How Ideological Divides Serve to Limit Bureaucratic Autonomy: A Case Study of the BLM

• Author: Matthew R. Fairholm,Joshua Malay
• DOI: 10.1177/0275074020911783
• Date: 01 May 2020
• Published date: 01 May 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074020911783

American Review of Public Administration

2020, Vol. 50(4-5) 375 –386

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0275074020911783

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Article

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has and continues

to face multiple challenges to its activities. The lack of a con-

sensus over the federal purpose of the lands managed by the

BLM presents a main and continuing thread of ambiguity

(Skillen, 2008). Environmentalism and management goals

have eroded the original resource conservationism of the

beginning of the 20th century. However, perhaps more

importantly, these changing perceptions of the purpose and

intent of public lands policy has led to federal land resource

agencies focusing on planning. For the BLM, the first

requirement of the Federal Land Policy and Management

Act (FLPMA), the participation of vested interests in the

planning process, takes on a primary role. A role that, accord-

ing to Skillen (2008), has and continues to become increas-

ingly cross-jurisdictional, collaborative, site specific, and

court mediated.

The formulation of land use plans, from a management

point of view, is the most important task assigned to the BLM

(“Interest Representation and the Federal Land Policy and

Management Act,” 1982). The BLM, under the multiple use

sustained yield principle that serves as Congress’ primary

directive to the agency, faces almost no significant limitation

on its discretion. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of

1960 is the source of this principle, and its efficacy both in

terms of administrative policy and as a check on BLM dis-

cretion has and remains in contention. It remains in

contention as its underlying assumption relies on replacing

clear standards for broad public participation. “Despite this

mandate, Congress has failed to set clear standards about the

nature of participation envisioned or its place in public

decision-making” (“Interest Representation and the Federal

Land Policy and Management Act,” 1982, pp. 1312–1313).

Although the act provides a procedural basis for addressing

federal land management, it does not provide a clear basis for

addressing the ideological differences in how the actions of

the BLM will be perceived by actors with different ideologi-

cal foundations.

The main question this article seeks to address is how the

BLM’s bureaucratic autonomy is affected by deep ideologi-

cal divides over land management policy. Bureaucratic

autonomy is defined by Daniel Carpenter (2001) as occur-

ring “when bureaucrats take actions consistent with their

own wishes, actions to which politicians and organized inter-

ests defer even though they would prefer that other actions

(or no action at all) be taken” (p. 4). This is, in essence, a

discussion within the larger category of administrative

911783ARPXXX10.1177/0275074020911783The American Review of Public AdministrationMalay and Fairholm

research-article2020

1University of South Dakota, Vermillion, USA

Corresponding Author:

Joshua Malay, University of South Dakota, 414 E. Clark St., DH 119,

Vermillion, SD 57069, USA.

Email: malayjoshua@gmail.com

How Ideological Divides Serve to Limit

Bureaucratic Autonomy: A Case Study

of the BLM

Joshua Malay1 and Matthew R. Fairholm1

Abstract

The main question this article seeks to address is how the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) bureaucratic autonomy

is affected by deep ideological divides over public lands management policy. Daniel Carpenter’s theory of bureaucratic

autonomy serves to provide the definition and method for evaluating the research question. The case study identifies that

the bureaucratic autonomy afforded the BLM is intrinsically bound to interest group politics. There exists little room for

initiative not supported by specific interests. Actions required by the multiple use mandate, but not supported by interests,

will be suppressed. But, of greater interest in understanding the BLM, once support shifts for an initiative, all previous action

is undone or at least mitigated to a point of inconsequence. Hence, limited bureaucratic autonomy is afforded either way,

as the multiple use requirement will not satisfy all parties and does not allow the BLM to ignore other potential uses of the

public lands.

Keywords

bureaucratic legitimacy, interest group politics, bureaucratic autonomy, administrative discretion, Bureau of Land Management,

public lands management