Humanitarianism, Egalitarianism, and Public Support for Political Compromise
| Author | David C. Barker,Christopher J. Carman,Shaun Bowler |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221123037 |
| Published date | 01 January 2023 |
| Date | 01 January 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
American Politics Research
2023, Vol. 51(1) 91–107
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221123037
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Humanitarianism, Egalitarianism, and Public
Support for Political Compromise
David C. Barker
1
, Christopher J. Carman
2
, and Shaun Bowler
3
Abstract
Democratic policymaking requires compromise, but public support for it varies substantially. Scholars know relatively little
about the psychology of such public attitudes. In this investigation, we consider the predictive capacities of humanitarianism (a
commitment to helping those who are suffering) and egalitarianism (a commitment to treating people equally). Such altruistic
values, we argue, foster concern for the common good and a cooperative vision of democratic policymaking —which, in turn,
engender support for compromise. Moreover, we suggest that partisan differences in such values (with Democrats being more
likely than Republicans to prioritize them, on average), help explain Democrats’disproportionate support for compromise.
Data from two nationally representative studies are consistent with this theoretical perspective, offering novel insights into the
roots of political compromise, the reach of core values as political determinants, and the dynamics of partisan asymmetry.
Keywords
compromise, core values, humanitarianism, egalitarianism, cooperative visions of democratic policymaking, partisan asymmetry
Political compromise enhances democratic efficacy (Crick,
2005 [1962]; Gutmann & Thompson, 2012), but many cit-
izens are unwilling to support it —at least when it comes to
how they want their own representatives to behave (e.g.,
Hibbing et al., 2009;Wolak, 2020).
1
Such public resistance
incentivizes obstinacy on the part of those lawmakers (e.g.,
Anderson et al., 2020;Barker & Carman, 2012;Kamarck &
Wallner,2018).
2
Thus, as a burgeoning literature reflects, it is
important to understand the variance in public attitudes to-
ward political compromise (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2009;
Mackuen et al., 2010;Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011;Wolf
et al., 2012;Harbridge et al., 2014;Haas, 2016;Bauer,
Harbridge and Krupnikov 2017;Kirkland & Harden, 2018;
Wolak, 2020).
3
Some prominent explanations for why many people
oppose political compromise point to moral, ideological,
and religious commitments (Barker & Carman., 2012,
Ryan, 2 017;Delton, DeScioli and Ryan 2019;Grossmann
& Hopkins, 2016), which can make compromise feel like
“selling out”or “dancing with the devil”(e.g., Grossmann
& Hopkins, 2016;Lelkes & Sniderman, 2016;Schufeldt,
2018;Ryan, 2017;Delton et al, 2019;alsoseeGingeset al.,
2007;Skitka, 2010). An easy inference to draw from these
studies is that the psychology of compromise is one of
moderation, perfidy, and/or weakness —that people
support compromise when they lack either the principles or
thegutstodemandwhattheyreallywant(alsosee
Berelson, 1952).
4
We suggest, by contrast, that some moral commitments
can actually motivate support for compromise. Specifically,
we reason that altruistic values such as humanitarianism (a
commitment to helping those who are suffering) and egali-
tarianism (a commitment to treating people equally) trea
nurture concern for the common good and a conceptuali-
zation of democratic policymaking that emphasizes coop-
eration over competition. As such, we argue, it is easier for
committed humanitarians and egalitarians to make conces-
sions in service to a broader “deal”than it is for citizens
whose values and orientations are weighted more toward
individualistism, competitiveness, and/or social dominance.
5
Moreover, because Democrats are more likely than Re-
publicans to prioritize humanitarian and egalitarian policy
goals over individualistic and/or hierarchy-preserving ones
(e.g., Barker and Tinnick 2006,Mcadams et al., 2008;Piurko
et al, 2011;Haidt, 2012,Barker and Marietta, 2020), we
suggest that such asymmetrical partisan value dynamics help
explain the well-established tendency of Democrats to
1
American University, Washington, DC, USA
2
University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
3
University of California-Riverside, Riverside, CA, USA
Corresponding Author:
David C. Barker, Government, American University, 234 Kerwin Hall,
4400 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, DC 20016-8007, USA.
Email: dbarker@american.edu
support political compromise more readily than Republicans
do (Hibbing et al., 2009;Wolf et al., 2012;Grossmann &
Hopkins, 2016;Ryan, 2017;Glaser & Berry, 2018;Mason,
2018;Wolak, 2020; but see Davis, 2019).
6
Two nationally representative studies, undertaken during
quite different political contexts and using different measures,
offer robust empirical support for our theoretical argument.
We suggest that these findings (a) offer new insight on the
psychology of political compromise, (b) broaden the range of
political attitudes for which scholars examine core values as
potential determinants, and (c) heighten understanding of
partisan asymmetry in political cognition. We hope that they
will catalyze further investigations to strengthen causal
inference.
