Ibn Tulun's Jihad: the Damascus assembly of 269/883.

• Author: Bonner, Michael
• Position: Brief article

Ahmad ibn Tulun is famous as the first ruler of Egypt in Islamic times who became, to a large degree, independent of the central caliphate. Between his appointment as governor in 254/868 and his death in 270/884, Egypt emerged as a serious power in the Islamic and Mediterranean worlds, after centuries of subordination to the Roman, Byzantine, Persian, and caliphal empires. In particular, Egyptian-based Tulunid power extended--if only for a while--across Palestine and Syria to the borderlands facing Byzantium in southern Anatolia. Meanwhile, Islamic Egypt expressed itself in an increasingly mature and distinctive voice, using the Arabic language, in the religious sciences, secular literature, and the visual arts. (1)

This article will focus on an episode that is already known but has not received special attention. Toward the end of his life, Ibn Tulun convened an assembly of jurists and notables at Damascus in order to thwart the designs of al-Muwaffaq, brother of the reigning 'Abbasid caliph, al-Mu'tamid. Not only did Ibn Tulun seek approval in declaring al-Muwaffaq deposed from his position as heir apparent (wall l-'ahd), but he tried to cajole or intimidate the assembly into subscribing to a declaration of jihad against this powerful prince. This unusual and (arguably) unprecedented move came as the culmination of a long involvement, on Ibn Tulun's part, with the Arab-Byzantine frontier district and the various practices of jihad.

Before I narrate this episode, I wish to describe its context, which is, broadly speaking, the frontiers of Islam, where we find, not surprisingly, a distinctive ethos and code of behavior for participants in the war against the adversaries of Islam, At the same time, we find an environment that is conducive to political creativity. In an unsettled era, when the central power and authority of the caliphate have grown fragmented and weak, many political and military entrepreneurs emerge. These tend to be men of low origins, often beginning as the client (mawla) or freedman (ghulam) of some great commander or prince. But they rise, compete, and then, in a few rare cases, become the founders of successful dynastic enterprises. Ibn Tulun is one of these. And like others, he participates in and deploys an ideology that we can identify--again, broadly speaking--as that of jihad. On the one hand, this jihad carries a backward-looking message: restoration of a long-gone social order, adherence to an obsolete system of exchanges and rewards, participation in wars of conquest in environments where conquest is no longer really possible. On the other hand, jihad carries new possibilities and meanings, especially when deployed creatively by the likes of Ibn Tulun. For, in fact, jihad is a core element in Ibn Tulun's project of founding a new, stable dynastic state (dawla). And with jihad comes, necessarily, the frontier, which I began by describing as the context of all this activity. As it happens, Ibn Tulun has the good fortune of becoming the ruler of Egypt, a sedentary and wealthy (if not entirely peaceful) country. But throughout his career he also remains attached to the wilder terrain of the Arab-Byzantine frontier. This attachment comes not only from pious devotion, but also from political ambition and calculation. For, again, the frontier is the breeding ground where entrepreneurial experiments can turn into flourishing Islamic states.

The episode in question took place as follows. (2) In 269/883, Ibn Tulun marched with his army from Egypt to Syria, in order to deal with the northern limits of his domains. He had made a similar journey only a few years before (see below). This time, however, he had a new list of problems to deal with, which included the recent defection of Lu'lu' whom Ibn Tulun had previously appointed as his deputy in northern Syria and (according to some accounts) the northwestern frontier region known as the Thughur. Ibn Tulun also had to deal with the refusal of a certain Yazman, who had recently become the governor or strongman of Tarsus, capital of the Thughur, to recognize his authority at all. Most importantly, either before or during this march to Syria, (3) Ibn Tulun received a message from the 'Abbasid caliph al-Mu'tamid saying that he (al-Mu'tamid) had slipped away from Samarra' in Iraq and was on his way to meet Ibn Tulun in al-Raqqa, in northeastern Syria. Al-Mu'tamid had held the title of caliph ever since his accession in 256/870, but had been compelled to share power with his brother, Abu Ahmad al-Muwaffaq. A talented and forceful military commander, al-Muwaffaq held the title of wall l-'ahd, or heir apparent. (4) As time went by and as al-Muwaffaq defended the caliphate against its most dangerous adversaries, especially Ya'qub the Coppersmith in the East (5) and the Zanj in southern Iraq,6 his power and ambition grew, as did also, not surprisingly, the tension between the two brothers. In this quarrel, Ahmad b. Tulun in Egypt sided more and more with the caliph al-Mu'tamid in Iraq. Thus when al-Muctamid wrote to Ibn Tulun to say he was coming to meet him at al-Raqqa, it was because Ibn Tulun had already invited him to do this.

