Honest brokers? American and Norwegian facilitation of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (1991-93).

• Author: Sanders, Jacinta

The official Israel-Palestinian talks in Washington, which commenced in December 1991 in the wake of the Madrid conference, proceeded through ten rounds without arriving at an agreement. As a mediating power, the United States failed to use its considerable influence to bring the two sides together. While the U.S. had been aware of the Oslo channel, the revelation in August 1993 that Israel and the PLO had initialed an agreement negotiated via the secret talks in Norway stunned the U.S. administration.

This article examines the extent to which the respective success and failure of the Oslo and Washington negotiations can be attributed to the mediating powers involved - though the notion of the success of the Oslo channel is queried. The contrasting styles and intentions of the mediators are explored, and the article poses the question of whether Norway implemented a U.S. agenda, and whether a mediator's neutrality can constitute complicity in the nature of an agreement reached between a strong and a weak negotiating party.

The American mediators of the official Israel-Palestinian talks in Washington were as stunned as the rest of the world when it was revealed in August 1993 that Israel and the PLO had secretly negotiated a peace agreement. Although the U.S. had been kept informed of the progress of the Oslo negotiations, it had seriously underestimated the prospects of Oslo succeeding where the official talks were not. The contrast between the stagnant Washington talks, poised to enter their eleventh round, and the success facilitated by Norway, a minor power with little strategic interest in the Middle East, served to highlight America's failure to bring Israel and the Palestinians together. While a convergence of international, regional and domestic forces on both sides had ripened the climate for negotiations, it was only the strict secrecy, careful Norwegian facilitation, and the direct inclusion of the PLO which permitted those forces to culminate in an agreement.

As the end of the Oslo interim period approaches, the hindsight of five years allows for more definite conclusions to be drawn regarding the nature and consequences of the secret negotiations in Norway. The Oslo channel's initial success in leading to an Israel-PLO agreement must be qualified by its commensurate failure to secure a substantive or enduring peace. The success itself was bought at the heavy price of deferring a resolution on the conflict's core issues: the refugee right of return, settlements, sovereignty, and the status of Jerusalem. This is an irony of Oslo; the very factors critical to its initial success have impeded subsequent progress towards peace.(1) Negotiated within a framework set by an imbalance of power, and permeated with the sterile and calculating pragmatism of 'Realpolitik', it was evident from the outset that the accords contained the strong potential to simply embody "war by other means."(2) This article, therefore, seeks to distinguish between the initial success of the Oslo process and its long-term failure, and also between the varying motivations of the individual players.

There is much about the Oslo channel and indeed the public Washington talks that remains unknown or disputed; the researcher must allow for competing narratives, the vicissitudes of participants' memories, and the desire to reconstruct and reinterpret events in a more complementary manner. Nonetheless, a generally consistent picture of both channels has emerged. With the above caveats in mind, this article addresses the ways in which American and Norwegian facilitation shaped the course of the two negotiating tracks. To what extent does each bear responsibility for the outcomes? What would have been the consequences had either acted differently? The focus is upon the contrasts between the U.S. and Norway's motivations and methods and on the interplay between the channels. Although Norway acted with relative autonomy, it was not immune from American influence. To what extent, therefore, may Norway be argued to have implemented a U.S. agenda?

AMERICAN MEDIATION AND THE WASHINGTON NEGOTIATIONS

"The United States will act as an honest broker in trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict." U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians, 18 October 1991(3)

The Washington talks pitted Israel against an official Palestinian delegation, comprised of Palestinian figures from inside the occupied territories with no formal links to the PLO. The talks emerged from the Madrid conference of October and November 1991, which the U.S. and Russia convened in the hope that it would lead to a comprehensive Middle East peace. On 6 March 199 l, U.S. President George Bush stated that the projected settlement was to be grounded in resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of 'territory for peace', providing for Israel's security and recognition for legitimate Palestinian 'political' rather than territorial or national rights.(4)

