Horne v. Department of Agriculture: An Invitation to Reexamine 'Ripeness' Doctrine in Takings Litigation

• Date: 01 September 2013

9-2013 NEWS & ANALYSIS 43 ELR 10735

Horne v. Department of

Agriculture: An Invitation to

Reexamine “Ripeness” Doctrine

in Takings Litigation

by John Echeverria

John Echeverria is a Professor of Law at Vermont Law School.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s relatively brief, unani-

mous decision issued on June 10, 2013, in Horne

v. Department of Agriculture,1 has received little

notice in comparison with the two other takings cases of

the Court’s 2012-2013 term, Arkansas Game & Fish Com-

mission v. United States,2 and (especially) Koontz v. St. Johns

Water Management District.3 is instant obscurity is not

wholly undeserved given the narrowness of the Court’s rul-

ing: the federal courts, in the context of reviewing a U.S.

Department of Agriculture (USDA) administrative order,

have “jurisdiction” to consider a defense based on the Tak-

ings Clause to monetary sanctions imposed on a raisin

“handler” pursuant to the Agriculture Marketing A gree-

ment Act (AMA A).

In reaching this result, the Court opted for a narrow

resolution of the case. e Hornes argued that, in general,

property owners should be able to sue for an injunction

and other equitable relief (including blocking monetary

sanctions) when threatened with an alleged taking, even

if they have the option of pursuing a claim for “ just com-

pensation” after the fact under the Takings Clause.4 e

linchpin of the Court’s ruling in Horne, however, is that

the Hornes can raise the Takings Clause as a defense to

the sanctions because the AMAA is a relatively rare exam-

ple of a federa l statute withdrawing the jurisdiction of

the U.S. Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act

to hear a takings claim seeking just compensation. us,

the Court left unaddressed the Hornes’ broader argument

that a property owner should be able to sue under the Tak-

ings Clause to block the government from proceeding, or

imposing sanctions, when the opportunity to sue for com-

pensation is available.

1. 133 S. Ct. 2053, 43 ELR 20122 (2013).

2. 133 S. Ct. 511, 42 ELR 20247 (2012).

3. 2013 WL 3184628, 43 ELR 20140 (June 25, 2013).

4. U.S. C. amend. V (“Nor shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation.”).

Nonetheless, the Court, perhaps inadvertently, high-

lighted the signicant confusion in current law surround-

ing the broader argument, setting the stage for future

debate and litigation. On the one hand, the Hornes’ broad

argument was audacious, given the substantial Supreme

Court precedent stating that parties contending that gov-

ernment action amounts to a taking generally cannot seek

equitable relief to prevent the taking, but must instead sue

for just compensation.5 On the other hand, as shown by

the decision in Horne, the lower court opinions in this case,

the brieng in the Supreme Court, as well as disparate

other cases, the basis for this frequently articulated rule is

remarkably obscure. Taken together, they reveal three dif-

ferent potential doctrinal foundations for this rule: court

subject matter jurisdiction; a special ta king ripeness rule;

or the limits of the substantive legal protection aorded by

the Takings Clause itself.

It is clear that these three dierent theories are mutually

exclusive. If a claim for equitable relief under the Takings

Clause is barred under this rule for lack of subject mat-

ter jurisdiction, it cannot also fail under this rule because

the claim is not ripe or the claimant has failed to state a

valid claim for relief. If the takings claim fails because it

is not ripe, the court cannot also lack jurisdiction over the

claim, and the cla im cannot fail as a matter of law. And if

the claim fails on the merits, aga in, neither subject mat-

ter jurisdiction nor a lack of ripeness can be the relevant

concern. In sum, only one of these labels for the rule can

be correct.

e doctrinal confusion is compounded by the fact that

these inconsistent labels are sometimes indiscriminately

tossed about in two dierent types of cases: ta kings suits

led in federal court against the United States based on

federal legislative or administrative action; and takings

5. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016, 14 ELR 20539 (1984)

(citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 697

n.18 (1949)).

Copyright © 2013 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.