How Do Institutions Address Collective-Action Problems? Bridging and Bonding in Institutional Design

• Published date: 01 March 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912918784199
• Date: 01 March 2019
• Author: Tomás Olivier
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918784199

Political Research Quarterly

2019, Vol. 72(1) 162 –176

© 2018 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912918784199

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Article

Introduction

Collective-action problems require different strategies to

be addressed. When actors implement these strategies, it

often results in specific and observable patterns of behav-

ior. Researchers have used social network analysis tools to

study how the type of collective-action problem affects the

structure of policy and collaboration networks (Berardo

2014; Berardo and Scholz 2010; Feiock, Lee, and Park

2012; Lee 2011), or how the characteristics of different ser-

vices (and the collective-action problems involved in their

production or provision) influence the structure of net-

works of contracts for providing those services (Andrew

2010). In line with the “risk hypothesis” (Berardo and

Scholz 2010), these studies have found that actors adopt

specific network configurations depending on the nature of

the perceived collective-action problem. When actors face

“low risk” collaboration problems, their networks present

bridging structures that facilitate coordination. On the

other hand, when they face “high risk” cooperation prob-

lems, their networks adopt bonding structures that facili-

tate monitoring and enforcement.

However, the interactions studied by this literature do

not always occur in an institutional vacuum, and are

often guided and constrained by existing institutional

arrangements. Formal or informal rules in place may

encourage the creation of certain collaboration patterns.

Therefore, it is important to disentangle the interactions

that occur because a rule mandates them from those that

are the product of other processes. Doing so would allow

researchers to identify the extent to which the dynamics

observed in policy or collaboration networks are a prod-

uct of actor behavior, and which are a product of the

institutions created to guide and constrain that behavior.

Conversely, findings from the risk hypothesis literature

can help define how institutions (rather than individual

behavior) mandate interactions to address collective-

action problems.

This paper focuses on how different types of collec-

tive-action problems affect the design of institutions

784199PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918784199Political Research QuarterlyOlivier

research-article2018

1University of California Los Angeles, USA

Corresponding Author:

Tomás Olivier, Institute of the Environment and Sustainability, University

of California Los Angeles. 619 Charles E. Young Drive East La Kretz

Hall, Suite 300, Box 951496, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1496, USA.

Email: tolivier@ioes.ucla.edu

How Do Institutions Address Collective-

Action Problems? Bridging and

Bonding in Institutional Design

Tomás Olivier1

Abstract

Collective-action problems affect the structure of stakeholder networks differently in policy settings (Berardo and

Scholz 2010). However, interactions in policy settings do not usually occur in an institutional vacuum; instead, they are

guided and constrained by agreed-on rules. Therefore, to better understand behavior in these settings, it is important

to understand the parameters that guide and constrain it. Combining arguments from game theory and social network

analysis, this paper focuses on how the nature of collective-action problems affect the design of formal institutional

arrangements. The cases are two institutional arrangements for the provision of high-quality drinking water, in New

York City and in Boston. The design of these arrangements is measured through Networks of Prescribed Interactions

(NPIs), capturing patterns of interactions mandated by formal rules. NPI structures in each case are then compared

analyzing their structural measures and applying exponential random graph models (ERGMs). By comparing these

NPIs, the paper assesses the effects of collective-action problems on the design of formal institutional arrangements.

Results show that cooperation problems are associated with designs prescribing redundant interactions that create a

balanced distribution of responsibilities among the key actors to the agreement.

Keywords

social network analysis, risk hypothesis, institutional design, institutional grammar tool