How large is the federal financial safety net?
| Jurisdiction | United States |
| Date | 22 December 2002 |
| Author | Walter, John R.,Weinberg, John A. |
| Published date | 22 December 2002 |
| Author | Walter, John R. |
In the 1980s and early 1990s, U.S. taxpayers paid $130 billion to make good on the federal government's guarantee to protect depositors in thrift institutions (U.S. GAO 1996: 14). The crisis affecting thrifts in the late 1980s exhausted the funds that had been set aside by the deposit insurance agency, and made it necessary for Congress to allocate new funds. This period marked the first major test of the federal deposit insurance system since its inception in 1933. The system was badly stressed, but it did succeed in one sense. Although there were a large number of bank failures, the type of bank runs and widespread panics seen in crises prior to the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) did not occur. Deposit insurance gave the average bank depositor a sense of safety not previously enjoyed. With this protection, however, depositors have little interest in paying attention to the riskiness of their banks' lending activities. Many observers argue that a lack of depositor scrutiny contributed to the problems experienced by banks and thrifts in the 1980s.
The government's interest in the safety of private savers and private financial institutions did not begin with the creation of deposit insurance. Indeed, in the earliest years of the republic the government sometimes reallocated the deposits it held with private banks in order to provide additional funding to a distressed institution (Studenski and Kroos 1963: 72-73). Even J. P. Morgan received government assistance in his efforts to rescue troubled institutions in the wake of the panic of 1907. While this episode is often cited as a case in which the government provided no support, the U.S. Treasury contributed $25 million at a crucial point to assure the completion of a successful rescue.
The federal government's financial support for private borrowers is not limited to banks and other financial institutions. On some occasions, the government has stepped in to assist large nonfinancial corporations that were in financial distress, as in the bailout of Chrysler in 1980. Government protection for the creditors of nonfinancial corporations arose again in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with the passage of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, providing up to $10 billion in loan guarantees to the airline industry. In addition, many government programs help individuals receive credit to finance small business development, home purchases, or other endeavors. This assistance is often in the form of loan guarantees under which the government pays the lender if the borrower defaults.
The various forms of federal government support for private borrowers comprise the federal financial safety net. In this article we estimate the size of the safety net. Specifically, we examine the extent to which the liabilities of private market participants are perceived to enjoy federal government guarantees. Our estimate includes a mixture of elements. Some of the liabilities, such as insured deposits, are explicitly guaranteed. Others, such as some deposit balances in excess of the limits on explicit deposit insurance and the liabilities of certain government-sponsored enterprises, are believed by many market participants to be implicitly guaranteed by the federal government. Our approach to implicit guarantees is to ask, "Based on past government actions, what might market participants reasonably expect future government actions to be?"
We estimate that explicitly guaranteed liabilities amount to $5.8 trillion and that implicitly guaranteed liabilities amount to $3.4 trillion, which implies that the total safety net is in the neighborhood of $9.2 trillion, or about 26 percent of total private liabilities. While we believe this figure reasonably suggests the safety net's size, we should emphasize that it is an estimate, including a variety of elements and reflecting our judgment regarding what should and should not be included.
Why does the safety net's size matter? It matters because actual or perceived guarantees can impair the efficiency of the financial system. Guarantees alter economic behavior by increasing people's willingness to take risks. Further, risk taking can become concentrated in those sectors of the economy enjoying the greatest protection. More broadly, resources tend to flow away from parts of the economy with few or no guarantees toward those with substantial coverage. The ultimate effect can be to limit the growth of income and wealth, and the larger the safety net the greater the effect. Our estimate of the safety net's magnitude suggests that such an effect is a real possibility.
The Federal Financial Safety Net
The federal financial safety net, as we define it, consists of all explicit or implicit government guarantees of private financial liabilities. By private financial liabilities, we mean debts owed by one private market participant to another including the deposit liabilities of banks, thrifts, and credit unions. By government guarantees, we mean a government commitment to protect lenders from losses due to a borrower's default.
Formal programs, such as deposit insurance or the Small Business Administration's loan guarantee program, form the explicit safety net. There have been many cases, however, in which borrowers not covered by formal guarantee programs have received public assistance in paying their debts. Examples include payments to uninsured depositors of failed banks and assistance to large, troubled corporations like Chrysler and Lockheed. Such examples create a public perception that similarly situated borrowers will be assisted if problems arise in the future. We are interested in the effect of the safety net on economic behavior, and when market participants perceive an implicit government guarantee, economic behavior is altered. Consequently, we define the safety net to include both explicitly guaranteed liabilities and liabilities without explicit guarantees that market participants nevertheless are likely to believe the government will protect.
It should be noted that identifying liabilities perceived to have implicit guarantees is a challenging task given the ad hoc nature of past government bailouts. We include liabilities in our measure of the implicit safety net only when our judgment that there is a public perception of protection is supported by other published sources. Hence, while we discuss bailouts of large nonfinancial firms, we do not include the liabilities of such firms in our estimated safety net. In contrast, many observers have written about the likely protection of certain large financial firms, and we attempt to take account of such firms' liabilities in our measure.
When we include liabilities in the implicit safety net, we count them as if the market believes that their full value is guaranteed. But market beliefs could be more variable; market participants may believe that some liabilities are only partially protected. At the same time, it is likely that some liabilities that we do not include are perceived to have at least some guarantee. Hence, we do not believe our approach results in an overstatement of the implicit safety net.
We do not address all types of protection that the government provides to private individuals or businesses. Most notably, we are not concerned here with the so-called social safety net that includes such programs as Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security. We also do not include other forms of general assistance like federal disaster relief. One could argue that such types of aid should be included in a measure of the financial safety net since they can certainly affect a recipient's ability to borrow in the private credit market. Income support, for instance, could help an individual repay debts, reducing the risk of default. Similarly, disaster relief programs assist victims in repairing or replacing damaged property that may serve as collateral in debt contracts. These forms of assistance, however, are not tied to specific private liabilities, as is an explicit or implicit government guarantee. (1) We limit our attention to the government's direct participation as a guarantor of private debts.
In addition to issuing guarantees, the government sometimes makes direct loans to private borrowers. Are such loans a part of the safety net? We do not include them in our measure, which focuses on guarantees rather than direct lending. As in the case of general government assistance, direct lending can have effects that are similar to the effects of government guarantees. Access to government loans could make it possible for an individual or business to borrow from private lenders at a reduced cost. Still, our focus is on cases in which the government places itself between private borrowers and lenders by guaranteeing the borrowers' debts.
By limiting our attention to guaranteed debts, we ignore one important type of private financial relationship. Specifically, we do not consider equity investments. To be sure, an investor who buys shares from a business is supplying money to the business. Unlike lending, however, an equity investment does not entitle the investor to a fixed or predetermined payment. Rather, an equity claim is a "residual" claim; its value varies with the fortunes of the enterprise. Guarantees, whether government or private, are typically attached to fixed claims, liabilities that will be considered in default if a certain payment is not made. Our measure of the safety net will be based on taxed liabilities.
How the Safety Net Affects the Economy
Government guarantees can change the way participants in private financial markets respond to risk. To explain these effects we introduce some basic concepts economists use to analyze risk-taking behavior. Specifically, the concepts of risk aversion and moral hazard help us discuss how a market economy allocates risk and how government...
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