How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay

• Author: Nils B. Weidmann,Eda Keremoğlu
• Published date: 01 September 2020
• Date: 01 September 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912278
• Subject Matter: Articles

912278CPSXXX10.1177/0010414020912278Comparative Political StudiesKeremoğlu and Weidmann
research-article2020
Article
Comparative Political Studies
2020, Vol. 53(10-11) 1690 –1703
How Dictators Control
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the Internet: A Review
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Essay
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912278
DOI: 10.1177/0010414020912278
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Eda Keremoğlu1 and Nils B. Weidmann1
Abstract
A growing body of research has studied how autocratic regimes interfere with
internet communication to contain challenges to their rule. In this review article,
we survey the literature and identify the most important directions and challenges
for future research. We structure our review along different network layers,
each of which provides particular ways of governmental influence and control.
While current research has made much progress in understanding individual
digital tactics, we argue that there is still a need for theoretical development and
empirical progress. First, we need a more comprehensive understanding of how
particular tactics fit into an overall digital strategy, but also how they interact
with traditional, “offline” means of autocratic politics, such as cooptation or
repression. Second, we discuss a number of challenges that empirical research
needs to address, such as the effectiveness of digital tactics, the problem of
attribution, and the tool dependence of existing research.
Keywords
autocracy, ICT, repression
Introduction
In most autocratic regimes, governmental interference in digital infrastruc-
ture and communication is commonplace. Governments control where and
when modern communication technology (ICT) is introduced in the first
1University of Konstanz, Germany
Corresponding Author:
Nils B. Weidmann, University of Konstanz, Universitätsstraße 10, 78457 Konstanz, Germany.
Email: nils.weidmann@uni-konstanz.de

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1691
place, who gets access to it, and what information is communicated. This
influence occurs for political motives—to ban opposition activists from
mobilizing their followers online, to contain the spread of information that is
critical of the regime, or to spy on the population to identify potential dissent-
ers. Examples include Hosni Mubarak’s complete internet shutdown in
January 2011 (Dainotti et al., 2014), or the censoring of online content
deemed unacceptable by the Chinese government (King et al., 2013). In this
review article, we take stock of the literature on autocratic interference in
internet communication, but also identify gaps and propose pathways for
future research.
The fact that dictatorships interfere in communication is not surprising,
nor is it a new subject of study in political science. In fact, some of the clas-
sic work on authoritarian rule has emphasized the importance for autocrats
to control the flow of public and private information (Friedrich & Brzezinski,
1965). In the digital age, this has become a greater challenge, but at the
same time a tremendous opportunity for autocrats. Technological progress
has vastly expanded the complexity, reach, and bandwidth of communica-
tions, requiring higher levels of technical sophistication for governmental
interference. At the same time, however, digital communication technology
opens up new possibilities for (fully or partly) automated interference: cen-
sorship software can automatically detect and block unwanted content, and
network traffic can be scanned to single out users transmitting suspicious
information.
Our review focuses on the different network layers that can be used for
interference. In using a (simplified) technology-centered structure for our
discussion, we do not mean to suggest that these are the only means of
authoritarian influence over the internet. Most regimes rely also on political
and legal measures to regulate the provision of telecommunication services
and the actors involved. However, once internet services are available to
large segments of the population—which is now the case in the vast majority
of countries worldwide—internet control usually means tampering with the
network infrastructure, the data traffic, and the content being transmitted.
After our review of the literature, we conclude our essay with a discussion of
the theoretical and empirical challenges that future research in this field
should address.
Interference at Different Layers
The internet is constructed as a system of stacked network “layers,” each of
which uses and expands the functions provided by the lower ones.1 For the
purpose of our review, we distinguish between three layers: the infrastructure

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Comparative Political Studies 53(10-11)
layer, which includes hardware and cables to establish and maintain a con-
nection; the network layer, which ensures that data packets are properly
routed from source to destination; and the application layer that consists of
the software tools that enable users to send and receive information over the
network. In the following sections, we review the different ways in which
governments can influence internet communication at these layers.
Infrastructure Layer
While earlier research found that autocracies were lagging behind in digital
innovation and internet penetration rates were lower as in their democratic
counterparts (Milner, 2006), more recent work found that they have now
caught up (Stier, 2017). To some observers, this delay was a deliberate strate-
gic choice, and internet service was not granted before accompanying control
mechanisms were installed (Boas, 2006). Nonetheless, even today some gov-
ernments are involved in meddling with the general infrastructure for digital
communication. Research has found that governments still play a crucial role
in access allocation, and service provision is systematically lower for politi-
cally excluded ethnic groups (Weidmann et al., 2016).
However, even when the infrastructure is in place, there are other means
to temporarily disable the entire infrastructure (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010).
This means that in the case of political events that are potentially threatening
to a regime, “just-in-time” shutdowns allow governments to temporarily dis-
connect parts of or the whole population (Dainotti et al., 2014; Deibert et al.,
2010; Freyburg & Garbe, 2018; Gohdes, 2015). However, there are also other
means to calibrate country-wide access. Those include tampering with digital
communication by throttling bandwidth to the extent that browsing of either
the internet or specific applications becomes nearly impossible (Ogola,
2019).2
Network Layer
The network layer is highly susceptible to intervention and provides gov-
ernments with the means to fine-tune control while the infrastructure
remains intact and usable otherwise. Several studies have found that author-
itarian governments systematically censor information and communication
they deem to be critical. To do so, the network layer provides various tools
such as filtering mechanisms based on critical keywords or senders/receiv-
ers of data packets (Hellmeier, 2016; Murdoch & Anderson, 2008; Zittrain
& Palfrey, 2008). China’s “Great Firewall” is the most popular example of
internet censorship where the government aims to regulate what content

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citizens can see and which applications they can use. This is achieved by
blocking connections to specific websites and services, thereby creating a
highly regulated “national intranet” (Kalathil & Boas, 2003). In addition to
these refined techniques, so-called denial-of-service attacks provide a rela-
tively cheap way of...