H Franks Hearings

• Library: Illinois Decisions on Search and Seizure (2017 Ed.)

H. Franks Hearings

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (Here, during the defendant's trial, the trial court admitted evidence that was obtained pursuant to the execution of a search warrant. The police officers' affidavit in support of the search warrant noted the victim's description of her assailant and the police officers' attempt to confirm that defendant's outfit matched that of the assailant. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence but the State court held that a criminal defendant does not have the right to challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by the police to procure the search warrant. HELD: Although an affidavit supporting a search warrant is presumed to be valid, an affidavit for a warrant that is facially valid can be challenged assuming it can be established there is false information within. In order to "go behind" an affidavit at a suppression hearing, there must be a preliminary showing of "deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth," not attributable to "negligence or innocent mistake," accompanied by a substantial showing of proof, and the false information must have been necessary to the finding of probable cause that was relied on to issue the warrant. Information deliberately or recklessly omitted from the affidavit that may have affected the probable cause determination may likewise entitle the defendant to a Franks hearing. The defendant must prove his claim of perjury or reckless inclusion of false information by a preponderance of evidence. If the affidavit still supports probable cause without the false or omitted information, the search warrant remains valid. In this case, the matter is remanded for further proceedings in State court).

People v. Chambers, 2016 IL 117911, 25 N.E.3d 660 (An officer filed a complaint for a search warrant for a house, which he and a "John Doe" confidential informant signed and swore to in the presence of a judge. The complaint stated that the officer had been a police officer for 11 years and that he had been investigating suspected narcotics sales from the house for three months based on numerous calls about marijuana sales by defendant. The complaint detailed how "John Doe" and two other men were stopped in their vehicle and detained on the previous day for drug related offenses and that on that day "John Doe" was in possession of marijuana that he had purchased from defendant at the house. The complaint stated that the officer knew "John Doe" because he had previously assisted the officer in other narcotics and weapons cases. The officer stated in the complaint that the "John Doe" had been inside of defendant's residence on multiple occasions, and had seen marijuana and firearms in the house. The complaint stated that the "John Doe" was able to identify defendant's mug shot and sign it on the back. The judge signed a search warrant, and on its authority police entered defendant's house. Inside, officers found large quantities of marijuana and cocaine, $52,000 in cash, several types of ammunition, a loaded assault rifle, three handguns, two shotguns, and two rifles. Defendant, who was alone in the house at the time, was charged with multiple counts of armed violence, UUW by felon, possession with intent to deliver over 900 grams of cocaine, and various other drug possession charges. Defendant filed a motion for a Franks hearing, alleging that the officer either knew the allegations in the complaint were false or that he made the statements with reckless disregard for the truth. Defendant claimed that the officer's statements that he had known the "John Doe" for over a year and that "John Doe" had assisted him in several cases was false, as the officer had only been employed by the city's police department for three days when he applied for the warrant. Claims that the officer had been investigating drug sales at this house for three months were false for the same reason. Defendant attached four affidavits from family members and a family friend swearing that defendant was not at the house when the "John Doe" alleged to have purchased drugs from him. Defendant also pointed out discrepancies in the warrant application; specifically, that the address that the "John Doe" was arrested at did not exist. In response, the State argued that, because the "John Doe" informant had been present in front of the judge at the warrant hearing, this case "clearly falls outside the scope of Franks," so the trial court would "need not address whether the defendant made a substantial preliminary showing" that the complaint contained statements that were deliberately false or that were made with reckless disregard of their truth. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a Franks hearing. In so ruling, the court noted that one of the affidavits was from an unrelated friend of defendant and that the friend worked as a dispatcher for the city's law enforcement agency. It also noted that if the stop of the "John Doe" took place at the address listed on the warrant complaint, the stop would have occurred "in the middle of a forest preserve." These factors led the court to conclude that the warrant affidavit contained "deliberately included falsehoods or there was a reckless disregard for the truth." The case was transferred to another judge, who set a date for a Franks hearing. On the date off the hearing, the State filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that defendant had not made the requisite preliminary showing for two reasons. First, the State asserted the incorrect address of the "John Doe" stop in the warrant complaint was due to typographical errors and that the original arrest report for the "John Doe" stop contained the correct address. Second, the State pointed out the affidavit from defendant's friend stated that the friend was with defendant between 11 a.m. and 2:30 p.m.; but the "John Doe" claimed to have purchased drugs from defendant at 4:30 p.m. Only defendant's family members claimed to have seen defendant late in the afternoon. The defense responded to the motion to reconsider, arguing that the motion was untimely because it was "filed a year and a half after the Franks hearing had been granted" and that, on the merits, defendant had made the requisite substantial preliminary showing to entitle him to a Franks hearing. This second trial court judge granted the State's motion to reconsider, following the rule established in People v. Gorosteata, 374 Ill. App. 3d 203, 870 N.E.2d 936 (2007), that a Franks hearing is not required when a confidential informant appeared in front of a judge at the warrant proceeding. Defendant next filed a second motion for a Franks hearing, which reasserted his original arguments. The second motion was accompanied by a video-recorded statement of teenager who had been arrested during the "John Doe" stop. Although the teenager, who was defendant's cousin, claimed that he did not tell the police that he had purchased drugs from defendant, and he asserted "he did not identify or sign a mug shot of defendant; he did not sign an affidavit for a search warrant; and he did not appear before the judge who issued the search." Defendant alleged that this teenager was the "John Doe" informant that the officer relied upon in his warrant complaint. The second motion for a Franks hearing also alleged that the officer lied about being a police officer for eleven years. Defendant claimed that, although the officer had previously been employed by another city's police department, the officer had been dismissed by the other city's police department and had not been employed as a police officer for a significant of time period prior to being hired by the current city's police department only days before defendant's arrest. The State denied that the teenager was the "John Doe" informant. The State urged the court to reject the teenager's statement because he was defendant's cousin and the statement had been recorded in defendant's attorney's office. The court denied defendant's motion, again relying on Gorosteata, and stated that the warrant complaint was "sufficient on its face for probable cause." Defendant filed a third motion for a Franks hearing. Attached to the third motion was an affidavit from another man who had been arrested in the "John Doe" stop. This affiant claimed to be the "John Doe" informant that the officer had used in the warrant complaint. This man also claimed to have signed a false affidavit claiming that he bought drugs from defendant because the officer had threatened him with five years in prison if he did not do so. This affiant asserted the marihuana he possessed in his vehicle was in fact stolen in an armed robbery. The man finally claimed that (1) he had never been an informant for police before this date; (2) the officer's claims that he had previously used the affiant as a "John Doe" informant were false; and (3) the officer coached him on what to say before he was brought in front of the judge to sign the warrant complaint. At the hearing on this third motion, the State argued that, under Gorosteata, no Franks hearing need be granted when the informant appeared before a judge at a warrant proceeding. The court denied defendant's third Franks motion, again relying on Gorosteata. The cases then

proceeded to trial. A jury found defendant guilty of armed violence and possession with intent to deliver. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying him a Franks hearing. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction, rejecting "the premise that a Franks hearing is never warranted if the informant who provides information necessary to the issuance of a warrant appears before a magistrate." The court held that the appearance of an informant before a magistrate is only "one factor to consider in determining whether to grant a Franks hearing," and that if a defendant "has evidence that the affiant-officer acted intentionally or with reckless disregard for the...