Guilty Pleas

• Author: Anthony G. Amsterdam/Martin Guggenheim/Randy A. Hertz
• Profession: University Professor and Professor of Law at New York University/Fiorello LaGuardia Professor of Clinical Law at New York University School of Law/Professor of Clinical Law at NYU School of Law
• Pages: 297-351

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CHAPTER 14

GUILTY PLEAS

PART A . INT RODUCTION

§ 14.01 Guilty Pleas in Juvenile Court

In all jurisdictions a juvenile respondent can enter a gu ilty plea in a delinquency case,

just as an adult defendant can in a cr iminal case. Many of the standards and procedures

for entry of a guilty plea in juvenile court are identical to t hose followed in adult crimi-

nal court. But there are some significant differences, which will be highlighted in t his

introductory sect ion and then discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow.

The major difference between guilty pleas in adult court and gu ilty pleas in juve-

nile court is that one primary form of adult court plea barga ining—pleadi ng to a lesser

offense in order to reduce the max imum possible sentence to which the adult defendant

is exposed—is inapplicable in the juvenile courts of most jurisdictions. The most com-

mon juvenile court statutory scheme empowers a judge at sentencing (or “disposition”)

to impose the same indeterminate sentence regardless of the nature or severity of the

offense for which the respondent has been convicted (or to which the respondent has

pled guilty). See § 38.03(c) infra. With what is perhaps the greatest single incentive for

guilty pleas in adult court withdrawn, defense attorneys i n juvenile court must consider

and evaluate other potential advantages of gu ilty pleas. These include, for example, pros-

ecutorial commitments to support a particular sentence. See § 14 .06 infra.

Another signif icant difference between guilty pleas in adult and juvenile courts

stems from the involvement of the parent in juvenile court pleas. It is clear in juvenile

court, as it is in adult court, that the ultimate decision whether to plead guilty must be

left to the client and that a defense attorney can not plead a client guilty, or not guilty,

against the client’s will. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 753 n.6 (1983) (dictum);

Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). Under this same logic the juvenile client’s right

to decide whether to plead guilty can not be abrogated in favor of the client’s parent. Cf.

Smith v. State, 484 So. 2d 560, 561 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (in Miranda context, court

expla ins that ju st as attorney cannot waiv e client’s rights a gainst self-incri mination, p ar-

ent cannot waive rights of his or her child); In re S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 512–13 (Min n.

1979) (parent cannot waive Miranda rights of child); In the Matter of Butts, 157 N.C. App.

609, 614, 582 S.E.2d 279, 283 (2003) (a statute establishing procedures for police inter-

rogation of juveniles “protects the rights of t he juvenile, which his parent can not waive

on his behalf ”). Indeed, the parent’s interests or goals may often be antagonistic to those

298 | Trial M anual for Defense Attorne ys in Juvenile Delinquency Ca ses

of the child (see § 4.04 supra), and thus the parent would be a highly suspect g uardian

of the child’s right to choose between pleading guilt y and contesting the case at trial. In

some jurisdictions, however, a judge who accepts a plea from a juvenile must ensu re that

the child’s parent is aware of the plea and acquiesces in the child’s decision to forgo the

constitutional r ight to trial. See §§ 14.24 , 14.2 6(a) infra.

§ 14.02 Organization of the Chapter; Terminology

This chapter will begin by examini ng the factors affect ing the choice to plead guilty

(§§ 14.0 3–14.12 infra) and will then discuss plea negotiations with the prosecutor

(§§ 14.13 –14.18 infra), counseling the client (and parent) on the decision whether to

plead guilty (§§ 14.19 –14.24 infra), procedures at the plea hearing (§§ 14. 25–14. 28), an d

procedures for subsequently withdrawing or challenging t he validity of a gui lty plea

(§§ 14.29–14.31). Under a strictly chronological organization the topic of plea negotia-

tions, of course, would precede a discussion of the criteria for assessing the plea offer

that has been ext racted through the negotiations. But since a cost-benefit analysis of the

value of a plea must inform each step of counsel’s work in this area, including prepara-

tion for the plea negotiation session, the cost-benefit analysis will be taken up f irst.

