to an employer by making policy for the employer.

The courts should empirically locate those policy-making capabilities by

looking to employers’ “Corporate Internal Decision Structures.” This

approach shows fidelity to the Court’s jurisprudence, provides for a more

objective and flexible standard for identifying proxies, and does not suffer

from the problems that plague some alternative methods.

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1786

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT’S EMPLOYER-LIABILITY

JURISPRUDENCE AND THE RISE OF PROXY LIABILITY ............................ 1788

A. TITLE VII AND MERITOR SAVINGS BANK V. VINSON ...................... 1788

B. BASELINE EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER ELLERTH AND FARAGHER .. 1790

C. EMPLOYERS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE UNDER ELLERTH AND

FARAGHER .................................................................................... 1791

 J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law, 2014; B.A., Creighton University,

2010. I have many people to thank: the members of the Iowa Law Review for their friendship

and editorial assistance; Jean Bender for helping me discover this topic; and Laura and my

family for their unending support. All errors are my own.

1786 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1785

D. INDEFENSIBLE HARASSMENT UNDER ELLERTH AND FARAGHER:

PROXY LIABILITY ........................................................................... 1792

III. SEARCHING FOR A PROXY-LIABILITY STANDARD ................................... 1794

A. FARAGHER’S CASE LAW FOUNDATION ............................................. 1794

B. CIRCUIT CONFUSION: THE PROLIFERATION OF FACTORS FOR

IDENTIFYING PROXIES ..................................................................... 1796

1. The Tenth Circuit ................................................................ 1796

2. Consistently Inconsistent: Other Circuits Apply Other

Factors ................................................................................... 1800

IV. ELLERTH’S HIDDEN INSTRUCTIONS: USING CORPORATE INTENT TO

IDENTIFY PROXIES ................................................................................ 1801

A. ELLERTH POINTS THE WAY: THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

AGENCY § 219(2)(A) AND CORPORATE INTENT ............................... 1801

B. THE POLICYMAKER STANDARD ....................................................... 1804

C. ATTRIBUTES OF THE POLICYMAKER STANDARD ................................ 1807

1. Fidelity to Ellerth, Faragher, and Subsequent Case Law ...... 1807

2. Flexibility & Objectivity ........................................................ 1810

3. Inferior Alternative Theories .............................................. 1811

a. The Status Quo Alternative .......................................... 1811

b. Target Alternatives ........................................................ 1811

c. Corporate Intent Alternatives ..................................... 1812

V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1815

I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s companion decisions of Burlington Industries, Inc.

v. Ellerth1 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton2 (collectively “Ellerth/Faragher”)

represent the modern framework governing employer liability in sexual-

harassment suits.3 These opinions establish the rule that “[a]n employer is

subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable

hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively

higher) authority over the employee.”4 To emphasize, employer liability is

1. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).

2. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).

3. See BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, WORKPLACE HARASSMENT LAW 1-21

(2012) (“Ellerth and Faragher, though factually dissimilar, gave the Court an opportunity to

articulate a unified jurisprudence of employer liability for harassment.” (footnote o mitted)).

Since Ellerth/Faragher, the Supreme Court has examined other aspects of Title VII cases, such as

punitive damages, retaliation claims, and constructive discharge claims, but has not altered the

fundamental framework of Ellerth and Faragher. See id. at 1-29 to -47.

4. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.