How to stop the Iranian bomb.

• Author: Kemp, Geoffrey

WITH THE fall of Ba'athi Iraq, there are only two targets left on the famous, or infamous, "axis of evil." And the tactfulness of the original locution aside, Iran is one of them. The Iranian regime sponsors terrorists who murder Americans and is building a very sophisticated, independent nuclear-technology infrastructure.

The Bush Administration has vowed to take pre-emptive action against regimes that pose such threats, so Iran's mullahs must be wondering if they are next in line for the application of U.S. force. After all, they more resemble Ba'athi Iraq's leadership--an elite seeking but still lacking an operational nuclear weapons capability--than they do the leadership of their missile trading partner in North Korea, which appears to have put itself beyond relatively risk-free U.S. military action. The mullahs know that the United States already has sufficient military power in the region to reduce most of Iran's budding nuclear infrastructure to rubble within 48 hours. They know, too, that all international efforts, including U.S. economic sanctions, to dissuade Iran from the nuclear course short of using force have failed. They have well earned the right to be worried.

So has the United States. Absent a fundamental change in the policy of the Iranian regime, especially its support for terrorism, or a change of the regime itself, the prospect of an Iranian bomb is very, very dangerous. The dangers fall into several categories. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the current regime would be regarded by its neighbors as a profound threat and would almost certainly stimulate interest in acquiring nuclear weapons in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The smaller Gulf Arab countries, meanwhile, are likely to call for a more explicit U.S. nuclear guarantee--and they might get it. Whether or not the United States agrees to a new iteration of nuclear guarantees, an Iranian nuclear capability, together with its missile program, will eventually threaten Europe, Russia and the United States itself. Such a capability would further harm the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whether Iran obtains the bomb legally by withdrawing from the Treaty, or illegally by violating it. And the bomb in the hands of the current Iranian regime could embolden it to provide more military and political support to the terrorist organizations Hizballah, llamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, all pledged to destroy the state of Israel. In extremis, Iran could provide nuclear or radiological material to these groups.

In light of all this, it may be satisfying to contemplate the expeditious destruction of Iran's nuclear facilities--and some Americans are arguing the case. But the use of force should be the very last resort in dealing with the problem of Iran's would-be bomb. There are three main reasons for this.

First, an attack would not end, but probably only delay the regime's ambition; and one can imagine political circumstances in which third countries would aid a post-attack Iran such that the delay would not be very significant. Even more important, however, some senior Iranian officials are mindful of the dynamics iterated just above and are not convinced that moving from a nuclear infrastructure to the actual fabrication and deployment of nuclear weapons is in Iran's national interest. The more likely a U.S. attack seems, the less influence such doubters are liable to have. A U.S. attack could also be counterproductive politically in Iran, where those opposed to the regime could be harmed by a welling up of Iranian nationalist fury.

Second, the broader political price the United States would pay for attacking Iran, almost certainly without allies and against the will of most major states, would be considerable. Unlike Ba'athi Iraq, Iran has yet to be found in serious breach of any of its legal commitments to existing non-proliferation agreements, nor does it have a record of invading its neighbors such that the United Nations Security Council has been moved to partially suspend its sovereignty.

The best reason, however, for avoiding the use of military force, at least for now, is that diplomatic means are available that can seriously slow and complicate, if not halt altogether, the Iranian program. Some of these means turn on technical vulnerabilities in the Iranian program, as we shall see just below. This is a case, moreover, where slowing the program may yield qualitative advantage. For if the regime in Tehran should change for the better, or change altogether, before Iran's bomb comes into being, then the problem, while not disappearing, becomes a good deal easier to manage. This possibility is not far-fetched.

There may also be an upside to U.S. restraint. If the present Iranian regime can be persuaded to abandon terrorism and, as a result, enter into a political dialogue with the U.S. government, the calculus of risks and incentives in Iran's contemplation of deploying nuclear weapons can perhaps be influenced for the better. Such an Iran could make possible the reconsideration of concepts for a regional security regime for the greater Middle East that could enfold the growing dangers of chemical and biological weapons proliferation as well as nuclear proliferation. If there is parallel progress on resolving the Palestinian-Israeli issue, a new dialogue on the sensitive subject of Israel's nuclear weapons might also be possible.

To stop, or significantly slow down, Iran's push for a bomb will require a multilateral, multi-tiered effort headed by the United States. It would have to involve carrots as well as threatened sticks, and much greater cooperation with Europe, Russia and China. It will, of course, also require a fundamental change in Iran's bilateral relations with the United States. However difficult both parts of this effort may be, it is worth pursuing. Otherwise, either hoping for relatively quick regime change in Tehran or a decision to use force made in Washington will remain the only options available to stop the Iranian bomb, with all the uncertainties of the former and all the dangers and costs of the latter.

The Iranian Program

IRAN'S NUCLEAR ambitions are the result of complex ideological and geopolitical circumstances. While the mullahs are clearly eager to build up their nuclear infrastructure, obviously to create an option to deploy a bomb, Iran's program began well before their tenure. The late Shah initiated it, and his motives were a fusion of Iranian national ambition and concern for the direction of the neighborhood. Some rather-too-casual observers have come to see Iranian strategic planning as if its planners had only one eye--facing westward, toward Iraq and Israel. But in the Shah's time, Iran also looked north toward the Soviet Union and east toward Pakistan and India. Over the past quarter century, the significance of an Iranian bomb as a sort of force de frappe-style insurance policy against the Soviet Union has lost much salience, but the United States has come to replace it as far as the present regime is concerned. More important, the strategic problem posed by India and especially Pakistan has risen dramatically. While the Islamic regime's anti-Israel posture is radical, uncompromising (so far) and worrisome, it would be a mistake to underplay Iranian concern with Pakistan, a mostly Sunni Muslim country with more than twice Iran's population and one facing long-term political instability.

As a result of such concerns, Iran has long been embarked on a serious and cleverly-structured project to develop a completely indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. The most advanced component is a 1,000 megawatt nuclear plant being built with Russian help at Bushehr on the northern Persian Gulf. When this and related fuel cycle projects are fully operational, Iran will be independent of foreign fuel suppliers for its nuclear power reactors and therefore capable of developing its own weapons-grade fuel. Since the...