The Psychology of Attitudes toward
Political Compromise
As with so many other political attitudes, citizens differ
considerably when it comes to their views of political
compromise. To provide just one example, in a 2019 poll by
George Washington University, respondents split evenly
between those who expressed a preference for politicians
who “make compromises with people they disagree with”
and those who preferred politicians who “sticktotheir
positions”—with 64% of Democrats favoring the former
statement and 66% of Republicans favoring the latter (Sides,
2019).
Breaking such attitudes down further, citizens tend to
support the abstract principle of compromise far more than
they support compromises on the part of their own repre-
sentatives (Wolak, 2020)—especially when it comes to
highly salient and divisive issues (Blumenthal, 2010;Doherty
et al., 2018;Sides, 2019).
What explains the variance in such attitudes? Some studies
have pointed to differences in (1) anger (e.g., Mackuen et al.,
2010), (2) psychological loss aversion (Glaser & Berry,
2018), (3) anti-government sentiment (Glaser & Berry,
2018;Glaser et al., 2019), (4) perceived threat (Maoz and
McCauley, 2009;Halperin et al., 2013;Haas, 2016), and (5)
social identity consciousness (Cohen et al., 2007;Mason,
2018;Davis, 2019).
7
Perhaps the most prominent explanation, though, points
to conviction —moral, ideological, and/or religious (e.g.,
Ryan, 2017;Delton, DeScioli and Ryan 2019;Grossmann
& Hopkins, 2016). Such conviction, the argument goes,
causes people to view compromise as a violation of
something sacred rather than a transactional necessity in
pluralistic communities (e.g., Tetlock, 2003;Marietta,
2012). The logic and evidence for this perspective are
compelling, as a general rule, but we suggest that there are
some important exceptions to that rule. That is, we argue
that some core values actually engender support,notre-
sistance, to compromise.
8
The specific values we have in mind are humanitarianism
and egalitarianism. Though the former is rooted in emotional
sympathy and the latter is rooted in a devotion to fairness
(Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001), the two values share an
empathetic concern for others to whom one is not genetically
or “tribally”related —especially for the underprivileged and
downtrodden.
9
It stands to reason, then, that such humani-
tarians and egalitarians (who are often, but not always, the
same people) would also tend to feel positively disposed
toward political processes that prioritize sociotropic bridging
between groups. Compromise is one such political process,
almost by definition. To compromise, after all, is to make
some measure of parochial sacrifice in order to promote
meaningful progress toward a collective agreement. Fittingly,
in actual negotiation settings, compassion is associated with
successful deal-making (e.g., Allred et al., 1997).
10
More directly, such altruistic instincts may also inspire a
conceptualization of democratic policymaking that pursues
consensus through cooperation (e.g., Rousseau 1782,
Mansbridge, 1980,Habermas et al., 1984;Fishkin 1991)—
to which compromise is essential. The absence of such in-
stincts, by contrast, may lead to a vision of democratic
policymaking as a venue for tribal competition (Sibley et al.,
2007), to which compromise is anathema (see Allred et al.,
1997; also see Glaser et al., 2019).
11
This logic is supported
by historical analyses pointing to the socially Darwinistic
roots of “adversarial”policymaking in the early Republic, as
well as the altruistic underpinnings of its more cooperative
alternatives (Mansbridge, 1980). Likewise, Levine (1999)
describes how pushing for cooperative models of democratic
policymaking was central to Progressive era ambitions —the
essence of which were altruistic commitments toward the
needy and the oppressed.
Accordingly, we further suggest that humanitarian and
egalitarian values account for some of the oft-noted partisan
asymmetry in support for compromise (e.g., Grossmann &
Hopkins, 2016;Ryan, 2017;Davis, 2019;Glaser & Berry,
2018;Glaser et al., 2019). American liberals/progressives
tend to define morality in humanitarian and egalitarian terms,
after all, whereas ideological conservatives are more likely to
prioritize competition, individualism, and punitive justice
(e.g., Lakoff, 1996,Barker and Tinnick, 2006;Mcadams
et al., 2008;Haidt, 2012,Barker and Marietta, 2020).
12
As
such, given the parties’contemporary ideological sorting
(e.g., Levendusky, 2009), we argue that Democrats are more
likely than Republicans to view compromise as a tool for
progress, whereas the latter are more likely to view it as
selling out. Such commitments to altruistic values such as
humanitarianism and egalitarianism, and thus (per our ar-
gument) to a vision of collective decisionmaking in which
consensus is a goal, may help to account for Democrats’
relatively steadfast pursuit of compromise despite some
evidence that the contemporary Republican Party does not
always deliberate in good faith (e.g., Hacker and Pierson
2016;Mann & Ornstein, 2016).
92 American Politics Research 51(1)
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