How Not to Do UN Peacekeeping: Avoid the Stabilization Dilemma with Principled and Adaptive Mandating and Leadership.

• Date: 01 April 2023
• Author: Coning, Cedric De
• Published date: 01 April 2023
• Author: Coning, Cedric De

1 Introduction

Looking back over the past seventy-five years of UN peacekeeping, the most enduring question is: Do peace operations work? Lise Morje Howard argues that the majority of quantitative studies of UN peace operations have come to a similar conclusion: "UN peacekeeping has a positive and statistically significant effect on containing the spread of civil war, increasing the success of negotiated settlements to civil wars, and increasing the duration of peace once a civil war has ended." (1)

Howard found that since the end of the Cold War, two-thirds, or eleven out of sixteen UN peacekeeping operations, successfully ended and withdrew. (2) Despite this historic record, peacekeeping is currently experiencing a significant trust deficit, largely because the multidimensional stabilization operations in Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mali are not meeting the expectations raised by their mandates when it comes to protecting civilians, helping host states to counter insurgents, and to end conflicts. At least partly as a result of the perception that these missions are not achieving their mandates, and under financial pressure, the UN Security Council has not deployed any new UN peacekeeping operations since 2014.

The new peace operations that have been deployed since 2014 -- for example, the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, the UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) and its cease-fire, and the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS),--have all been deployed as special political missions. (3) These political missions have no armed uniformed personnel, although some have guard units whose role is limited to protecting the mission's premises, equipment, and personnel. They are significantly smaller and are thus less costly than peacekeeping operations. Because of their lighter footprint and less intrusive mandates, they are seen as less of an imposition on the sovereignty of the host state. There is also less risk of reputational harm because they are not mandated to protect civilians or otherwise provide security guarantees to a peace process. As they do not have large numbers of personnel, there is less risk of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and other forms of misconduct. Should the peace process or cease-fire fail, the blame is more squarely on the parties to the conflict as the UN presence is small and mandated only to support the process. The combination of these factors--and taking into consideration the perceived ineffectiveness, cost, and reputational damage caused by, for example, the SEA associated with the large peacekeeping operations--meant that it has been easier for the members of the Security Council to find agreement to deploy special political missions rather than UN peacekeeping operations. (4)

This may be a temporary period of contraction and moderation for peacekeeping operations, but it does signal a tension between the overall evidence that UN peacekeeping works, and the perception that contemporary multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations are problematic. This article analyzes the effectiveness of these peacekeeping operations--UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), and UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)--to understand the sources of this tension. Based on this analysis, I then offer recommendations about what can be done to guide and improve the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations in the future.

2 Emerging Findings from the Research of the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network

To assess the effectiveness of these operations, this article primarily draws on the studies of the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) as it uses a comparative methodology that makes it possible to assess multiple operations using the same criteria. (5) EPON is an informal network of researchers and research institutions with an interest in researching peace operations' effectiveness. The network forms multidisciplinary and multinational teams that undertake qualitative studies into the effectiveness of specific contemporary peace operations. The members of the network have developed a theoretical framework and a shared methodology that are used as a baseline across the studies to enable comparative and longitudinal analysis.

EPON defines effectiveness as the overall strategic impact of a peace operation, understood as reducing conflict dynamics in the area of operation over a particular period of time, in the context of its mandate and resources. The network's studies employ three analytical tools: a context analysis, an assessment of effects, and a review of explanatory factors. (6)

Since 2018, EPON has undertaken fourteen studies employing this methodology, including studies of the peace operations in CAR, Cyprus, the DRC, Lake Chad, Mali, the Sahel, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan, as well as a thematic study of the protection of civilians mandate implementation across three of these operations.

In the next section, I summarize and analyze the findings of the EPON studies, including especially those of the operations in CAR, the DRC, Mali, and South Sudan. It needs to be emphasized mat this analysis does not represent the views of the authors of these studies nor of the EPON network.

2.1 Prevention of Large-Scale Violent Conflict

Most of the peace operations studied by EPON so far have made significant contributions to preventing the outbreak of large-scale conflict. A broad range of stakeholder communities in CAR, the DRC, Lake Chad, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan are of the opinion that the level of violent conflict in these countries or regions would have been significantly worse if these peace operations were not present. Their presence and actions are thus widely understood by those communities to have a deterrent effect that contributed to preventing large-scale violent conflict.

Despite the role of the UN peacekeeping operations in CAR, the DRC, and Mali in contributing to preventing large-scale violent conflict, the security situations in each of these countries has deteriorated over the past few years. The capabilities and activities of these operations, despite the expectations raised by their mandates, were not sufficient to prevent ongoing low-level violent conflict. In all three of these countries there have been civilian massacres that involved the brutal killing of dozens of civilians, and there has been an overall increase in civilian and combatant casualties and deaths despite the protection of civilians and stabilization mandates of the UN peacekeeping operations.

2.2 Ending Violent Conflict

In none of the contemporary operations studied by EPON have the peacekeepers been able to bring about an end to violent conflict in the countries where they are deployed. EPON has chosen to study ongoing peace operations, rather than those already concluded. As pointed out earlier, of the seventeen operations that have ended and withdrawn to date, Howard regards eleven as having successfully contributed to bringing an end to the violent conflict in those countries. (7) One significant factor that differentiates the remaining or contemporary UN peacekeeping operations from the historic record, perhaps with the exception of the operation in South Sudan (UNMISS), is the absence of a viable political or peace process that realistically can be expected to represent a road map for bringing about an end to the violent conflict. Without a peace process in place, these peace operations cannot be expected to end the conflict in these countries on their own. Peace cannot be imposed; it can only be achieved politically.

2.3 Protection of Civilians

As recent protests against peacekeepers in the DRC and Mali have demonstrated, the UN peacekeeping operations in CAR, the DRC, and Mali have not met the local and international expectations raised by their mandates, when it comes...