Guerrilla Statesmanship: Constitutionalizing an Ethic of Dissent

• Author: Chad B. Newswander
• Date: 01 January 2015
• Published date: 01 January 2015
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12293

Chad B. Newswander is assistant

professor in the Department of Political

Science at the University of South Dakota.

His research focuses on administrative

statesmanship, administrative law, admin-

istrative ethics, power and politics, and

constitutional governance.

E-mail: chad.newswander@usd.edu

126 Public Administration Review • January | February 2015

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 75, Iss. 1, pp. 126–134. © 2014 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12293.

action resulted in another round of reprisal—his

weekly days of‌f were moved to Friday and Saturday

instead of Saturday and Sunday.

Stemming from these retaliatory responses, Dill

charged that his First Amendment rights had been

violated.  e free speech clause granted him both

power to subvert his superiors’ wishes and protection

from the ensuing retaliation.  e Tenth Circuit Court

of Appeals accepted Dill’s claim, arguing that his state-

ments amounted to a matter of public concern. His

actions in expressing these sentiments were not found

to impede the ability of the district attorney’s of‌f‌i ce

or the police department to properly function, and

no managerial harm was substantiated. As a result,

Dill’s opposition to the direct recommendations of his

bosses was vindicated.

 is type of dissent, as described by Rosemary

O’Leary, involves “the actions taken by career public

servants who work against the wishes—either implic-

itly or explicitly communicated—of their superiors”

(2014, xi). Even though guerrilla government is

Abstract: According to judicial precedents, administrators informed by their expertise can speak on issues of public

concern under First Amendment protections. In one sense, they could dissent by working against their employers in

an attempt to direct issues of public concern through an educational function.  e power to act like a statesman in

raising such issues allows administrators to lead from behind and in front, as long as certain judicial thresholds are

met. However, the U.S. Supreme Court recently moved to tighten the scope of such activity.  is article assesses how

an ethic of dissent has been translated into a constitutional perspective that at f‌i rst was moderately constrained and

later became very restricted. While the move to limit an ethic of dissent provides necessary constraints, it also may have

weakened administrators’ ability to perform necessary statesmanship acts rooted in guerrilla government to achieve the

common good.

Practitioner Points

• Employees must accept that their initial title or role is that of a citizen.

• As citizens, administrators have the power to speak out, occasionally even following an ethic of dissent in

order to resist and reveal employer mandates.

• Because the Supreme Court has granted employees with First Amendment protections, civil servants must

be aware of the nuances and protections granted to them.

•  e ability to speak out allows administrators to have the opportunity to elevate their vision and act like a

guerrilla statesman in educating the public about the common good.

Guerrilla Statesmanship: Constitutionalizing

an Ethic of Dissent

Chad B. Newswander

University of South Dakota

Jimmy Ray Slaughter was the prime suspect in a

double homicide, accused of killing his daughter

and her mother in their Oklahoma home.

Witnesses conf‌i rmed that Slaughter was present

near the residence during the time of the murders,

which was further corroborated by the autopsy. Even

with this evidence, Detective Dennis Dill of the

Edmond Police Department had an alternative theory

of the crime. He rejected the evidence that pointed

to Slaughter and raised his theory about the crime to

his superiors, who explicitly told him “not to pursue

it further because it might ‘muddy the water’” (Dill v.

City of Edmond Oklahoma, 155 F. 3d 1193, 1200

[10th Cir. 1998]). Dill, however, did not comply with

this command.

His f‌i rst act of insubordination was his refusal to be

cajoled into writing a police report that contained

what he perceived to be false information.  is failure

to comply resulted in his demotion to patrol of‌f‌i cer.

His next act of def‌i ance was to write a letter to the

chief of police regarding “exculpatory evidence” that

the district attorney’s of‌f‌i ce needed to possess.  is