Human Rights Abused? Terrorist Labeling and Individual Reactions to Call to Action

AuthorAna Bracic,Amanda Murdie
Published date01 December 2020
DOI10.1177/1065912919861154
Date01 December 2020
Subject MatterArticles
/tmp/tmp-18Xxte85J9nRcq/input 861154PRQXXX10.1177/1065912919861154Political Research QuarterlyBracic and Murdie
research-article2019
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2020, Vol. 73(4) 878 –892
Human Rights Abused?
© 2019 University of Utah
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Terrorist Labeling and Individual
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919861154
DOI: 10.1177/1065912919861154
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq
Reactions to Call to Action
Ana Bracic1 and Amanda Murdie2
Abstract
What leads individuals to be motivated to act for human rights causes? Human rights organizations (HROs) often use
personal and emotional stories of the abused in order to gain the attention of individuals reading newspapers or emails
directly from the organization. McEntire, Leiby, and Krain show that personal frames are most successful at increasing
knowledge about a specific human rights situation and motivating individuals to act. However, HROs are not operating
in a political vacuum; repressive governments often try to spin information about abuses and the abused to their
advantage. This study uses an experimental approach to address how the discursive interactions between states and
HROs influence individual-level support of HRO efforts. When governments respond to HRO claims by labeling the
abused as a terrorist, individuals are much less likely to be spurred into certain types of action, like signing a petition,
and feel differently about the specific case. Interestingly, we do not find that trust in the information provided by an
HRO is harmed by being associated with someone labeled a terrorist.
Keywords
human rights, human rights organizations, NGOs, experiments
There can be a fine line between defending the rights of
hope that individuals in third-party countries will pres-
terror suspects and defending their views. Amnesty
sure their own political representatives to increase dip-
International has been thrust into a very public struggle
lomatic pressure on the repressive regime. Because of
about where exactly that line is.
this increased attention and diplomacy from a now-
—Guz Raz, NPR Host of “All Things Considered” February
empowered transnational advocacy network, regime
27, 2010.
leaders are often forced to rethink the imprisonment of
the identified prisoner (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse,
For decades, Amnesty International and other human
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 2013).
rights organizations (HROs) have been working for the
Although advocating on the behalf of prisoners of con-
release of “prisoners of conscience” throughout the
science is just one small portion of what Amnesty
world. These individuals are often serving long prison
International does, collecting information and sharing
sentences in excruciating conditions; they have been
stories of abused individuals has been a crucial tactic in
jailed for nothing more than their beliefs and nonviolent
the repertoire of many HROs. This tactic is often called
advocacy efforts. Once a prisoner of conscience is iden-
“naming and shaming” or “shaming and blaming.”
tified, Amnesty International and other HROs begin a
Recent cross-national research has found that naming and
media campaign specifically designed to increase pres-
shaming tactics can influence foreign policy decisions
sure on a regime to release the prisoner. Both directly,
(Murdie and Peksen 2013, 2014), change investment pat-
through emails and social media, and indirectly, through
terns (Barry, Clay, and Flynn 2013), end genocides and
media coverage of their press releases and reports,
HROs try to get individuals around the world to under-
1Michigan State University, East Lansing, USA
stand the plight of the prisoner of conscience and join
2University of Georgia, Athens, USA
efforts to get the prisoner released. For those in the same
Corresponding Author:
country as the prisoner, HROs hope that the poignant
Amanda Murdie, University of Georgia, 327 Candler Hall, Athens, GA
information they provide will lead citizens to pressure
30602, USA.
their government for the prisoner’s release. HROs also
Email: murdie@uga.edu

