How Voters Punish and Donors Protect Legislators Embroiled in Scandal
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912918781044 |
| Author | Brian T. Hamel,Michael G. Miller |
| Published date | 01 March 2019 |
| Date | 01 March 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2018
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2019, Vol. 72(1) 117 –131
How Voters Punish and Donors Protect
© 2018 University of Utah
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Legislators Embroiled in Scandal
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918781044
DOI: 10.1177/1065912918781044
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq
Brian T. Hamel1 and Michael G. Miller2
Abstract
Previous studies have largely overlooked three key components of a scandal that could determine how it shapes
election outcomes: the extent to which it is covered in the media, the potential that donors respond differently
than voters, and the likelihood that the impact of scandals have changed over time. Examining U.S. House scandals
between 1980 and 2010, we find that while scandal-tainted politicians receive fewer votes and are less likely to win
than otherwise similar legislators not embroiled in scandal, donors actually contribute more money to their campaigns
after the scandal’s revelation. Both of these effects, however, are limited to financial and sex scandals that garnered
national media attention. Moreover, we find that voters are less punitive and donors are even more supportive in the
post-1994 period of nationalized electoral politics.
Keywords
scandal, elections, donors, media coverage, Congress
Scandal is an omnipresent force in American politics.
details of a scandal matter, but also that individuals are
Indeed, at least one member of the U.S. House has been
reasonably sophisticated in how they evaluate scandal-
embroiled in a scandal during each Congress since 1991,
tainted politicians (e.g., Doherty, Dowling, and Miller
resulting in dozens of indictments, resignations, and failed
2011).
reelection bids (Basinger 2013). Given that scandals are
However, we believe that important questions remain
such an enduring feature of American politics, academics
largely unexplored. First, the scandal categorization
and media alike have devoted a great deal of attention to
scheme that researchers typically employ might sometimes
understanding their effects. The general expectation,
fail to adequately reflect the circumstances under which
given the litany of defeats and high-profile resignations, is
“bad behavior” becomes “scandal,” because the visibility
that scandals should be detrimental to a political career.
of such behavior (i.e., the extent to which it receives major
Yet despite their apparent challenges, many scandal-
media coverage) is likely to be a more important determi-
tainted politicians ultimately win reelection (e.g., Basinger
nant of its political significance than its “type.” Second,
2013; Jacobson and Dimock 1994; Peters and Welch
donors’ responses to even the most visible scandals may
1980; Rottinghaus 2014; Welch and Hibbing 1997).1
attenuate the overall damage to a politician’s political
While this puzzle has been oft-identified in the extant lit-
future. We posit that since donors are both more ideologi-
erature, previous research has yielded only limited insight
cally motivated than voters (Barber 2016b; Bonica 2014)
into why some scandalous politicians manage to over-
and display a high degree of sophistication generally
come their circumstances, while others fail.
(Barber, Canes-Wrone, and Thrower 2017), they might
Much existing research has looked to the particulars of
take a longer view, contributing more money in the wake
the alleged conduct for answers. For instance, prior work
of a scandal to protect their investment. Third, the manner
has considered whether “financial” scandals are more
in which voters and donors respond to scandal today may
damaging than those featuring a “moral” transgression—
differ from the way that people reacted to scandals in
with mixed results (Basinger 2013; Carlson, Ganiel, and
Hyde 2000; Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2011, 2014;
1
Welch and Hibbing 1997). Other work has categorized
University of California, Los Angeles, USA
2Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
scandals by recency, evaluating whether the immediate
effects of scandals are worse than older ones (Doherty,
Corresponding Author:
Dowling, and Miller 2014; Praino, Stockemer, and
Brian T. Hamel, Department of Political Science, University of
California, Los Angeles, 4289 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095-
Moscardelli 2013). Although previous findings do not
1472, USA.
