How Terrorism Spreads: Emulation and the Diffusion of Ethnic and Ethnoreligious Terrorism

Published date01 November 2020
DOI10.1177/0022002720930811
Date01 November 2020
AuthorSara M. T. Polo
Subject MatterArticles
Article
How Terrorism Spreads:
Emulation and the
Diffusion of Ethnic
and Ethnoreligious
Terrorism
Sara M. T. Polo
1
Abstract
Previous research on the causes of domestic terrorism has tended to focus on
domestic determinants. Although this approach can be helpful to understand many
causes of terrorism, it implicitly disregards how the tactical choices made by similar
nonstate actors elsewhere influence a group’s decision to resort to terrorist tactics.
This study argues that the adoption of terrorism among ethnic and ethnoreligious
groups results from a process of conditional emulation. Groups are more likely to
emulate the terrorist choice of others with whom they are connected by shared
political grievances and spatial networks. The theory is tested on a new and original
group-level data set of ethnic and ethnoreligious terrorism (1970 to 2009) using
geospatial analysis and spatial econometric models. The results provide strong
support for the hypothesized mechanism leading to the diffusion of terrorism and
suggest that emulation—more than domestic and contextual factors—substantially
influences dissidents’ tactic choice.
Keywords
terrorism, tactics, diffusion, emulation, spatial econometrics
1
Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom
Corresponding Author:
Sara M. T. Polo, Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ,
United Kingdom.
Email: sara.polo@essex.ac.uk
Journal of Conflict Resolution
2020, Vol. 64(10) 1916-1942
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022002720930811
journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr
Recent terrorist attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016), carried out by returning
fighters from the war in Syria, have sparked fears of a spread of terrorism. Those
attacks showed how disenfranchised individuals could get inspired by the terrorist
activities of similar groups elsewhere, travel to conflict zones, receive training in
terrorist tactics, and conduct major attacks upon their return home (Schmidt 2016).
Indeed, terrorism has become an increasingly popular tactic among dissident groups.
Terrorist attacks have surged, globally, from an average of 1,523 attacks in the 1970s
to over 13,000 attacks in 2016 (Global Terrorism Database [GTD]). Moreover,
ethnic and ethnoreligious terrorism has become the most common: in 2016, four
of the five most active terrorist organizations were linked to ethnic and ethnoreli-
gious groups (i.e., Pashtun, Iraqi Sunni, Zaydi, and Kurds) killing an estimated 7,283
civilians. Despite the growing popularity of terrorism, however, not all groups
engage in this tactic. The tactical choices of the above groups stand in contrast with
those of other ethnic groups fighting conflicts in Chad, Myanmar, Liberia, and
Ethiopia, who largely avoided resorting to terrorism. Why has terrorism become a
dominant tactic among some groups and not others? To what extent are the Paris and
Brussels attacks illustrative of a broader phenomenon, whereby a group’s choice to
adopt (or reject) terrorism is influenced by the tactical choices of similar groups
elsewhere?
Despite a wealth of research on the causes of terrorism, existing work has not yet
adequately addressed the choice of terrorism by specific subnational groups and
organizations. Quantitative studies of domestic terrori sm
1
typically focus on the
attributes of states where terrorism emerges. Yet, this approach does not explain
why countries that are similar in many aspects (e.g., regime type, institutions, eco-
nomic wealth, instability) experience very different levels of terrorism by ethnic and
ethnoreligious groups, or why such terrorism has become so widespread. While it
may be tempting to explain domestic terrorism based solely on attributes of the
domestic context, this approach is incomplete as it disregards strategic interdepen-
dence in nonstate actors’ decision-making; that is, how the tactical choices by one
group affect the choices of other groups elsewhere. To date, only a handful of studies
have examined the diffusion of terrorism, but focusing only on transnational terror-
ism and on the country-level incidence of attacks (e.g., Braithwaite and Li 2007;
Neumayer and Plu
¨mper 2010). Domestic terrorism, however, is not a countrywide
phenomenon but typically emerges from specific subnational communities (Nemeth,
Mauslein, and Stapley 2014). Thus, we still know little about why terrorism is
chosen by some substate groups and not others and under what conditions domestic
groups respond to external incentives and “copy” the terrorist choice of others.
This article aims to fill this gap. I present a novel argument focusing on domestic
terrorism as the product of a diffusion process whereby groups observe and emulate
the tactical choice of others whom they perceive as similar to them and as an
example for their own behavior. The tactical choices and experiences of similar
ethnic groups are perceived to (and in fact may) contain relevant information on
the appropriateness of a tactical innovation in a specific political context (Simmons
Polo 1917

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