How to detect illegal corporate insider trading? A data mining approach for detecting suspicious insider transactions
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/isaf.1446 |
Author | Ulkem Basdas,M. Fevzi Esen,Emrah Bilgic |
Published date | 01 April 2019 |
Date | 01 April 2019 |
RESEARCH ARTICLE
How to detect illegal corporate insider trading? A data mining
approach for detecting suspicious insider transactions
M. Fevzi Esen
1
|Emrah Bilgic
2
|Ulkem Basdas
3
1
Istanbul Medeniyet University, Istanbul,
Turkey
2
Kayseri University, Kayseri, Turkey
3
Philip Morris International, Izmir, Turkey
Correspondence
Esen, M. Fevzi, Istanbul Medeniyet University,
Istanbul, Turkey
Email: fevzi.esen@medeniyet.edu.tr
Summary
Only in the U.S. Stock Exchanges, the daily average trading volume is about 7 bil-
lion shares. This vast amount of trading shows the necessity of understanding the
hidden insights in the data sets. In this study, a data mining technique, clustering
based outlier analysis is applied to detect suspicious insider transactions.
1,244,815 transactions of 61,780 insiders are analysed, which are acquired from
Thomson Financial, covering a period of January 2010–April 2017. In order to
detect outliers, similar transactions are grouped into the same clusters by using a
two‐step clustering based outlier detection technique, which is an integration of
k‐means and hierarchical clustering. Then, it is shown that outlying transactions
earn higher abnormal returns than non‐outlying transactions by using event study
methodology.
KEYWORDS
Corporate InsiderTrading, Event Study, Fraud Detection, Outlier Analysis
1|INTRODUCTION
CEOs, directors, managers and other executive members, those who
are required to disclose their transactions to the public, are a class of
corporate insiders accessing inside information of a company. Corpo-
rate insiders are required to report their transactions in their own firms
following the transaction. Therefore, the stock returns of their transac-
tions are widely studied in the literature. Early researches focused more
on the empirical background of corporate insider transactions and
descriptive findings. In general, these studies suggest that corporate
insiders were willing to exploit their preferential and superior access
to non‐public information in order to get unfair informational advantage
over the market. Besides, the profits generated by insiders (i.e., the
returns of these trades) were found statistically significant (Lakonishok
& Lee, 2001; Lin & Howe, 1990; Marin & Olivier, 2008; Seyhun, 1986).
These researches confirmed that corporate insider trading is informa-
tive and corporate insiders gain higher returns than the market.
Despite the proved informativeness of insider trading, insiders
make their trades for a variety of reasons. Traders, who do not have
any preferential access to inside information and trade for liquidity
or some other reasons, are associated with informational disadvantage
against informed corporate insiders. The uninformed traders (i.e., out-
siders) must ascertain whether insider transactions are privileged of
possession of inside information that would affect the firm value.
Therefore, the classification of information content of an insider trad-
ing is also critical to drive conclusions.
There are specific kinds of corporate insider transactions that have
been prohibited by the law. Insider ‐Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
and Insider ‐Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
define illegal insider trading as “buying or selling securities by insiders,
while in possession of material, non‐public information which is not avail-
able to the public”(SEC, 2018). Martha Stewart's stock trading on pref-
erential information and Levine & Boesky's misappropriation of
material, non‐public information about firms for the purpose of
profiting are high‐profile cases of people, who were convicted of
engaging in illegal insider trading.
The presence of abnormal returns from corporate insider transac-
tions shows that insiders use preferential information to conduct prof-
itable trades and they perform significantly better than market. If
insiders' transactions contain predictive content for future returns,
we would expect to see significant abnormal returns (Seyhun, 2000;
Tavakoli, McMillan, & McKnight, 2012).
Received: 7 August 2018 Revised: 15 April 2019 Accepted: 23 April 2019
DOI: 10.1002/isaf.1446
60 © 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Intell Sys Acc Fin Mgmt. 2019;26:60–70.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/isaf
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