How 'reasonable' has become unreasonable: a proposal for rewriting the lasting legacy of Jackson v. Indiana.

• Author: Rosinia, Nicholas

Introduction

Inquiry into a defendant's competence to stand trial has been termed "the most significant mental health inquiry pursued in the system of criminal law." (1) As a result, competency to stand trial is one of the most widely debated concepts in criminal jurisprudence. (2) Proposals for upheaval and revision of the doctrine of competence to stand trial pervade legal literature. (3) Among the most frequent contention is that competency is misunderstood within the legal process, leading many scholars to advocate for a greater understanding of the basic doctrine. (4) One commentator even believes the doctrine may be doing more harm than good, and has thus suggested a defendant should be granted limited rights to waive competency inquiries. (5)

This debate has spilled into pretrial commitment of incompetent defendants. (6) Once a defendant is deemed incompetent to stand trial, courts typically remand the defendant to the care of state hospitals and/or mental health professionals. (7) This process has spawned tales of defendants faced with extended pretrial commitment for alleged crimes, prompting revisionary proposals to protect defendants from court-sanctioned injustice. (8) The debate is particularly contentious, however, because within this pretrial commitment process stands a trifecta of competing interests. While the state and public as a whole deserve protection and justice, a defendant equally deserves due process and a fair trial. (9) Thus, a collision course is charted, with a defendant's constitutional rights squaring off against the deep-rooted motivations of criminal jurisprudence--offering victims closure and justice while ensuring respect for the law. (10)

This Note enters the debate over pretrial commitment for defendants deemed incompetent to stand trial, arguing that revisions are needed to remedy an insufficient patchwork of state statutory provisions providing for such commitment. Part I features an overview of the competency doctrine. Part II addresses the durational limitations on pretrial commitment of defendants deemed incompetent to stand trial set forth in the 1972 Supreme Court decision Jackson v. Indiana. (11) Part Ill investigates statutory provisions in all fifty states and the District of Columbia to determine how states have responded to Jackson's durational limitations. Finding wild variations among these state provisions, Part IV turns to social science literature to decipher what such durational limits should be. Finding a need for revision within states and for further research to propel these revisions, Part V proposes establishment of a cross-disciplinary group of experts tasked with conducting targeted research and crafting a model statute in hopes of providing states with a legislative solution to meeting Jackson's mandate.

1. A Brief History of Competency

   Arising from common-law roots (12) and fears associated with a trial in absentia, (13) competency to stand trial has become a fundamental concept in today's criminal justice system. (14) This stature is justified by an interest in preserving the respected appearance of the trial process, as well as ensuring that a fair, accurate, and adversarial trial is achieved and that appropriate sentencing rationales can be applied. (15)

   The Supreme Court first offered a definition of competency in Dusky v. United States. (16) In a per curiam opinion, the Dusky Court stated that competency hinged on "whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." (17) This standard has since been recognized as the baseline inquiry that due process requires. (18) Though initially only applicable at the federal level, the Dusky standard has become widely regarded as the standard state courts should apply. (19)

   A defendant's right to competency during trial was subsequently ensconced in constitutional protection in Pate v. Robinson. (20) In Pate, the defendant, Robinson, was convicted of murder, but not before his attorney raised a question as to his competence. (21) Robinson's attorney entered into evidence a long history of mental health issues by producing a slew of witnesses that testified to Robinson's incompetence. (22) Robinson's conviction was nonetheless affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that Robinson had waived his right to claim incompetence, and, even if he had not, Robinson had failed to proffer enough evidence of his incompetence. (23) The United States Supreme Court overturned Robinson's conviction, finding that the Constitution requires a trial halt and an inquiry into competence commence when a defendant's competency is questioned. (24) The Court held that failure to perform this inquiry abridged Robinson's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus Robinson's trial was fatally flawed. (25)

   The fundamental precepts of Dusky and Pate were then woven together by the Supreme Court in Drope v. Missouri (26) In Drope, the petitioner was on trial for the forcible rape of his wife. (27) The petitioner's counsel filed a pretrial request for an inquiry into the petitioner's competence accompanied by a psychiatric report declaring him to be in need of psychiatric assistance. (28) The petitioner's wife then testified that her husband suffered from irrational behavior, which was followed by the petitioner attempted suicide during trial. (29) In analyzing his subsequent conviction, the Supreme Court stated that to meet the Dusky standard, "[i]t has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial." (30) Under this standard, the Court vacated the petitioner's conviction, stating, "[w]hatever the relationship between mental illness and incompetence to stand trial, in this case the bearing of the former on the latter was sufficiently likely that ... the correct course was to suspend the trial until such an evaluation could be made." (31)

   As a result, when faced with a defendant whose competence is questioned, courts follow the approach set out in Dusky and Drope to evaluate a defendant's fitness to proceed. (32)

2. Jackson v. Indiana

   1. The Case

      The Supreme Court added another wrinkle to the competency doctrine when it decided Jackson v. Indiana in 1972. (33) The defendant in Jackson was a "mentally defective deaf mute with a mental level of a pre-school child," rendering his ability to communicate virtually nonexistent. (34) Arrested on suspicion of two separate robberies, Jackson was deemed incompetent to stand trial and committed to the Indiana Department of Mental Health until "the defendant [was] sane." (35) Armed with physician evaluations finding Jackson's prognosis "rather dim" (36) and doubting his ability to ever attain the communication skills necessary to be deemed competent, Jackson's counsel filed a petition alleging--in part--that Jackson's commitment amounted to a "life sentence" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. (37) The Court agreed, finding that "Indiana's indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial does not square with the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process." (38) The Court then stated that "[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." (39) To flesh out this "rule of reasonableness," (40) the Court continued:

      commitment" only if a defendant was deemed incompetent to stand trial, dangerous, and that "suitable arrangements for the custody and care of the prisoner [were] not otherwise available." Id. at 731-33; see also Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 373-74 (1956). Armed with this blend of criminal and civil commitment standards, the Court was satisfied that commitment was not based on incompetency alone--which it readily asserted would not accord with the Due Process Clause when a defendant of questionable ability to attain competency was at issue and the commitment was for an indeterminate period of time. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738; see also Gobert, supra note 4, at 683 (stating

      We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal. In light of differing state facilities and procedures and a lack of evidence in this record, we do not think it appropriate for us to attempt to prescribe arbitrary time limits. We note, however, that petitioner Jackson has now been confined for three and one-half years on a record that sufficiently establishes the lack of a substantial probability that he will ever be able to participate fully in a trial. (41) The Court then remanded the case to the Indiana courts to consider Jackson's commitment under its newly established standard, with the hint that Jackson's situation fell into the first category of defendants--those without the capacity to attain competency in the "foreseeable future." (42)

   2. The Mandate

      Jackson thus held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause mandates...