How Electoral Cycles Shape the Implementation of Public Works Programs: Evidence From India

• Published date: 01 March 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231195079
• Author: Anjali Thomas,Jonathan Darsey
• Date: 01 March 2024
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Political Research Quarterly

2024, Vol. 77(1) 106–120

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/10659129231195079

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How Electoral Cycles Shape the

Implementation of Public Works

Programs: Evidence From India

Anjali Thomas

1

and Jonathan Darsey

1

Abstract

Why do public works programs in developing democracies often experience implementation failures at the local level?

Building on the literature on political business cycles, our study sheds light on a key explanation. We argue that electoral

cycles undermine the completion of public works projects because of incumbents’diff‌iculties in reaping electoral

rewards for following through on projects proposed just prior to an election. Analyses based on project-level data from a

nation-wide public program in India supports the argument. We f‌ind that projects proposed close to an upcoming

election are less likely to be eventually completed than projects proposed at other times. We further f‌ind that incumbent

turnover exacerbates the effect of electoral cycles and that this modifying effect is plausibly causal. The results suggest

that new incumbents have reduced incentives to follow through on projects proposed by their predecessors due to the

diff‌iculties involved with claiming credit for such projects.

Keywords

political business cycles, public works, public goods, distributive politics, incumbent turnover

In many parts of the world, governments implement

public works programs aimed at providing a range of

goods and services to citizens. The local level projects that

these programs fund are intended to create tangible

amenities—such as roads, school buildings, or improved

sanitation facilities—that are tailored to the needs of local

citizens. However, the implementation of these programs

is typically uneven. In particular, many local projects are

started but never completed, leaving in their wake un-

f‌inished schools and roads while wasting scarce public

resources and bureaucratic effort. As a result of these local

failures, public works programs often fail to deliver

promised benef‌its to local communities. Examining when

and why local projects fail could thus provide an im-

portant explanation for why governments in many de-

veloping countries often struggle to provide essential

public services.

Our goal in this paper is to take on this task by shedding

light on a key—but so far largely overlooked—explanation

for when and why public works projects often fail to be

implemented successfully. In doing so, our study seeks to

contribute to the vast literature on public service provision in

the developing world. Much of this existing research focuses

on political factors that help explain the level of funding for

public service provision,or the outcomes of spending in

terms of the quantity or quality of public goods delivered

(e.g., Stasavage 2005;Harding 2015;de Mesquita et al.

2003;Keefer 2007;Chhibber & Nooruddin 2004;Ross

2006;Lake&Baum2001;Thachil & Teitelbaum 2015;

Mani & Mukand 2007). While this research has dramatically

advanced our understanding of how political factors affect

public service provision at the aggregate level, our research

focuses on the local level and examines political factors’

inf‌luence on the completion rate of local development

projects. Previous studies have explained non-completion of

development projects—or implementation failures of de-

velopment projects more broadly—by focusing on legisla-

tors’commitment problems in the context of collective

expenditure choices (Williams 2017), the propensity of

democratic governments to prioritize more visible outcomes

1

Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Anjali Thomas, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia

Institute of Technology, 781 Marietta Street NW, Atlanta, GA 30332,

USA.

Email: athomas424@gatech.edu