Host government impact on the logistics performance of international humanitarian organisations

• Date: 01 November 2016
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2016.05.011
• Published date: 01 November 2016
• Author: N. Dube,R.H. Teunter,L.N. Van Wassenhove,T. Van der Vaart

Host government impact on the logistics performance of international

humanitarian organisations

N. Dube

a

,

*

, T. Van der Vaart

a

, R.H. Teunter

a

, L.N. Van Wassenhove

b

a

University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business, Nettelbosje 2, 9747 AE, Groningen, The Netherlands

b

INSEAD, Technology and Operations Management, Boulevard de Constance, 77305, Fontainebleau, France

article info

Article history:

Accepted 4 May 2016

Available online 17August 2016

Accepted by: Mikko Ketokivi

Keywords:

Humanitarian logistics

Host governments

Delivery performance

Complex emergencies

abstract

Host governments severely impact international relief operations. An openness to assistance can lead to

the timely delivery of aid whereas a reluctance to receive assistance can have devastating consequences.

With lives at stake and no time to lose in humanitarian crises, understandi ng the host government's

impact on the logistics performance of international humanitarian orga nisations (IHOs) is crucial. In this

paper, we present an in-depth multiple-case study that explores this aspect. Results show that host

government actions are explained by their dependency on IHOs and the levels of tensions between their

interests (i.e., conflicting strategic goals). In addition, a host government's regulatory and enforcement

capabilities are important for ensuring that they can safeguard their interests. We derive four stances

that host governments can adopt in regulating logistics-related activities: non-restrictive, opportunistic,

selectively accommodating and uncompromising. Each of these has different im plications for the lo-

gistics performance of IHOs.

©2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Host governments are political actors with a major impact on

the inventory management and transport activities of international

humanitarian organisations (IHOs) (Kovacs and Spens, 2008; Long

and Wood, 1995; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2008;

Menkhaus, 2010). In fact, “government”is by far the most

frequently mentioned topic in humanitarian logistics research

(Kunz and Reiner, 2012). While some host governments facilitate

good performance by declaring a state of emergency and relaxing

regulations, others impose barriers that impede performance (Long

and Wood, 1995; McLachlin et al., 2009;Menkhaus, 2010;Pettit and

Beresford, 2005; Toole and Waldman, 1997). Understanding why

host governments display such heterogeneity in dealing with IHOs

is crucial for enhancing delivery performance in humanitarian

operations.

This research seeks to understand the impact of host govern-

ments on humanitarian logistics in complex emergencies. The

World Health Organisation (WHO) defines a complex emergency as

a“situation with complex social, political and economic origins

which involves the breakdown of state structures, the disputed

legitimacy of host authorities, the abuse of human rights and

possibly armed conflict, that creates humanitarian needs”. Complex

emergencies constitute the majorityof disasters worldwide and are

increasingly the backdrop against which major natural disasters

occur. They are characterised by large-scale multi-faceted human-

itarian needs that are worsened by major security issues, popula-

tion displacement and the hindering of humanitarian assistance by

political or military actors.

1

We posit that host government actions are best explained by the

strategic-level dynamics of their interactions with IHOs. Host

governments and IHOs are governed by divergent institutional

logics (Alford and Friedland, 1985). They inherently have conflicting

strategic interests (i.e., tensions between interests) but, neverthe-

less, high interdependency (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Since

tensions between interests and dependency are not mutually

exclusive, this raises the question as to how the two interact and

impact on the delivery performance of IHOs in day-to-day (opera-

tional level) and medium term (tactical level) planning and

*Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: n.dube@rug.nl (N. Dube), j.t.vandervaart@rug.nl (T. Van der

Vaart), r.h.teunter@rug.nl (R.H. Teunter), luk.van-wassenhove@insead.edu

(L.N. Van Wassenhove).

1

https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/

definition-of-hazard/complex-emergencies/Accessed on 31 July 2015.

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Operations Management

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jom

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2016.05.011

0272-6963/©2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Journal of Operations Management 47-48 (2016) 44e57