In many jurisd ictions the term “admission” is employed in juvenile court as a euphe-

mism for the term “guilty plea.” This terminology reflects t he notion that a juvenile

cannot be found “guilty” of a “crime,” and therefore can merely “admit” to the status of

being a “juvenile delinquent.” The term “guilty plea” nevertheless will be used in this

chapter and throughout this book, si nce it provides the most accurate description of the

actual process a nd consequences involved in a juvenile’s entry of an “admission.” The

term “guilty plea” also avoids the confusion engendered by the use of the term “admis-

sion” for both confessions to the police and gui lty pleas.

In several jurisd ictions the term “disposition” is often used in both juvenile court

and adult court as a substitute for the term “guilty plea.” In order to avoid confusion

with the “disposition” (sentencing) phase of a juvenile case, the term “disposition” will

not be used in connection with guilty pleas and will be used solely to refer to a juvenile

sentence.

PART B. THE DECISION WHETHER TO PLEAD

GUILTY OR GO TO TRIAL: FACTORS

TO CONSIDER IN MAKING THE DECISION

§ 14.03 Overview of the Cost-Benefit Analysis Involved in

Deciding Whether to Plead Guilty or Go to Tri al

The determination of the advisability of a guilty plea usually requires a complex cost-

benefit analysis that takes into account: (i) the likeli hood of winning t he case at trial;

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(ii)the chances that t he judge, in the event of conviction, would pena lize the respondent

at sentencing for going to trial and—i n the judge’s opinion—wasting the court’s time

and (if the respondent testifies) perjuring himself or herself on the witness stand; and

(iii) the advantages that could be gained through a gu ilty plea. Even a very likely vic-

tory at trial might be bar tered away for the invaluable sentencing advantage, available in

many jurisdict ions, of probation without verdict (with the eventual outcome of dismissal

of the case and expungement of arre st records). On the other hand, a juvenile respondent

could reasonably opt for trial even in the face of overwhelming prosecution evidence,

when a guilty plea is un likely to produce any sentencing advantages.

§ 14.04 Assessing the Likelihood of Winning at Trial

The threshold determinat ion of the chances of acquittal at trial will require far more

than a simple weighing of the relative merits of the prosecution’s and defense’s compet-

ing theories of the case. Counsel’s calculus will have to incorporate a host of variables

tha t are d iffi cult t o predi ct, su ch as t he lik ely re solutio n of deb atable i ssues of adm issibi l-

ity of specific evidentia ry items, the odds of a prosecution or defense wit ness failing to

appear for trial (and the likely response of the judge to such a failure to appear), and the

effect of the judge’s application of a variety of presumptions a nd other legal doctrines.

§ 14.04(a) The Strength of the C ase for the Prosecution

The first step is, of course, to a nalyze the streng th of the prosecution’s case and the

prosecutor’s ability both to make out a prima facie case (thereby overcoming a defense

motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the prosecutor’s case-in-ch ief) and to sust ain a

guilty verdict at the conclusion of the trial. Counsel should begin by examining the

Petition and listing all of the elements that the prosecution wi ll need to prove in order

to sustain each of the counts of the Petition. Then, using the information that counsel

has learned through discover y and investigation, counsel should analyze t he prosecutor’s

ability to prove each of these facts w ith the witnesses, doc uments, and exhibits believed

to be available to the prosecution.

If counsel has learned th rough investigation that a prosecut ion witness will be out

of town or otherwise unavailable on the trial date, counsel w ill need to predict whether

the prosecutor will be able to procu re a continuance in order to arrange t he witness’s

presence, or whether the judge is likely to grant a defense motion for dismissal for want

of prosecut ion. See § 15. 03 infra. If counsel has learned through invest igation that a

prosecution witness is reluct ant to come to court, counsel will need to predict whether

the prosecutor will b e able to secure the witnes s’s presence through judicial enforcement

of a subpoena. Counsel will a lso need to predict whether, in the event that the wit-

ness’s presence cannot be secured, the prosecution will be able to make its case without

that witness. Simi larly, if counsel can predict that certain necessary documents w ill be

unavailable on the trial date—for example, in many jurisdictions, tape recordings of

911 phone calls, which the prosec ution must turn over to the defense, a re routinely

erased before the time when the prosecutor gets around to requesting them from the