HOW WE WON & LOST THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: TWO YEARS IN THE PASHTUN HOMELAND.

• Author: McGuire, Conor
• Position: Book review

A Review of How We Won & Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

By Douglas Grindle

(Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2017), 288 pages.

As a former field officer for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Douglas Grindle relates a first-hand account of his time in Afghanistan. In his accounts, he shows readers how the United States' efforts--both military and civilian--to stave off the Taliban and implement development projects to grow the Afghan economy were both intermittently successful and, ultimately, a failure. Grindle's thesis, made explicit in the title, is a compelling one. According to him, although the US military made the necessary security gains for peace and the civilian efforts of USAID laid the groundwork for effective development projects, a combination of haphazard long-term planning and the premature withdrawal of already insufficient funds prevented the US from achieving its aims. Returning to anecdotes of the ups and downs of individual projects that he undertook over the course of several years in two of Afghanistan's southern districts, Dand and Maiwand, Grindle certainly achieves what he sets out to do in this book by giving readers insight into the day-to-day foibles that cost the US the war against the Taliban.

Following his journey from joining USAID and initial placement in the district of Dand to his transfer more than a year later to the district of Maiwand, Grindle takes us away from the capital of Kabul and into Afghanistan's more rural southern districts to see how far U.S. military and development initiatives reached and in what capacity. In Dand, Grindle works directly with District Governor (DG) Hamdullah Nazak, who proves to be a masterful leader in his dealings with individuals from all sectors of society, from farmers to tribal elders to the Taliban. Over the course of Grindle's time in Dand, DG Nazak meticulously establishes a system of governance that positions the Dand district to benefit from American aid money by successfully implementing many development projects, such as a well-repair program and training for women on tailoring. Ultimately, however, Grindle shows us how the "flabby thinking" of USAID headquarters and the decision by higher-ups to pull aid money from the rural districts contributes to the collapse of the system DG Nazak had so painstakingly put in place. In Maiwand (where the Taliban has a greater grip on the territory, and opium poppy...