always agree, they typically underscore not only that the
Email: bhamel@ucla.edu
118
Political Research Quarterly 72(1)
earlier time periods. This question is particularly salient
of politicians (e.g., Carlson, Ganiel, and Hyde 2000;
given recent work arguing that American electoral politics
Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2011, 2014; Funk 1996;
have become increasingly nationalized of late (e.g., Bonica
Jacobson and Dimock 1994; Peters and Welch 1980; Welch
and Cox, 2018; Hopkins 2018; Lee 2016). We, therefore,
and Hibbing 1997). In many cases, the effect is sizable.
might expect voters to be less punitive and donors to be
Peters and Welch (1980), for example, show an average
even more supportive in the wake of scandals that occurred
vote share decrease of 6 to 11 percent. The resultant per-
during the more nationalized period.
ception of vulnerability appears to have substantial elec-
To test these expectations, we examine how the reve-
toral ramifications; politicians involved in scandals fare
lation of a scandal affects the subsequent behavior of both
worse in the election after the scandal breaks (Basinger
the mass voting public and campaign contributors. Using
2013), in part because they are more likely to face a strong
data on scandals in the U.S. House between 1980 and
challenge in subsequent primary elections, general elec-
2010, we compare outcomes for scandal-tainted Members
tions, or both (Basinger 2013; Hirano and Snyder 2012;
of Congress (MCs) to those for similar non-scandal-
Lazarus 2008).
tainted MCs with a selection on observables identifica-
Yet, despite these difficulties, most legislators impli-
tion strategy. We distinguish between scandals that
cated in scandal ultimately retain their seats (Basinger
garnered coverage in a national newspaper (the New York
2013; Peters and Welch 1980; Welch and Hibbing 1997).
Times) and those that received no such national media
For example, Basinger (2013) shows that 73 percent of
attention. We report four key findings. First, we demon-
scandal-tainted incumbents survived the subsequent pri-
strate that MCs involved in a scandal receive fewer votes
mary, and of those, 81 percent won the next general elec-
and are less likely to win reelection than MCs not
tion. Likewise, Peters and Welch (1980) find that 75
embroiled in a scandal. Second, we show that MCs
percent of corrupt members who reach the general elec-
involved in a scandal raise more money in the immediate
tion win reelection. These figures might seem high, par-
aftermath of a scandal than do similar non-scandal-tainted
ticularly given the importance of trust (e.g. Fenno 1978,
legislators. Third, while these first two findings point to
56) and perceived ethics in the dyadic legislator-constitu-
differing motivations of voters and donors, they are con-
ent relationship (Butler and Powell 2014). This begs a
strained to scandals that received national media atten-
question: If scandal is so detrimental to voters’ immediate
tion, with particularly strong effects in nationally visible
judgment of politicians, why are so many scandalous
financial and sex scandals (as opposed to “political” or
politicians re-elected?
“other” types of scandals). Fourth, consistent with recent
One explanation for the seemingly high rate of scandal
theories of electoral competition and the nationalization
survival is that the oft-noted incumbency advantage (e.g.,
of politics, we find that all of these effects are signifi-
Gelman and King 1990) helps MCs to blunt their effects.
cantly different in the post-1994 period than they were
However, the story is almost certainly more complex.
before; voters appear to be less willing to punish politi-
Previous work has recognized that the capacity of a scan-
cians during this period, while donors offer more support
dal to harm a politician’s subsequent electoral prospects
to scandal-tainted members of Congress.
likely depends in large part upon the scandal itself. Much
In short, our findings suggest that voters do not pun-
extant research has, therefore, employed some categori-
ish, and donors do not make effort to rescue, scandalous
zation of scandal in an effort to determine which ones are
MCs unless the scandal is serious enough to garner media
especially damaging. For instance, a growing literature
attention in the national press. Moreover, this is a fairly
has recognized a difference between “moral” offenses—
new development that has coincided with the rise of
those involving sexual or some other kind of social
national political media and the twenty-four-hour news
impropriety—and “financial” transgressions featuring
cycle. These results, therefore, suggest the need to aug-
misbehavior relating to a MC’s taxes, spending, or cam-
ment a typology of scandal with additional consider-
paign finance accounts. When it comes to the question of
ations, such as the extent to which it was covered by the
which scandal type...
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