H. Receiving Stolen Goods

• Library: The Criminal Law of South Carolina (SCBar) (2014 Ed.)

H. Receiving Stolen Goods

1. The Current Statute

The common law offense of receiving stolen goods is now codified as follows:

It is unlawful for a person to buy, receive, or possess stolen goods, chattels, or other property if the person knows or has reason to believe the goods, chattels, or property is stolen. A person is guilty of this offense whether or not anyone is convicted of the theft of the property.
* * * For the purposes of this section, the receipt of multiple items in a single transaction or event constitutes a single offense.

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-13-180 (Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). An amendment effective July 1, 1993, added the emphasized language. Prior to that time the statute provided that "[i]t is unlawful for any person knowingly to buy or receive stolen goods . . . ." Id. (1985) (emphasis added).

The elements of the offense were once described by the South Carolina Supreme Court as: "First, were the goods stolen; and, second, did the appellants receive them knowing them to be stolen and with a fraudulent intent?" State v. Rickenbaker, 187 S.C. 448, 451, 198 S.E. 43, 44 (1938). This description must now be modified to accommodate the alternative objective mental state provided by the 1993 amendment. For a complete analysis of the crime one must add to the above the requirements that the goods must have been stolen by someone other than the receiver, State v. Tindall, 213 S.C. 484, 50 S.E.2d 188 (1948), and that the goods retained their characteristic stolen status at the time they were received. United States v. Dove, 629 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1980).

Thus a comprehensive list of elements of the crime includes the following: (1) one must come into possession of goods that were stolen by another; (2) the goods must retain the character of stolen property at the time they are received; (3) the recipient of the goods must have known or have had reason to believe that they were stolen; and (4) at least under pre July 1, 1993 law, the receiving of the goods must have been with a fraudulent intent.

2. Elements

a. The Goods Must Have Been Stolen By Another

To establish the first element of the crime it must be shown that the goods in question were taken and carried away from the owner by a thief and then delivered to the receiver. State v. Tindall, 213 S.C. 484, 50 S.E.2d 188 (1948). The facts of Tindall are as follows: Mr. Cade, at the cotton warehouse of his employer, was approached by Tindall, who asked him about several bags of cotton on the warehouse floor. Cade replied that the bags belonged to his employer; Tindall then offered a sum of money for them that was far less than their actual value. Cade accepted the money, and Tindall put the bags in his wagon and took them away. Finding that it was reasonable to infer that the payment to Cade was to secure his acquiescence in the theft and noting that Cade had not participated in the carrying away of the goods, the Supreme Court reversed Tindall's conviction for receiving stolen goods, stating:

[T]he acts involved in depriving the owner of his possession of the cotton were without question committed by the appellant. If larceny was committed he committed it. And he cannot be guilty of having received stolen goods, because there is no evidence that the goods were stolen unless they were stolen by him.

213 S.C. at 491, 50 S.E.2d at 191. The crime of larceny must, therefore, be completed before delivery to the receiver can be made. Otherwise the "receiver" is probably a thief rather than a receiver.

The Tindall Court also noted that one who had some role in the theft, acting as an accessory before or after the fact, can be convicted of receiving stolen goods if such person did not participate in "the actual caption and asportation" of the goods. 213 S.C. at 489, 50 S.E.2d at 190. Accord State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 205 S.E.2d 827 (1974); State v. Sweat, 221 S.C. 270, 70 S.E.2d 234 (1952). Likewise, one who conspired to commit the larceny may nonetheless be convicted of conspiracy and of receiving stolen goods if he had no active role in their theft. State v. Rutledge, 232 S.C. 223, 101 S.E.2d 289 (1957). One's status as co-conspirator does not automatically render him a principal in the commission of the substantive offense which was the object of the conspiracy. Id. at 228, 101 S.E.2d at 291. See Chapter IV.E. Parties to Criminal Offenses, infra. There is an annotation on constructive possession of stolen goods in 30 A.L.R.4th 488 (1984).

