The impact of the repeat-voting-habit persistence phenomenon on the probability of voting in presidential elections.

AuthorCebula, Richard J.
PositionStatistical table
  1. Introduction

    The purpose of this study is to develop and test a probability model of individual voting behavior under the assumption that, when voting for the Office of the President, all potential voters are affected at the margin by the expected costs and benefits of voting. Additionally, some potential voters will have higher voting probabilities that are independent of such considerations. These voters may be independently motivated by external and/or internal factors that are captured under the umbrella of what is referred to here as the "repeat-voting-habit persistence phenomenon." The latter might reasonably be interpreted so as to include the impact of "social conditioning." According to Tollison and Willett (1973), unless social conditioning is accounted for, empirical voting models will not be completely specified and estimates of turnout on individual voting probabilities will be biased. Specifically, Tollison and Willett (1973, p. 61) argue that:

    Where social conditioning has affected individuals' response patterns in a significant manner, for instance, by instilling in individuals a sense of duty to vote, then to be useful, explanatory models must take this into account, even if this comes at the cost of the disciplinary pureness of the resultant model. Interestingly, some years after this work by Tollison and Willett (1973), Knack (1992) provided a perspective and empirical findings that seem to smoothly interface with the notion of social conditioning. In particular, in the Knack study, voting is regarded as a collective action problem, one that is overcome by means of solidarity and purposive selective incentives. Specifically, Knack finds empirical support for the hypothesis that enforcement of voting norms through social sanctions significantly augments voter participation. Within this framework, the decline in voter turnout in the United States in recent decades is interpreted in terms of a weakening of social ties, which adversely affects the socialization and enforcement of those norms responsible for generating civic participation. The latter argument is echoed frequently in the well-known nonempirical work of Putnam (2000, pp. 31-3).

    To date, very little empirical work has attempted to measure how social conditioning, or a related pllenomenon such as that found in Knack (1992), might influence general election voting behavior. One exception is the recent study by Matsusaka and Palda (1999). Although the primary focus of the Matsusaka and Palda (1999) study is the relative lack of explanatory power for empirical voting models, the effect of internal, unobserved factors on voting is briefly analyzed. A basic assumption of Matsusaka and Palda (1999) is that individuals who voted in a previous election have a higher probability of voting in a current election. Underlying this assumption is a corollary, namely, that consecutive-election voters are motivated by socially conditioned internal factors that are not controlled for in standard Downs (1957) rational interest models. To correct this shortcoming, the Matsusaka and Palda (1999) model includes a dummy variable, whose value equals 1 if the respondent voted in the immediately previous election and whose value is 0 otherwise. The variable is always very statistically significant, suggesting that consecutive-election voters are different from those who are not consecutive-election voters.

    The present study seeks to extend and refine the procedures introduced by Matsusaka and Palda (1999). To begin with, we use data on individual voting in two consecutive Presidential elections. Adopting this data set, we then integrate the "repeat-voting-habit persistence phenomenon" (or simply, REPVOTHAB) into the empirical analysis. This hypothesis argues that a factor or variety of factors such as (i) social conditioning and/or (ii) some logic-based or education-based reasoning involving recognition of the need to vote in order to preserve democracy and freedom and/or (iii) family-instilled values or observed family voting behaviors, and/or (iv) perhaps even a simple psychologically generated "habit" of "mechanically" voting for President per se combine to result in a situation in which those persons who have voted in a given Presidential election are more likely to vote in the following one, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the present study empirically demonstrates that, although the exact processes cannot be easily identified, the REPVOTHAB phenomenon (which we argue does include social conditioning and/or related phenomena) appears to systematically affect voting among the respondents in the data sample. These results can be interpreted as supporting the Tollison and Willett (1973) view (and presumably that of Knack [1992]) that unless the repeat-voter-habit phenomenon (inclusive of social conditioning) is accounted for, flawed estimates of voter turnout and of individual voting probabilities will be the likely result.

    Section 2 of this study provides a brief survey of the related empirical literature and establishes the basis for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Data limitations prevent incorporation of all previously used variables, but the most consistently statistically significant influences are accounted for. In section 3, we modify the rational voter model to include the repeat-voting-habit persistence phenomenon. In section 4, we create a measure for the REPVOTHAB variable and incorporate this variable into a regression using the overall sample of those who were potential voters in 1984. In section 5, we stratify the data and empirically demonstrate that white males who voted in the 1980 Presidential election had a much higher probability of voting in 1984 than those who did not vote in the 1980 Presidential election. This is partly due to differences in mean values and in coefficient estimates between the two subgroups. Using the decomposition technique developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) for use in wage and income discrimination studies, we isolate those portions of the total probability differential that are attributable to mean and coefficient differences. After this adjustment, a substantial probability differential remains. We attribute this probability differential to the components of the REPVOTHAB phenomenon, which includes (among other things) differing social conditioning and differing internal voting motivations as between those who did and did not vote in the 1980 Presidential election. A summary of the results and their implications are presented in section 6.

  2. A Review of Empirical Studies of Voting Behavior

    As Tullock (2006, p. 41) observes, since the modern introduction of rational interest as a primary voting motivation (i.e., the rational voter model [Downs 1957; Black 1958; Buchanan and Tullock 1962]), general election voting has been extensively tested using a wide variety of variables, methodologies, and data. The common assumption among these studies is that politicians and constituents maximize a political utility function, which incorporates both the expected costs and expected benefits of voting. Empirical results are rather mixed, but the Downs (1957) rational interest theory of voting is largely supported.

    Early studies focused on the marginal effects of closeness, income, age, race, gender, concurrent elections (such as in the Senate or House of Representatives), and other factors on the probability that an individual will or will not vote or that average voter turnout will increase or decrease. Examples of important works include the study of individual voting by Ashenfelter and Kelly (1975), cross-section studies of turnout by Tollison and Willett (1973) and Silberman and Durden (1975), and the excellent early survey paper by Foster (1984), which summarizes the literature on empirical voting models up to that point. An outstanding, somewhat more recent contribution to the individual voting literature that is pertinent to the present study is that by Knack (1992), as is summarized above.

    Somewhat more recent work by Durden and Gaynor (1987) tried to bring the empirical analysis up to date and to extend or refine the basic model. Even more recent refinements and extensions include new analyses of the following: (i) the effect of closeness on voter turnout (Kirchgassner and Zu Himmern 1997; Grofman, Collett...

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