Harnessing Inertia to Improve Army Enlisted Service Length: A Case for Opt-Out Enlistment Contracts

• Author: Brian J. Miller,Lyle Hogue
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X18785380
• Published date: 01 January 2020
• Date: 01 January 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Harnessing Inertia

to Improve Army

Enlisted Service Length:

A Case for Opt-Out

Enlistment Contracts

Lyle Hogue

1

and Brian J. Miller

2

Abstract

Army recruiting, initial entry training, and retention enterprises consume tre-

mendous manpower resources and become disproportionately more expensive and

challenging as the size of the Army increases. Fortunately, empirical evidence sug-

gests that the Army could readily improve enlisted continuation rates by changing

enlistment contracts from its present form, requiring soldiers to reenlist or opt-in to

continue service, to open-ended enlistment contracts that require soldiers to opt-

out of service upon fulfilling their service obligations. Changing enlistment contracts

to an opt-out paradigm—similar to how officer populations are currently man-

aged—could greatly increase the number of soldiers who continue service past their

initial enlistment obligation. Improved continuation rates could save the Army

hundreds of millions in recruiting and reenlistment incentives, as well as freeing

thousands of Non-Commissioned Officers serving as recruiters, drill sergeants, and

retention specialist to support other operational requirements.

Keywords

defense policy, political science, public policy, recruitment/retention, military

effectiveness

1

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army – Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Washington, DC, USA

2

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Army, G1 Washington, DC, USA

Corresponding Author:

Brian J. Miller, Army G1, Washington, DC 20310, USA.

Email: brian.j.miller1@gmail.com

Armed Forces & Society

2020, Vol. 46(1) 116-131

ªThe Author(s) 2018

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X18785380

journals.sagepub.com/home/afs

Manning an organization as large and complex as the U.S. Army is no small chal-

lenge. The total Army force (Active, Reserve, and National Guard) consists of more

than 1 million soldiers, making it larger than any other employer in the United States

with the exception of Walmart. Complicating manning challenges beyond sheer size

are a myriad of laws, Department of Defense (DoD) directives, and Army policies

that further constrain personnel decisions. A few examples include mandatory end

strengths, limited lateral entry, rank distribution limits, mandatory promotion oppor-

tunities, and enlistment and reenlistment length requirements. Each of these limits

push manning decisions further from an optimal solution.

Congressionally established manning requirements—officially known as end

strength requirements—and policy limiting lateral entry constrain the Army to fill

structural personnel needs through accessions (recruiting), promotions, and reten-

tion.

1

Meeting end strength laws requires a delicate balance between new accessions

and loss management. Personnel managers must forecast both voluntary and invo-

luntary losses in order to backfill all losses fr om more junior populations. Any

change in separation behavior or end strength requirements necessitates adjustments

to recruiting and promotions to cover the difference.

Recruiting the right quality and quantity is a continual challenge due to compe-

tition with the civilian labor market, colleges, and other military services as well as a

decreasing eligible and propensed population (Mission Readiness, 2009). Recruiting

becomes increasingly more expensive when accessions targets are high because the

Army must invest in more advertising, a dditional recruiters, and larger bonu ses

(Heaton, Hosek, Martorell, Simon & Warner, 2010). Moreover, recruiters as well

as drill sergeants are Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) primarily in the ranks of

staff sergeant and sergeant first class that are consistently in high demand to fill

leadership and skilled technical positions throughout the Army.

On average, each new soldier costs the Army US$68,600 to recruit and train

(Army G1 Estimates).

2

When accession missions increase, total expenditures on

enlistment bonuses rapidly increase. This increase in spending results from both the

need to attract a wider segment of the population to Army service and the failure to

differentiate between recruits’ willingness to serve. Once enlistment bonuses

become available, all eligible recruits receive the bonus despite the fact that most

would join without a bonus.

3

Moreover, smaller accession requirements allow the

Army to be more selective, which leads to less attrition, hence fewer recruits (Con-

gressional Budget Office, 2006).

4

Common quality measures such as Armed Forces

Qualification Test scores, educational attainment, and various waivers point to

higher attrition for recruits with lower aptitude, less education, and a history of legal

problems (Army G1 Estimates).

Beyond budgetary impacts, the accessions and training enterprises consume a

large manning requirement at the expense of the operational force.

5

Soldiers under-

going initial entry training, along with instructors, administrators, and recruiters are

not available to combatant commanders for operational use. When Army end

strength is at steady state, approximately 6%of the enlisted population is undergoing

Hogue and Miller 117