Bracic and Murdie
879
politicides (DeMeritt 2012; Krain 2012), and, in certain
of the HRO itself could have lasting consequences for
situations, improve human rights practices (Hendrix and
the success of the organization. Many repressive govern-
Wong 2013; Murdie and Davis 2012).
ments have been increasing their targeting of civil soci-
The success of HROs and of the overall transnational
ety groups, a phenomenon known as “closing civil
advocacy network, however, rests on the ability of HROs
society space” (Wilson 2016, 331). If individuals also
to influence individuals—both elites and non-elites—to
lose faith in HROs when repressive governments issue
take actions to stop human rights abuses. If the informa-
counterclaims, this could doubly restrict the ability of
tion HROs produce fails to motivate individuals into
HROs to improve human rights.
action, the transnational advocacy network breaks down
This paper proceeds as follows. We first provide some
before it can be argued to have any potential impact on
background on the work of HROs and the strategic use of
repressive regimes.
information by HROs and governments. We then present
HROs often use personal and emotional stories of the
our theoretical argument and hypotheses. Our experimen-
abused in order to gain the attention of individuals read-
tal design is then presented and our results are discussed.
ing newspapers or emails directly from the organization.
We conclude by situating our findings into the larger
When compared to informational or motivational frames
practitioner and academic literature and provide some
of abuse, McEntire, Leiby, and Krain (2015b) show that
calls for future research.
personal frames are most successful at increasing knowl-
edge about a specific human rights situation and motivat-
ing individuals to act.
HRO Accounts of Government
However, HROs are not operating in a political vac-
Abuse
uum; repressive governments often try to spin informa-
tion about abuses and the abused to their advantage
HROs are crucial actors in overall transnational advocacy
(Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 2013). Many prisoners
efforts; their attention is commonly seen as the critical
of conscience have been accused of violence and labeled
factor in both mobilizing international condemnation and
terrorists by the governments that imprison them, often
strengthening local efforts for human rights improvement
without clear evidence that this is actually the case. This
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).
information makes it to the same news outlets that are
This process of human rights improvement, however, is
covering the HRO’s press releases and reports. News
not strictly linear and often involves a very serious back
stories on the abuses HROs uncover regularly include
and forth with repressive regimes. Risse, Ropp, and
counterclaims made by repressive governments. The
Sikkink (1999) lay out this logic in their discussion of the
media may include these counterclaims in an effort to
five phases of potential human rights change, which they
appear unbiased.
term the “spiral model” (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 22). In
In this project, we conduct a survey experiment to
the first phase, HROs and other transnational advocacy
examine whether information—coming directly from the
actors become aware of abuse and begin their attempts
government accused of the abuse—claiming that the
for more international attention and condemnation, start-
abused person is a terrorist is enough to stop individuals
ing with just gathering information about the abuses. In
from supporting a personalist HRO campaign. Does ter-
the second phase, as HRO shaming against the targeted
rorist labeling affect a person’s willingness to trust the
state ratchets up, the repressive government’s “initial
HRO and their feelings on the case? Does it limit an indi-
reaction . . . is almost always one of denial” (Risse and
vidual’s willingness to support the campaign?
Sikkink 1999, 7).
In extant studies of HROs, advocacy networks, and
At this second phase of the spiral model, targeted gov-
shaming, the counteractions of governments in response
ernments often try to frame the HRO and accounts of the
to HRO shaming are rarely addressed.1 This study uses
abuses as ignoring the security needs of the state; in other
an experimental approach to address how the discursive
words, the repressive state tries to invalidate the claims of
interactions between states and HROs influence individ-
the HRO, often with references to the need for order and
ual-level support of HRO efforts. Individuals often have
national security. It is at this stage that claims of violence
a front-row seat to this discursive interaction in the press
and terrorism frequently appear, as the repressive state
and social media. When a repressive regime labels a
tries to isolate “domestic human rights organization and
prisoner of conscience a terrorist, does this limit the suc-
international pressures by identifying these groups as
cess of an HRO’s personalist frame? If so, understanding
conscious or unconscious accomplices of terrorism”
and anticipating government counteractions to HRO
(Risse and Sikkink 1999, 23). As Risse and Sikkink
attention is necessary to improve human rights. (1999) point out, these...

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