Hunger to Violence: Explaining the Violent Escalation of Nonviolent Demonstrations

AuthorDaniel Gustafson
DOI10.1177/0022002719890669
Published date01 July 2020
Date01 July 2020
Subject MatterArticles
Article
Hunger to Violence:
Explaining the Violent
Escalation of Nonviolent
Demonstrations
Daniel Gustafson
1
Abstract
Under what conditions do nonviolent demonstrations escalate to violence? I answer
this question using a novel theory of individual impatience in protests that begin
peacefully.Rather than considering protestgroups as unitary actors, I present a theory
of collective action in which a group’sdecision over whether or not to engagein anti-
government violence is the product of individual preferences.Individuals involved in a
nonviolent demonstration use the immediacy of their needs and the sustainability of
collective action to decide whether or not to init iate violence against the state.
Specifically, I hypothesize that the likelihood of violent escalation will increase when
the food price increases and unemployment rate is high or when the event is spon-
taneous. Analysis of a Bayesian multilevel model of 2,405 nonviolent demonstrations
from 1991 to 2017 in Africa and Latin America supports my expectations.
Keywords
nonviolence, protest, escalation, food security
Venezuela has been gripped by political and social unrest since 2010. The socio-
economic crisis began during the end of Hugo Ch´avez’s tenure and continued to
grow under President Nicol´as Maduro with citizens calling for his removal from
1
Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC, USA
Corresponding Author:
Daniel Gustafson, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 451
Hamilton Hall Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA.
Email: gustafson@unc.edu
Journal of Conflict Resolution
2020, Vol. 64(6) 1121-1145
ªThe Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0022002719890669
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office and resulting in a presidential crisis. The primary grievance for Venezuelan
citizens is a lack of access to necessary goods including food, water, medicine, and
hygienic supplies. Indeed, in 2016 alone, consumer prices rose by 800 percent (Pons
2017), and roughly 75 percent of the population lost an average of 19 lb. due to lack
of nutrition (Pestano 2017). Throughout this period, political grievance has mani-
fested itself in the form of massive demonstrations. While these events have mostly
originated as peaceful protests, a large portion have escalated to violent encounters
with Venezuelan security forces (Casey 2017). Scholars have developed countless
theories to explain the evolution of civil conflicts but very few that relate to why
individual events become violent. This type of escalation from nonviolence to vio-
lence during events is relatively common. For example, in my sample of 2,405
peaceful protests, roughly 15 percent escalated to violence. Why do some nonviolent
demonstrations remain peaceful while others escalate to violence?
Rather than considering protest groups as unitary actors, I present a theory of
collective action in which a group’s decision is the product of individual preferences.
During periods of civil opposition, nonviolent demonstrations are more likely to
become violent when individual members are impatient, desperate, or fear that
collective action will fall apart. Individuals involved in a nonviolent demonstration
use the immediacy of their needs and the sustainability of collective action to decide
whether or not to begin behaving violently. This theoretical approach is an improve-
ment over the unitary framework because it allows me to consider factors that affect
individuals rather than only group attributes. Exploring the things that shape indi-
vidual decisions is necessary since violent escalation is driven by demonstrators
themselves.
Specifically, I consider three factors that influence demonstrations’ likelihood of
escalation: food price increases, unemployment rate, and whether the protest was
organized or spontaneous. First, food price stability or decreases in a country should
allow nonviolent demonstrators to continue using peaceful tactics to attempt to force
concessions. Higher food prices may necessitate a switch to violent tactics because
the need for nutrition must be immediately resolved. Second, when the unemploy-
ment rate within a country is high, individuals will face increased difficulties in
providing for themselves and their families. As a result, they will be more likely to
try any possible tactic, including violent ones, to coerce change. Beyond these two
factors’ individual impacts, the confluence of high food prices and a high unem-
ployment rate creates an environment in which violent escalation is most likely.
Finally, organized demonstrations indicate that leaders have borne the costs of
collective action, signaling the sustainability of nonviolent action. Conversely, the
duration of spontaneous protests is highly uncertain and may cause demonstrators to
consider a switch to violent tactics before collective action collapses.
This project furthers the violent and nonviolent civil conflict research agenda in
three key ways. First, while countless studies investigate why protests and anti-
government violence occurs, few analyze the dynamics of individual events. By
exploring the factors that encourage nonviolent protests to escalate to violence, I
1122 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(6)

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