How Moral Beliefs Influence Collective Violence. Evidence From Lynching in Mexico

• Published date: 01 January 2025
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231223747
• Author: Enzo Nussio
• Date: 01 January 2025

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2025, Vol. 58(1) 43–77

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140231223747

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How Moral Beliefs

Inf‌luence Collective

Violence. Evidence From

Lynching in Mexico

Enzo Nussio

Abstract

How do moral beliefs inf‌luence favorability to collective violence? In this

article, I argue that, f‌irst, moral beliefs are inf‌luential depending on their

salience, as harm avoidance is a common moral concern. The more accessible

moral beliefs in decision-making, the more they restrain harmful behavior.

Second, moral beliefs are inf‌luential depending on their content. Group-

oriented moral beliefs can overturn the harm avoidance principle and

motivate individuals to favor collective violence. Analysis is based on a

representative survey in Mexico City and focuses on a proximate form of

collective violence, locally called lynching. Findings support both logics of

moral inf‌luence. Experimentally induced moral salience reduces favorability to

lynching, and group-oriented moral beliefs are related to more favorability.

Against existing theories that downplay the relevance of morality and present

it as cheap talk, these f‌indings demonstrate how moral beliefs can both re-

strain and motivate collective violence.

Keywords

morality, harm avoidance, collective violence, emotions, survey, Mexico

ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

Corresponding Author:

Enzo Nussio, ETH Zurich, Haldeneggsteig 4, Zurich 8092, Switzerland.

Email: enzo.nussio@sipo.gess.ethz.ch

Data Availability Statement included at the end of the article

Introduction

Collective violence is often justif‌ied with moral claims. The military invasion

of a country, for example, is framed as an act of self-defense, rioters derive

their legitimacy from perceived injustice, and mobs attack thieves to provide

deserved punishment. Appealing to a greater good, such as protection,justice,

and punishment, makes the inf‌liction of harm look necessary (Fiske & Rai,

2014;Ginges, 2019). These examples show that morality plays a key role for

collective violence. After all, morality concerns our beliefs about right and

wrong behavior, including the acceptable use of violence (Dill & Schubiger,

2021). However, political scientists have rarely studied the effects of moral

beliefs on violence. They rather examine morality as an attribute of violence,

focusing on the conditions under which violence is perceived to be moral or

legitimate –as empirical political scientists have done (Dill & Schubiger,

2021;VandenBerg, 2021), or focusing on the normative conditions under

which war is moral or justif‌ied –as political theorists have done (Bellamy,

2006; e.g. Lazar, 2017).

In this study, I ask how the moral beliefs individuals hold inf‌luence their

favorability to collective violence. I thus focus on morality as a driver of

violence rather than an attribute of violence. Despite its central importance,

this question has received surprisingly little attention. Why? On the one hand,

moral beliefs are an intricate aspect of dominant theories on collective vio-

lence and are thus hard to separate from other key concepts. Theories focusing

on identity (Horowitz, 1985), grievances (Cederman et al., 2013), culture

(Huntington, 2011), ideology (Maynard, 2019), and religion (Fox, 2004)

subsume morality under a broader category. Identity scholars, for instance,

often refer to clashing moral worldviews of rival groups; scholars of religion

see religious beliefs as source of morality; and grievance scholars make

important assumptions about injustice and group loyalty. However, they do

not intend to disentangle moral aspects from these broader categories.

On the other hand, moral beliefs are an exceptionally challenging object for

empirical inquiry. Some scholars claim that moral beliefs represent merely

post-hoc justif‌ication with no explanatory weight for behavior (Swidler, 1986;

Walter, 2017). According to this view, expressing moral concerns to justify

violent action is cheap talk. Others argue that moral beliefs are a spurious

factor. Given that morality is an adaptation to social context, resulting be-

havior is determined by precisely that context and not morality (Tilly, 2003).

Yet another group of scholars views moral beliefs as a consequence of vi-

olence rather than a cause of it (Solomon et al., 1991;Staub, 1999). These

empirical challenges in part explain why students of collective violence have

eschewed moral beliefs.

With the present study, I focus on the moral beliefs held by individuals.

They harbor an important explanation for collective violence, as collective

44 Comparative Political Studies 58(1)

violence often faces problems of collective action, given the risks implied in

personal participation (Wood, 2003). Moral beliefs are one candidate that can

help individuals overcome such barriers. The f‌irst contribution of this study is

theoretical: I offer a theory of how moral beliefs can inf‌luence favorability to

collective violence, distinct from theories about identity, grievances, and other

dominant theories. This study’sf‌indings are thus relevant for theories on

collective violence that embed aspects of morality. The second contribution is

empirical: I devise a strategy that overcomes the profound challenges to

empirical inquiry, by comparing individuals living under the same contextual

conditions and using experimentation to discard post-hoc justif‌ication and

reverse causation.

Against existing theories that downplay the relevance of morality or

subsume it under broader categories, I argue that moral beliefs can inf‌luence

an individual’s favorability to collective violence through two distinct logics:

moral salience and group-oriented moral beliefs. First, moral beliefs are

inf‌luential if they are a salient ingredient of decision-making. Decision-

making draws on different types of beliefs as input (Ajzen, 1991). When

moral beliefs are salient, meaning when they are on one’s mind, they should

act like a brake on violence, given that harm avoidance is a common –some

argue universal –moral concern. Mainstream psychology, in fact, views

morality as a “muscle”that restrains harmful behavior (Baumeister, 1999).

Bandura (2016) even argues that to inf‌lict harm, a person needs to morally

disengage, suggesting that morality can be switched either onor off. Authors

focusing on such restraint, a key insight in moral disengagement theory, tend

to see the moral domain as limited to universal values of harm avoidance and

fairness. In line with this thinking, I argue that moral salience reduces fa-

vorability to collective violence. Observing such an empirical pattern would

challenge rationalist and materialist theories, which make us believe that

moral concerns have no bearing on violence.

Second, and distinct from the logic of moral salience, the content of moral

beliefs can also be inf‌luential. In contradiction to claims to moral universalism

(Kohlberg, 1981), which are baked into the moral salience logic, moral beliefs

vary across societies, communities, and individuals, ref‌lecting moral plu-

ralism (Graham et al., 2011). This is an important insight often attributed to

anthropologist Richard Shweder et al. (1997), but noted much earlier for

example by Edward Westermarck (1908). This variation allows us to examine

how certain kinds of moral beliefs inf‌luence violence. One of the most

universally held moral principles is avoidance of harm, which should reduce

favorability to violence, in accordance with the logic of moral salience.

However, overriding moral goods, especially if they relate to groups, can

motivate individuals to inf‌lict harm (Fiske & Rai, 2014;Hoover et al., 2021).

Hence, I argue that group-oriented moral beliefs, stressing collective values

such as loyalty and authority more than individual goods, increase favorability

Nussio 45