Ibn Tulun now waited in Syria for al-M'tamid to arrive, expecting to escort him to Egypt; we are told that in this way Ibn Tulun hoped to make his own capital, al-Qata'1' (near Fustat), the seat of a restored 'Abbasid caliphate. (7) However, al-Muwaffaq's agents got wind of the scheme and a commander loyal to him, Ishaq b. Kundaj, then governor of Mosul, encountered al-Mu'tamid at Haditha. According to some accounts, a leading administrator (katib or wazir) of al-Muwaffaq's named Sacid b. Makhlad also had a leading role, as he allayed the suspicions of al-Mu'tamid's commanders and then, once their guard was down, clapped them into irons. (8) One way or another, al-Mu'tamid returned to Samarra' in virtual confinement. Al-Muwaffaq then awarded Ibn Kundaj the governorship of the western provinces, including Egypt, although Ibn Kundaj was not so foolhardy as to try to seize these from the powerful Ibn Tulun. (9)

In Damascus, meanwhile, Ibn Tulun convened an assembly of judges, jurisprudents, and notables (al-qudat wa-l-fuqaha' wa-l-ashraf) from all his territories, which by now had come to include Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Diyar Mudar in the Jazira, (10) and the frontier region known as the Thughur, facing the Byzantine Empire. Once they had gathered, the participants made speeches denouncing al-Mu'tamid's confinement and al-Muwaffaq's "betrayal." However, Ibn Tulun wanted more. He demanded that the assembly approve of a document (kitab) that removed al-Muwaffaq from his position as wall l-'ahd, or heir apparent, because he had usurped and denied the lawful caliph's rights. Ibn Tulun also demanded assent to the following proposition: "jihad against [al-Muwaffaq] is incumbent upon the [entire] Muslim community."

The document received the approval of most participants in the assembly, including the three chief qadis (judges) who held jurisdiction, respectively, over northern Syria and the Thughur, central Syria and Palestine, and Diyar Mudar. These three judges subscribed, in their own handwriting, to this effect. However, three Egyptian jurists, led by Bakkar b, Qutayba, chief qadi of Egypt for well over twenty years, balked and refused to subscribe to the document in its entirety. Furious, Ibn Tulun proceeded to issue his declaration nonetheless. From Iraq, al-Muwaffaq then replied with a counter-declaration that pronounced a curse against Ibn Tulun. This was read out from the pulpits of places still under direct 'Abbasid rule, and most notably in Samarra', where it was pronounced by none other than the caliph al-Mu'tamid and his son Ja'far al-Mufawwad. (11) Ibn Tulun was now stymied in his contest with al-Muwaffaq, but he proceeded with his northern campaign and his goal of dislodging Yazman from his position in Tarsus. This campaign went badly for Ibn Tulun as the people of Tarsus, who had already had an unfriendly encounter with him only a few years before (see below), now put up stiff resistance in dismal winter conditions. As Ibn Tulun and his army besieged the town, its defenders diverted the flow of the river Baradan so that it inundated them and forced them to abandon their camp and everything in it. In the midst of all this Ibn Tulun fell ill and returned to Egypt, where he died several months later, in 270/884.

The assembly that Ibn Tulun convened at Damascus was unusual for its time. (12) Nearly a century earlier, 'Abd al-Malik b. Salih, who held the governorship of Syria intermittently during the reigns of al-Rashid and al-Amin (170-198/786-813), solicited the opinions of several leading jurists regarding the fiscal and political status of the island of Cyprus. However, this consultation took place through correspondence (rasa'il) and not by a meeting. (13) We may also consider the conclave of jurists convened years afterward, in Baghdad in 309/922 by the 'Abbasid vizier Hamid b. al-'Abbas, with the goal of destroying the ecstatic mystic al-Hallaj. There, after much prodding, the jurists signed a death warrant, the caliph al-Muqtadir approved it, and al-Hallaj was gibbeted, tortured, and dispatched. This death warrant contained signatures from representatives of the different madhithib, or schools of law. (l4) It is also noteworthy that both these proceedings--the consultation about Cyprus and the kangaroo court for al-Hallaj--were not instigated by caliphs, but rather by a governor and a vizier seeking legal cover for their undertakings. Both instances also generated some publicity. In these ways they had a certain amount in common with Ibn Tulun's assembly of 269/883.

Otherwise the early caliphs, both Umayyad and 'Abbasid, sought advice from legal experts from time to time, but using discretion and out of the public eye. The caliph al-Ma'mun (198-218/813-833) may have been an exception, since he liked...