Although Russia was no more than a nominal sponsor, the United States had a strong strategic interest in the regional stability anticipated to follow a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict (with the Palestinian issue at its hub). The inclusion of the Palestinians was necessary to achieve U.S. objectives, but difficult to manage. Negotiating with the PLO was anathema to both U.S. and Israeli foreign policy, yet the official Palestinian delegation did little to conceal that it operated under PLO direction. This lent a farcical element to the talks and seriously impeded the possibility of a negotiated agreement. The Palestinian delegation had little autonomy, and Arafat felt threatened by the prospect of being superseded by an alternative leadership.(5) As Jan Egeland, Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister during the Oslo negotiations, has observed, the official Madrid formula "meant that the PLO controlled the negotiating team without feeling identity with them."(6)

Although Dennis Ross, a high-level official involved in the Washington talks, characterized the American role as "catalyst, clarifier, reassurer, facilitator and guarantor,"(7) the U.S. remained committed to Israel and broadly adhered to the latter's agenda. The examples of the conflict over Palestinian representation and the U.S. bridging proposals will illustrate this.

Secretary of State, James Baker, had stated in his 18 October 1991 letter of assurance to the Palestinians that: "The United States does not seek to determine who speaks for Palestinians in this process. . . . Only Palestinians can choose their delegation members, which are not subject to veto from anyone."(8) Yet the U.S. also promised Israel that it would not have to meet with any 'unacceptable' Palestinians, which the Likud government interpreted as any Palestinians from the Diaspora or East Jerusalem. This set the scene for a conflict over representation that was avoided only when the Americans effectively exercised a veto on Israel's behalf. The U.S. thus accepted Israel's definition of acceptable Palestinians and abrogated its own letter of assurance. During a meeting with the delegation on 10 October 1991, Hanan Ashrawi has recalled that Baker "told us point-blank that Faisal [Husseini] and I would not be part of the official negotiations because the Israeli delegation must not be subjected to Palestinians carrying Jerusalem identity cards." Baker attempted to mollify the delegation by declaring that "We will continue to meet with you. Everybody will know who is leading and directing the negotiations, but the Israelis cannot be forced to meet with people they find unacceptable."(9) The Bush administration later recognized Faisal Husseini as 'Head of the Palestinian Team to the Peace Conference,'(10) but the pattern of sensitivity to Israel's viewpoint persisted.

The Americans continued to pressure the Palestinians to accept whatever 'autonomy' Israel offered, no matter how small the responsibility. The U.S. also decreed that rather than "expressing general views, the Palestinians had to take each specific item (for example, each sphere of operation), and state in detail to the Israeli side their points of agreement and disagreement."(11) In effect, the U.S. was driving the Palestinians to merely react to the Israeli agenda, despite Baker's rhetorical support of the delegation's formulation of interim self-government proposals.(12)

The style of U.S. mediation during the Clinton administration differed little from that under the Bush administration, though Clinton quickly established a reputation as the most pro-Israel of U.S. presidents. This reputation further encouraged Israel's hard-line negotiating stance. Despite a perception that Bush was tougher on Israel, his administration had adhered to the fundamentals of the strategic alliance. The Clinton administration's efforts to break the impasse between Israel and its Arab interlocutors were initially limited to the calling of weekly meetings between all delegations, but this failed to engender progress. In March 1993 the administration decided to take on the role of 'full partner', and its efforts to inject momentum included submitting draft proposals for joint Israel-Palestinian understandings on 12 May and, again, on 30 June 1993.(13) The proposals were ostensibly an attempt to clarify the aims of the negotiation process and synthesize the positions of each side. However, they exhibit the near-total American adoption of Israel's agenda. The proposals further alienated the Palestinian delegation, though in hindsight it is noteworthy that some minor details concede more to the Palestinians than Israel granted the PLO at Oslo.

The 12 May 1993 draft 'Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement' is a wide-ranging document. It reiterates the centrality of resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of a final status settlement, to be implemented subsequent to an interim period of Palestinian "self-government arrangements" in...