How to unlock innovation at the Defense Department.

AuthorTrail, Scott
PositionCOMMENTARY

* The United States is losing its technological edge. As Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall states in Better Buying Power 3.0, the wide availability of advanced computing technologies and vulnerability of intellectual property is challenging our technological superiority. This challenge is occurring at a time when producing new systems takes 10 to 20 years and they end up closely resembling those fielded decades earlier.

Innovation was not always this stagnant. During the late 1960s through the early 1980s, innovation flourished at the Defense Department. Since then, new programs--especially large ones--replaced existing systems with upgraded versions. In 2014, eight out of the 10 largest defense programs were replacements or upgrades of existing equipment. While providing improved capability, these eight programs hold little hope of fundamentally changing warfare. The two arguable exceptions are the V-22 and joint strike fighter programs. Both experienced delays during development.

What happened in the 1980s to stifle innovation? With reports of $600 toilet seats dominating the evening news and corruption involving senior Pentagon officials, Congress passed over 240 laws between 1985 and 1986. In response the Defense Department created an undersecretary of defense, senior government positions, military executive and vice chief posts. Nearly 11 months of development contract cycle time growth can be attributed to systems developed since 1980. The increase in legislation likely contributed heavily to that cycle time increase. Of this slew of legislation, the most influential was the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The act, as interpreted, has created an impenetrable wall between the services, which approve requirements, and the acquisition process managed by the office of the secretary of defense. But, according to a 2010 RAND Corp. study, this wall exists despite the fact that members of Congress did not intend it to be built. In turn, the barrier between services and OSD gave rise to the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System in 2002.

The JCIDS process is a capabilities-based assessment that establishes detailed, top down, rigid requirements that can take two years to complete. For over 14 years, this lengthy and detailed requirements process has produced systems with little innovation, largely resembling the systems they replace.

Based on the requirements produced by JCIDS, large...

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