The fact that the offense of receiving stolen goods requires the goods to have been stolen by another keeps the offense from being a lesser included offense of the crime of larceny. State v. McNeil, 314 S.C. 473, 445 S.E.2d 461 (1994); State v. Martin, 278 S.C. 256, 294 S.E.2d 345 (1982); State v. Sweat, 221 S.C. 270, 70 S.E.2d 234 (1952). Consequently, a court has no jurisdiction to accept a plea of guilty to receiving stolen goods on a charge of larceny, absent written waiver. In re Interest of Jason T., 340 S.C. 455, 531 S.E.2d 544 (Ct. App. 2000), overruled by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 63, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005) (family court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a juvenile delinquent for receiving stolen property on a petition charging petit larceny).

The goods must in fact have been stolen, and this element, like any other, must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. A record of another's conviction for the theft of the goods creates only prima facie evidence that they were stolen; such evidence is not necessarily conclusive. State v. Daniels, 80 S.C. 368, 61 S.E. 1073 (1908). It is, of course, no defense that the thief did not know the identity of the actual owner of the goods. Sweat, 221 S.C. 270, 70 S.E.2d 234 (1952). See Section B, Larceny, supra. It is not necessary that the recipient of the stolen property receive all of the goods that were stolen, nor that he receive all of them at the same time. State v. Crawford, 39 S.C. 343, 17 S.E. 799 (1893).

The statute explicitly provides that one is guilty of receiving stolen property regardless of whether anyone has been convicted of having stolen it. Nonetheless, that someone did steal it most definitely is an element of the offense and must be established at the receiver's trial by proof beyond a reasonable doubt just as any other element of a crime must be established.

b. Goods Must Still Be "Stolen" at Time of Receipt

Not only must the goods have been stolen, they must retain their stolen status at the time the receiver acquires possession. Once the property has been recovered by its owner or by someone acting on his behalf, it is no longer stolen property for the purposes of this offense. Perkins and Boyce, 399-400. This issue typically develops when law enforcement personnel intervene before the goods have been received, typically by apprehending the thief, but then allow the scenario to unfold and arrest the receiver of the goods when he subsequently obtains possession. The South Carolina Supreme Court has not addressed this issue.

In the New York case of People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906), a clerk stole goods from his employer but was apprehended before he was able to rendezvous with his receiver. The goods were marked, and the clerk was directed to deliver them as he and the receiver had planned. Although the prosecution conceded at trial that the goods were no longer stolen, Jaffe was convicted of attempting to receive stolen goods. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that a person cannot be convicted of even the lesser offense of attempting to receive stolen goods when, in fact, the goods are no longer stolen goods. Id. (In South Carolina, the attempt to receive stolen goods prosecution would fail unless the goods in question were worth more than $1,000 because an attempt to commit a misdemeanor is not an indictable offense.) State v. Redmon, 121 S.C. 139, 113 S.E. 467 (1922). See Chapter IV.D. Attempt.

The Fourth Circuit case of United States v. Dove, 629 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1980), appears to make a distinction between goods that have been recovered by law enforcement agents who hold such goods as trustee for the true owner and goods over which the agent does not have control but which he has under observation. In Dove, an FBI operative posed as a used car salesman; he purchased a stolen car with money provided by the FBI. It was then sold to Morrow, who believed the car to be stolen. In holding that the car was no longer stolen property and that Morrow could not, therefore, be convicted for receiving stolen goods, the Court noted:

The car sat on the lot of Apache Auto Sales in the actual and exclusive possession of the F.B.I. and its operative, Baker, for over a month. Morrow undoubtedly believed he was buying a stolen car . . . [T]hat bad purpose, standing alone, will not support a conviction.

Id. at 329.

Baker also helped Hutto steal two bulldozers, which Hutto then sold to the defendants Dove and Johnston. Finding that "Baker was at all times acting under the general criminal design of Hutto," the court held that even though Baker had possession of the bulldozers at one point, this was not recovery and "[t]he conduct of Baker in the theft and sale . . . should be viewed as a form of observation." Id.

In Barnes v. United States, 313 A.2d 106 (D.C. App. 1973), a private investigator was hired and assigned as helper to a salesman suspected of theft. The salesman stole some goods and sold them to Barnes; the investigator unloaded the goods while the salesman collected from the receiver. It was held that the investigator had not recovered the goods. Id. at 109. Apparently, the distinction rests on the element of control, but the status of the law in this area is unsettled. As the Dove Court observed:

In applying this body of law we do not pretend that the cases speak with one voice and make inevitable the result we reach. We look instead to the purpose of the rule and of the distinction between "recovery"

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