How the Unorganized Mass Public (Sometimes) Gets Represented in Regulatory Politics

• Published date: 01 March 2018
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912917724005
• Date: 01 March 2018
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917724005

Political Research Quarterly

2018, Vol. 71(1) 88 –101

© 2017 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912917724005

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Article

Introduction

In recent years, exploding oil rigs, undrinkable tap water,

and waves of foreclosures have highlighted how weak

enforcement may undermine regulation that is designed

to protect the well-being of the public.1 Ideally, in a

democracy, th e public interest would be served by the

threat of electoral accountability for regulatory failures.

There are, of course, other factors at work, including the

political influence of well-organized industry actors, poten-

tially weakening regulatory enforcement. Considering that

elections are one of the main, albeit imperfect, mechanisms

by which the public exerts control over policy, surpris-

ingly few studies examine how electoral incentives spur

the government to regulate vigorously on behalf of

consumers.

Understanding how and why regulation is crafted and

implemented in a manner that benefits the public is criti-

cally important. The vivid examples cited above illustrate

that whether the government stringently enforces regula-

tion has important consequences for the nation’s econ-

omy and its citizens’ quality of life. In addition to the

dramatic regulatory failures that make headlines, scholars

have argued that ineffective regulatory enforcement in

affluent democracies has permitted a rise in industry rent-

seeking, contributing to growing economic inequality

and other negative outcomes for citizens (Sorensen 1996;

Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011).

Classic theories and recent research suggest that

industry will be advantaged in competition with the

poorly organized mass public, leading to weak, ineffec-

tive regulation (Gordon and Hafer 2014; Haeder and

Yackee 2015; Kolko 1965; Lowi 1969; McConnell 1966;

Stigler 1971; Yackee and Yackee 2006). However, it is

puzzling that democratically elected governments so

often appear to oversee weak regulatory enforcement that

fails to benefit the public and, instead, benefits industry.

Elections are intended to ensure that the unorganized

public exercises some control over policy (Hill, Leighley,

and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Leighley and Nagler 2007),

and important research at both the federal and state level

indicates that policy making can, under certain condi-

tions, be responsive to the preferences of the mass public

(Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 1995, 2002; Lax and

Phillips 2012). Moreover, literature on political control of

the bureaucracy suggests that regulatory activity is often

consistent with the preferences of elected political princi-

pals (Wood and Waterman 1994).

724005PRQXXX10.1177/1065912917724005Political Research QuarterlyMiller et al.

research-article2017

1University of South Carolina, Columbia, USA

Corresponding Author:

Christopher Witko, Department of Political Science, University of

South Carolina, 349 Gambrell Hall, 817 Henderson Street, Columbia,

SC 29208-4114, USA.

Email: witko@sc.edu

How the Unorganized Mass Public

(Sometimes) Gets Represented in

Regulatory Politics

Susan M. Miller1, Christopher Witko1, and Neal D. Woods1

Abstract

Many scholars have argued that because consumers are poorly organized, regulatory enforcement will tend to be lax

and serve the interests of industry. Considering, however, that elections are one of the main mechanisms by which

the public exerts control over policy, surprisingly few studies have examined how electoral incentives may spur the

government to regulate vigorously on behalf of consumers. We argue that when the threat of electoral accountability

is greater, regulatory activities will serve the interests of the public, even if they impose costs on industry. We test this

theoretical expectation by analyzing state regulatory activity in the wake of exogenous storms and natural disasters,

which provide us with important theoretical and causal leverage. We find that a more “pro-regulation” electorate and

elected chief regulators acting in close proximity to elections are associated with pro-consumer regulatory action.

Keywords

regulation, elections, insurance, business, consumers, disasters