The Hunt for Bin Laden--Task Force Dagger--On the Ground With the Special Forces in Afghanistan

• Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kevin H. Govern
• Pages: 06

210 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 179 THE HUNT FOR BIN LADEN―TASK FORCE DAGGER―ON

THE GROUND WITH THE SPECIAL FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

REVIEWED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL KEVIN H. GOVERN1

As far as the Green Berets sergeants were concerned, this war was going to be anything but conventional. The ultimate goal was still Osama bin Laden. Taking Afghanistan was just a stop along the way. The Green Berets knew they must control bin Laden's sanctuary in order to destroy his terrorist apparatus. In spite of the broad mission to liberate Afghanistan, one personal mission remained at the forefront of every Green Beret's consciousness: they had to kill the senior leaders of al-Qaida,2 and they had to kill bin Laden.3

Few, if any, authors can match Robin Moore's subject matter immersion in writing a book. Long after his World War II service,4

Moore went through Basic Airborne School at Fort Benning, Georgia; and then, in 1964, became the only civilian to complete the Special Forces (SF) Qualification Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.5 His

reason: to gain access to the troops, locations, and materials that became the heart of his highly popular 1965 book, The Green Berets.6

Thirty-five years later, after the cataclysmic events of 11 September 2001, Moore traveled back to Fort Bragg then forward to Central Asia to be in the midst of Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations and chronicle the efforts of U.S. and Coalition SOF during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). He intended this book to "show . . . how only a few hundred men, operating from a secret SF base, changed the course of history in Central Asia and destroyed a hundred-thousand man terrorist army in less than ninety days."7

This review comments on Moore's study of American, Afghan, and coalition members' operations as part of the Combined Joint Special Operations Force, titled Task Force Dagger, under then-Colonel (promotable) (COL(P)) John F. Mulholland, Jr. It examines the flow of ideas and key themes, and "completes the record" where Moore's book is otherwise silent or inaccurate with respect to applicable law and policy

regarding the most notable comments and vignettes in his book. Moore's work contains equal parts romantic adventure novel and historical analysis of recent SOF operations. The book progresses in twenty-four chapters from the earliest reactions to the World Trade Center and Pentagon disasters,8 through Operation Anaconda9 in which SOF and conventional forces crushed Taliban and al-Qaida strongholds dug deep into the Shah-i-Kot Mountains of eastern Afghanistan, to an epilogue on Moore's SOF protagonist friends and admired colleagues-in-arms.10 He carefully details the appearance, actions, and attitudes of the subjects he discusses in his book, using dramatic emphasis and colorful language to paint a picture of the fast-paced, life-and-death decisions that faced Task Force Dagger troops daily. He also shows his pro-SOF or anti-"conventional force" bias throughout the book,11 and glosses over or misstates some key legal considerations bearing upon the conduct of SOF and coalition forces.

Moore takes many opportunities to revel in Task Force Dagger's use of high tech personal weapons, communications equipment, close air support, horse-borne equipment, motorized ground vehicles, and aircraft, with deadly result against Taliban and al-Qaida forces.12 While Moore concedes that these SOF hardware items were essential to the success of operations in Afghanistan, the abiding requirements for SOF must be consistent with the so-called "SOF Truths."13

General Charles R. Holland, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), has said that a large part of the reason that U.S. SOF can quickly carry out operations overseas is that

several "SOF Truths" are embedded in USSOCOM's philosophy of maintaining high training and deployment readiness.14 These truths reflect the lessons learned from the history of American SOF employment, and the operations in Afghanistan revalidated them.15 The SOF Truths are: (1) "Humans are more important than hardware;" (2) "Quality is better than quantity;" (3) "SOF cannot be mass-produced;" and (4) "SOF cannot be created after a crisis occurs."16 Moore enumerates these truths in this book, but advocates the need for a fifth SOF truth: "Given that SOF Truth #1 is true, humans deserve the requisite personal hardware to fight and survive."17 Moore's rationale for this novel fifth SOF truth was that many in the Department of Defense caught on to the "humans are more important than hardware" philosophy, and directed the acquisition of many pieces of "SOF-developed" equipment because of its desirability and ability to better protect human life.18 Moore bemoans, but fails to substantiate, a perceived lack of missions and resources going to Special Forces.19

Based on that misperception, Moore asserts, with little extra support, that the fifth SOF truth should become reality. Beyond better equipping them, Moore believes the SOF should carry on as the primary force in Afghanistan with conventional force support. 20 Moore's justification is that since "SF ha[s] now shown what they alone [can] do and are now in the hands of the ultimate commander in chief, George W. Bush, and Donald Rumsfeld . . . let them continue to do it, and give them the gear to do it."21

At its core, this book remains a story of innovative and heroic men, rather than military machines. Moore emphasizes the SOF operators' long years of training,22 the sage SOF commanders whose experience guided training and preparation,23 and the SOF operators' interpersonal skills and key relationships they built with Afghan resistance commanders and their forces.24 Those relationships were built on "drinking chai,"25 leading by example in combat rather than training in classroom settings,26 and maximizing the resources of cash and equipment to work and fight together.27 Readers quickly discover that not all the vignettes of Afghan or Northern Alliance leadership were of noble warriors with pure purposes. The seamier side included strained support alliances with Pakistan and Uzbekistan;28 General Franks' purported alienation from Afghan commanders due to intercultural misunderstandings;29 conflicting loyalties of Afghan commanders like Ismail Khan and others with ties to Iran;30 repugnant practices, such as General Naderi's "right of the lord" deflowering of newlywed wives in his tribe;31 and the flamboyant and aggressive homosexual advances of some Afghans towards SOF operators.32

Moore recounts incidents of unintended consequences, such as several purported fratricides resulting from transposed target coordinates, confusion in target identification, and "danger close" proximity to fires.33

He also outlines how integrated, timely, coalition efforts routed Taliban

and al-Qaida forces with unprecedented speed and force of effect in spite of interagency disputes over...